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PREFACE
Friedrich von Holstein, a Vortragender Rat in the 
Berlin Foreign Office, influenced German foreign policy dur­
ing the Wllhelr.t&n Bra. He appeared as the controversial and 
mysterious figure who guided the Second Reich through the era 
of Veltpolitlk. Holstein’s contemporaries, as well as histo­
rians, asserted that his influence was a contributive factor 
In causing Germany to fight World War I. To ascertain the 
extent of his influence, on© must consider his actions in a 
particular instance. The purpose of this study, therefore, is 
to examine a specific diplomatic incident and, at least in 
this instance, place in proper perspective Holstein’s in­
fluence on German foreign policy. A significant problem, 
which permits an examination of his influence, is the attempt 
at an alliance between Great Britain and Germany in 1901.
Germany, since the Bismarckian Era, had always ex­
pressed an interest in concluding an alliance with Great 
Britain. Her leaders realised that the geographic position 
of Germany exposed her frontiers to French and Russian at­
tack and that only a British alliance would provide the pro­
tection against possible invasion. The possibility of Ger­
many concluding such an agreement arore during 1901, but 
the proposal failed to materialize. Failure to conclude an
iil
alliance supposedly resulted from the actions of none other 
than Friedrich von Holstein*
# # # «•
For matters of simplification and clarification the 
following changes have been carried out through the entire 
text* In place of umlauted German letters an **eH has been 
inserted* and all headings on diplomatic exchanges have been 
limited to the surname of the correspondent*
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CHAPT'TI I
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE BISMARCKIAN ERA
On April 21^ , 1337# Friedrich von Holstein was b o m  
at Schwedt an den Oder.^* As a member of an old Mecklenburg 
family, Holstein inherited, along with a tradition of mili­
tary service, a fairly substantial fortune. His parents, 
Karoline and August von Holstein, provided their only child
with the normal upbringing due a son of the lower Prussian 
o
nobility. Ee spent ills first eleven years at the country 
estate of freeenow with occasional journeys to B e r l i n . 3 
Young Friedrich had, for the most part, a happy childhood, 
but at times he exhibited a wi fchuravr and quiet side to his 
character. His tendency to withdraw, which later contributed 
to his gloomy disposition, he Inherited from his father 
PJhen Revolution came In 13*|.3, the elder Holstein
^Helmuth Rogge (el.), Friedrich von Holstein Lebens-
bekenntnia im Briefer an elne Frau (BerllyTj ¥ er lag Ull3t ein,
I9J£), pp. 3—U-"* Her"eaTF--:-r ~cTteT~as Rogge, Lehensbekenntnla.
2q. P. Gooch, "Holstein* Oracle of the Wilhelmstras- 
36*” Studies In German History (Hew Yorki Longmans, Green and 
Co., l^liB), p. 391. Hereafter cited as Gooch, Holstein Oracle.
^Norman Rich and K. H. Fisher (ed.), The Holstein 
Papers (£4. vols•; Cambridge: At the University Press, 195?-
196377 1# x. Hereafter cited as Holstein Pape >s.
^Rogge, Lob er. s b ek enn tn 1 a, pp. xvi -xvi i , I4
2sold his estate and moved his family to Karlstein, the home
of his sister, Mlnne von Holtzendorff, near Zehden an der
Oder.'* At Karlstein Friedrick formed a close friendship with
his cousin and life-lor.g correspondent, Ida von Btuelpnagel,
nee Holtzendorff.^ During the lP60fs, as their friendship
grew, the family circle expected ^rledrich and Ida to marry,
ribut they remained only confidential friends# *
The Holstein family, when not In Karlstein, resided
n
in Berlin or traveled in France, Switzerland, and Italy#
On the family trips abroad Friedrick developed a great facil­
ity in foreign languages which later contributed to his rapid 
rise In the diplomatic service
Holstein's education was under the supervision of a 
private tutor until lS£3, when he entered the University of 
Berlin# He concentrated his studies In the area of law, but 
his real interest was for a military career# Holstein, while 
at the University, attempted to enter the army but failed to 
pass his medical examination.^* H© soon obtained his law de-
^Holstein Papers. Ill, 3*
^Throughout his life, Holstein maintained an avid
correspondence with Ida von 3tuolpnagel to whom ho revealed a 
great deal of information concerning his role in the Foreign 
Office. These letters provided on© of the first major, reli­
able sources dealing with Holstein as published in Hogg©, 
Leben sbekennfcn i s•
^Rogge, Leben abek enntn1s, p. xiv# 
^Holstein Panere, I, x. -       __  Ay   * W
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 391. ^%olstein ihpers, I, x
3gree, and in l8£6 he entered th© Prussian civil service. For 
the next four years he served as an official In the City 
Court of Berlin.^ It was during these years that Count Al­
fred von Schlieffen, later Chief of the Prussian General 
Staff, introduced him to Berlin society.^
Apparently dissatisfied with the civil service, Hol­
stein, in i860, applied for a transfer to the Prussian diplo­
matic service. He received a provisional transfer but only 
as a result of the influence of Count Otto von Bismarck.^3 
His first diplomatic appointment followed on December 6, i860, 
when he became an attach© in the Prussian Embassy at St. 
Petersburg.^ At th© time Bismarck was the Prussian Ambas­
sador. Thus began Holstein's thirty year period of associa­
tion with the future German Chancellor. Bismarck reported 
that Holstein was eager, industrious, intelligent, though 
awkward in society, and somewhat dominated by prejudice. ^
^Friedrich von Trotha, Fritz von Holstein als Kenach 
und Polltiker (Berlin* Verlag RTc'hard Schroed@r,193^)» p. 
Hereafter cited as Trotha, Holstein als Mensch.
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 391.
•^Holstein Papers, 1, x.
^Xbid., Ill, 3.
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 391-92.
According to Buelow, Holstein * s inability to advance socially 
In Russia later led him to oppose the pro-Hussian policy of 
the Chancellor. This appears quite unlikely. Prince Bernard 
von Buelow, Memoirs of Prince von Buelow, trans. F, A. Voigt 
(h vols•; Boston: LFttle, Brown and Co., 1931), IV, 607.
Hereafter cited as Buelow, Memoirs.
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The Ambassador Introduced him to the Russian Foreign Minister, 
Count Karl Nesselrode, as w *a future diplomatl1
Holstein, while in Russia, developed a close and In­
timate relationship with rI rnnrok’s family. He appeared to 
the family as merely another one of Its members• Both Her­
bert or?d W5 H i  mi, the Ambassador ’© two sore, looked upon him 
as a comrade. During the I87O ’,® there vere even rumors of a 
possible marriage between Holstein and Marie von Bismarck, 
the Ambassador’s only daughter
In April, 1863, Holstein returned to Berlin to talc© 
his final diplomatic examinations. Ill-health and the tragic 
death of his father postponed the examinations until May,
1863# His next appointment was to the unstimulating Embas­
sy at Bio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he remained only a year. 
Holstein’s next assignment cam© during the war against Den­
mark in 1861]., when he accompanied ^leld Marshall Wpangel, th© 
Commander-In-Chief of the Austro-Prussian forces, as the as­
sistant to the diplomatic representative of the Foreign Of­
fice.^ That same year Holstein served as © member of the 
Prussian delegation at th© bonaon Conference, called to solve
•^^ Crooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 391. 
x7lbld., pp. 391-92#
13Holsteln Papers, IIT, 3» 2ls.
^Gooch, Holatain Oracle. p. 393«
5th© Schleswig-Holstein question, The Conference failed, and 
Holstein remained in London as a regular member of th© Prus­
sian diplomatic ataff.^O His stay in Great Britain was un­
fortunate. He disliked both the weather and British snubbing 
of Prussians due to the antagonism resulting from the Danish 
war • ^
Holstein, in the summer of 1%5, took a holiday in 
the United States. Re war- so taken with America that he re­
quested and received an appointment to the Prussian Embassy 
in Washington, Holstein was impressed by his visits to Hew 
"ork City and an excursion into the West, but he showed a 
particular interest in the legislative form of government, 
which he deemed as the future political system of G e r m a n y . ^2
In Washington, Holstein developed a romantic attach- 
m<nt for the wife of Urited States Senator Charles Sumner, 
the Chairmen of th© Senate Foreign Relations Committee.^3 
The romance reached such a serious nature that the Prussian 
government recalled Holstein from his post. Possibly th© 
romantic incident influenced his future Ilf© as, supposedly,
^ Holstein Papers, I , xl. •
^Cooch, Holstein Orscl e, pp. 392-93.
22IM*« * PH* 393— Hogge, hebensbeker»ntris, 
pp. 14.9-61$,.
^3For further details concerning the romantic affair 
sec Ceorv© V. F. Ballgerten, "Fritz von Holstein Geheimnls," 
Historisoh© Zeitschrift, CLXXVII ( 1 9 S U ) ,  75-03*
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happened with the controversial Arnisn affair of the l870*s. ^ 
In 1867 Holstein returned from th© United States and 
never again left Europe* he received immediately a post in 
th© Prussian Embassy at Copenhagen, where his dissatisfaction 
rivaled that experienced in London. The legation suffered 
strict social isolation, ns Danish society hated the Prus­
sians as a result of the recent war-.‘~5
Early in 1Q6 %  Holstein hegor n three year leave of 
absence from the diplomatic s e r v i c e . H e  and a number of 
his Belgian friends formed the Rhine lowing Company with 
hopes of gaining considorable financial benefit from an in­
vestment in a new method of canal transport.27 Holstein in­
vested heavily in tne project, Which eventually proved un­
profitable. In fact he lost a substantial portion of his 
fairly large inheritance.^
iiolstein returned to active diplomatic service in 
duly, 1870, when war threatened, with F r a n c e .  **9 Bismarck,
^'Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects
of German Statecraft {Balt5.-m.ore: ~Joteslopk 1 ns Press, 19$Bj,
p. pIT. Hereafter cTted as Craig, From Bismarck, cf. pp. 8-13,
^?Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 39U.-95*
26liolstGin Papers, IX, 29.
2?There was some speculation that Holstein1s absence 
from the diplomatic service indicated that be was conducting
some secret assignment for Bismarck. Gooch, HoistoIn Oracle, 
p. 398.
c^Holstein loaners, III, 2lj *
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 395.
?who desired to know the position of the Italian government in 
th© Franeo-Prussian War, dispatched Holstein on a secret mis­
sion to Italy for the purpose of discovering the attitude of 
certain Italian political groups• H© successfully completed 
his assignment and once again confirmed Bismarck’s belief In 
his ability and usefulness.31
For a brief time in 1870 Holstein served in the Po­
litical Division of the Foreign. Ministry, but he disliked the 
dull office work, particularly when war raged In France. He 
again attempted to enter the army but failed. In January, 
1871, he appeared unsolicited at Bismarck’s headquarters in 
Versailles, where he hoped to gain an assignment« Bismarck 
allowed him to remain In Paris and eventually attached him 
to his personal staff. Following the war, Holstein remained 
In France and served In minor positions, ?,n eluding an appoint­
ment to the staff of Count Alfred von Waldersee, who later 
served Holstein as an intermediary with Kaiser Wilhelm II.32 
The nature of Holstein’s life changed after he re­
ceived the appointment of Second Secretary In the Imperial 
Embassy at Paris In November, 1871.33 He appeared to have 
adopted the life of a diplomat as he proved successful in his 
Paris post and solved, though tragically, his problems with
3%iol3tein Papers, I, 1*.2-1*5•
3^1bid., III, 29.
32ibid. 33Ibid.
8th© towing company* In 1873 the towing venture proved com­
pletely unprofitable, and he withdrew from Its Board of Direc­
tors* He suffered further financial loss in the economic 
crash of 1373* when he lost the remainder of his fortune.
His financial losses forced him to depend solely on his- small 
official salary and resulted in th© frugal existence that 
characterised the rest of his life*3^
Supposedly more Influential on Holstein’s life was 
his involvement with Count Harry von Amim-Suckow*35 In 18?1 
Count Arnim, influential In court circles and a favorite of 
Kaiser Wilhelm I, received the appointment of ambassador to 
France*3& Arnim, who desired to become chancellor, disagreed 
with Bismarck’s policy toward the French government and in­
stituted his own p o l i c y * 37 The Chancellor knew that Arnim 
disregarded his instructions, and in 16714. he obtained the 
Count’s removal* Arnim*s successor. Prince Chlodwig zu 
Hohenlohe-Sshillingsfuerst, reported that certain documents 
were missing from the embassy files. Bismarck requested Axrim 
to return the documents, but h© declined. The Chancellor fol­
lowed by charging Arnim with illegally removing documents
3%bld., i n ,  29-30.
35uorman Rich, "Holstein and the Arnim Affair," The 
Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (March, 19?6>), 33* Here- 
a/ter cited as Me$TJ HArnim Affair*”
3 6 & o o c h ,  Holstein Oracle, pp. 399-Ij.OO*
37Holsteln Papers, II, 32n. 2.
9from the government files*3®
In th© ensuing trial Arnim*s defense counsel charged 
that Holstein, under official orders, reported the activities
of the Ambassador to Bismarck* The Chancellor immediately 
summoned Holstein as a witness for the government* Thereupon 
Arnim*s counsel withdrew th© charge stating It was made on 
Insufficient Information*^ Holstein was Innocent of the spy 
charges^ and testified that he remained on good relations 
with Arnim until 1873* when It became evident that the Ambas­
sador actually worked against official policy* Holstein 
said that he then requested a transfer, but Arnim refused 
and kept M m  at his Paris post.-** The trial finally ended 
with Arnim receiving a short jail sentence, which he avoided 
by fleeing to Switzerland where he soon dled,^
On the basis of Holstein* s testimony hie only respon­
sibility for Arnim*e removal was that he wrote various crit­
ical letter© in which he commented on the Amlse-Piamarolc 
quarrel and recommended the transfer of the Ambassador,^3
3^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp* 399-1*00,
3%olstein Papers, I, 96* HI eh, ”A m i m  Affair”, 
PP. 36-37*
M ^Bolateln Papers, I, xii,
^Ibid., Ill, 36-37*
b^Goaoh, Holstein Oracle, p# 100,
Wpich, "Arnim Affair,” pp, hi, ph.
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Holstein tws lawfully guiltless*^ but those in opposition to 
Bismarck--the court circle, A m i n ’s many frlends,ultramon­
tanes displeased with the Knlturkampf, and gossips--clamored 
and spread the rumor that Holstein was a dishonorable, vile 
spy* Later when Holstein achieved greater control and in­
fluence, bis contemporaries and enemies^ interpreted his 
role in th© Arnim affair as an explanation for his twisted 
nature, which verged on a persecutlon-manla}^ his tendency 
for intrigue; the reason for opposing Bismarck after 1890;U-7
VtNeither the Foreign Ministry files, the records of 
th© Arnim trial, nor the four volumes of The Holstein Papera 
indicated that Holstein *s role in th© Arnim t’riaT was morally 
wrong, dishonorable, or that his life was greatly affected by 
the incident* Holstein Papers, I, xii•
^One of th© central problems involved with the study 
of Holstein is what was the true nature of the man, and how 
did this affect his influence on German foreign policy, if 
It did at all* All the specific studies or illusions made 
to Holstein, until the publication of his letters, pictured 
him, predominantly because of his implications In the Arnim 
trial, as a man of evil influence, and an intriguer, suffer­
ing from partial mental derangement, For a possible excep­
tion see Trotha, Holstein als Mensch*
^Trotha, in her sympathetic treatment, Holstein als 
Mensch, p* 33, argued that Holstein was not pathoTogTcaTly 
disturbed, sullen, crabby, odd, or basically eccentric*
UT^hen Bismarck fell from power in i890, Holstein re­
mained at his post and obtained influence over foreign pol­
icy* The degree of his influence corresponded to that of the 
succeeding Chancellors under whom he served* These facts 
caused some speculation, now disproven, that he was involved 
in an intrigue to remove the Chancellor* His contemporaries 
and historians claimed that behind the fall of Bismarck were 
the workings of Holstein's revenge for having been used as 
the scapegoat in the Arnim trial* As far as Holstein was 
concerned, he did not blame Bismarck for involving him in 
the Arnim episode, but as he wrote in his memoirs in 1907, 
Count Joseph Radowitz, Vortra&ender Rat in the Foreign Office
11
and th© factor that forced him to withdraw from society and 
become a recluse• Highly exaggerated, his contemporaries 
declared that he was transformed from a 11 debonairn young dip* 
lomat into a social outcast* Holstein, however, suffered no 
more from social ostracism than any other adherent of Bis* 
marck.^
His social difficulties ’were no greater than those 
of most Germans, when considering the nature of the l8?0!s —  
the opposition to Bismarck and the treatment received by 
Prussians in Paris Holstein's anti-social orientation 
appeared much earlier in his life,-50 well before the Arnim 
affair, and as early as his stay In St. Petersburg *^1 His 
father wrote him in Russia admonishing him for not taking 
a more active part in s o c i e t y . 5 2  it was not that society
from 1872 to l87f|, was responsible for his involvement in th© 
trial. Holstein felt that possibly R a d o w i h e l d  some secret 
with which he blackmailed Bismarck into forcing the trial. 
According to Holstein, R&dowits favored the dismissal of 
Arnim, not Bismarck.
This raises the question where did Holstein obtain 
his information for labelling Radowit£ as th© culprit? Prom 
Bismarck, who possibly hoped to keep Holstein in the dark as 
to how he, the Chancellor, was responsible for summoning him 
from Paris to testify? There is also the fact that Holstein 
hated Radowits, who helped implement Holstein's removal as 
on© of the secretaries at the Congress of Berlin. Holstein
^8Ibld., I ,  xll. Rich, "Arnim Affair," p p .  3 6 - 3 ? .  
^ Holstein Papers, I , xl 1.
S°I M d . . I l l ,  211.-28.
^ R i o h ,  " A rn im  A f f a i r , "  p .  52.
^Holstein Papers. III, 3“23.
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avoided him but more that he avoided society.53 His friends, 
though few in number, wore close and never was he socially
(i^l ^
isolated*^ Holstein wrote in 1876 of how lonely and un- 
oheerful his life was; h o w e v e r , h e  made no connection be­
tween his solitary existence and the effects of the Arnim 
affair*5^ After his appointment to the Berlin Foreign Office 
In 1876, his social relations continued to decline, but this 
fact must not be over-exaggerated in light of hi s enormous 
correspondence 'with all types of acquaintances and hi3 asso­
ciations with many political figures•^  Once questioned on 
his unsociable nature, Holstein replied, !f f Th© civil service
^jcbld.. I, xll.
5^ft*otha, Holstein als Henseh, p. 91l.
^Holstein Papers. Ill, 1*0. no. 21. In 1«77 he wrote
"You know my passion for society* I never go out at all, be­
cause beyond what I have now, I want nothing and aspire to 
nothing, not even a wife." Ibid., ijlu
^Interesting and'of unknowable significance, Hol­
stein wrote in 1877 that on© Robert Keudell, was black­
mailing him, or at least threatening to, and that the inci­
dent may damage his relations with Bismarck as "at all 
events this much la certain, that the whole business, with 
th© annoyance it has caused me • • • has had consequences 
affecting my whole life.” Just exactly what Holstein meant 
by the above statement is not known or the nature of th© 
quarre1 wlth Keude11• Ibid*, III, b5n• 1*
r**7
J Rich stated, in his astute article on Holstein and 
the Arnim trial, the host argument against the Arnim affair 
changing the nature of Holstein*a life and character* He 
said if Holstein possessed a somewhat unnatural character 
and made mistakes in his political judgments, "1t was not 
for want of contact with other people or with ‘reality.1" 
Rich, "Arnim Affair," p. $2•
13
r*has destroyed me as a human being*1 Whatever the reason 
Tor Holstein's anti-social tendencies, tne effect of one 
Ariiim trial, at least in a subconscious sense, cannot be dis- 
regarded as having molded ais strange character*^
Uols bein drew closer to Bismarck during the 1870's*
In these years the nasure and degree or his influence de­
pended upon his personal relations with the Chancellor and 
the lauter's confidence in his ambitious assistant*^ The 
Chancellor possessed valid reasons for employing Holstein in 
matters that dealt with both internal and foreign affairs * ^  
He was a meritable drafting officer, proficient in the nec­
essary technical skills,^ reliable, conscientious,^3 and 
possessed a superb knowledge of languages,^! as well as an 
Immense capacity for work* The Chancellor employed him as 
his personal secretary at both Berlin and Varzin, the country 
estate of Bismarck* At times he appointed him to the vacant 
positions of officials who were on leave from the Foreign
F* Gooch, “Baron von Holstein., the Mystery Man 
of the German Foreign Office 1890-1906,11 *fhe Cambridge His­
torical Journal, 1, (1923)$ 7In* 2* Hereafter cited as 
Gooch, “Mystery Man*1*
^Rich, “Arnim Affair,” pp* S2-5>3*
^ Holstein Papers, II, xi •
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp* ij.O3-lj.05>*
k^Craig, From Bismarck, p* 39*
^Buelow, Memoirs, IV, 282.
6t)lbld», 5^3.
Iti
Ministry*^ Bismarck, In return for Holstein's services 
granted him the privilege of conducting an extensive private 
correspondence, through which he supplied information not 
usually found in official communications. It was an indubi­
table fact that he served as a remarkably well-informed as­
sistant*^
Bismarck, In 1875# appointed Holstein First Secretary 
in the Paris E m b a s s y * T h a t  same year he received the offer 
of posts as First Secretary at St. Petersburg end Constanti­
nople. He refused these positions, preferring to stay in 
Paris and wait for an appointment in Berlin, where he was 
nearer th© center of affairs.^8 In 18?6 the appointment 
came, and Holstein returned to Berlin, where he remained for 
the next thirty years* It was not long before he was a part 
of th© exclusive circle that was the center of Bismarck's 
foreign ministry*^ He held the rank of Legationarat?® and 
easily won Bismarck's praise as ” 'the faithful Fritz.»n71 
At th© Congress of Berlin he served a portion of the meeting
^Rich, “Arnim Affair,” pp* Ij.O-Lj.1*
^Holstein papers, II, xi.
^7Joachim Kuerenberg, Holstein pie Graue Emlnenz 
(Berlins Verlag Helmut Rauschenbusciii T^UTT^pT 3*7* Here­
after cited as Kuerenberg, Emlnenz*
^®Rich, “Arnim Affair,” p. 52.
k^craig, From Bismarck, p. 35*
?0(jooch, Holstein Oracle, p. LjOy*
71lbld*, p. 14-03*
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as a secretary, for which he received a lower grade of th© 
French Legion of Honor. Holstein was even at the side of 
Bismarck when he signed the 'Dual Alliance in 1Q?9. In 1880 
he advanced to M s  highest • cal t! 01?, that of ^ortragender 
Rat, Assistant Under-Secretary,72 or 8anlor Connaellor In th© 
Political Division of the Foreign Kiri©try.73
The Vortragender Hat enhanced his position, particu­
larly during the 1870*s by his continued intimate relation­
ship with Bismarck fa family* Johanna von Biomarek, wife of 
the Chancellor, looked upon Holstein with special favor. She 
always provided a cheerful welcome on his various visits and 
holidays ©pent at Var*in*7U Bismarck especially enjoyed the 
discussions with Holstein, and Herbert felt he was on© of his 
closest friends* His connections with the family were also 
interwoven with his official position* He, along with Herbert 
and Killian, functioned as th© Chancellor1© private secre­
tary. In such capacity they maintained, the link between th© 
Chief at Varz-In and th© Foreign Ministry in Berlin.75
By the late 1370*9 Holstein began to withdraw from Hue 
intimate social life of th© Bismarck family. In l8?6 Marie
7?il.td., j.p. L- , -14.07.
73]ioig teln Papers 3 II, xi .
7%v°gge, Lebensbcker. >tinIs. p. xxxv. Baulc-u,
Memoirs, II, 126.
^ Holstein Papers^ II, xii.
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von Bismarck married -lio ambitious Count Kuno zxx Rantzau,76 
who Joined Holstein and the Chancellor* s sons as personal 
secretary at Varzin and Fr10drichsruh•77 Holstein hated 
K&ntsau, whom he found offensive as well as i n c o m p e t e n t .78 
Eventually his hatred caused him to break relations with the 
Count, and slowly he decreased the number of M s  visits to 
the Bismarcks• In 1-3% the Tlantzau-Holstein antagonism went 
ao far that Holstein dial longed the son-in-law to a duel. 
Hantzau refused to accept and the matter ended*79 Holstein’s 
social relations with Bismarck’s family almost ceased to ex­
ist, but even 30, th© Incident failed to damage his official 
or personal relations with Bismarck and Herbert
Holstein, during the late 1370*s and iS80fs, contin­
ued to increase his influence and power. He demanded that 
every document and report pass through his hands. 'Tith his 
complete knowledge of the Foreign Finistry fil©3, he always 
provided a ready explanation of any negotiation, and gave 
freely of his advice as to the wisest policy.^ More Impor-
^Durlng the l-370fs there wore strong Indications 
that Holstein would marry Marie. Fogge* Lebensbekenntnis, 
p. xvii•
77HoIstein Papers, I, 21^ .
7Bibid,, XX, 96-98.
79Ibld.. 151-5?.
8oXbld.. X, xtii.
°^Gooch, Hols tain Oracle, p. lill.
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tant was als control and direction of policy through diplo­
matic channels* Bismarck permitted Holst© 5.n, as did the next 
three Chancellors# to correspond directly with German diplo­
matic representatives, as well as with a number of foreign 
contacts• ^  Such communications war© not officially filed 
b? the foreign Office, nor were they submitted to the Chan­
cellor or Foreign Secretary* Besides obtaining valuable in- 
forma ti on through his correspondence# th© Fortragender Fat 
communicated, quite unofficially, the German nosit4on on a 
pending question or the attitude that he desired a certain 
government to believe as reflecting Borman policy, By such 
means ho influenced, if not controlled, the outcome of dip­
lomatic I s s u e s .^3 in actuality Holstein conducted r» secret 
diplomacy, independent and sometimes contrary to the policies 
of the four Chancellors under* whom he s e r v e d . O t h e r  offi­
cials conducted private correspondence, but it was not so 
advantageously employed as was the case with Holstein*^
Intrigue was another means whereby Holstein increased
O p
Holstein lapera# 1, xlx. It was Joseph Chamberlain# 
Hermann von Sckar^ste In, Alfred Rothschild, and the Duk© of 
Devonshire, the so-called foreign contact?* who conducted the 
sporadic negotiations lor an Anglo-German alliance from IB98 
to 1901* fhls type of diplomacy led to the problems and dis­
crepancies of the alliance talks.
^3ibl.rt*, III, ix-x.
*%Gooch# Holstein Oracle, p. hii9.
^Holstein Papers, III# ix-xi•
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his power and multiplied his Influence.^ His suspicious 
nature and personal likes m d  dislikes led him to remove in­
dividuals from both high and low positions*^7 Th© fact that 
he possessed such a great amount of compromising knowledge 
merely intensified his passion for intriguing against those 
he felt were incompetent or who offended h i m * I n  many in­
stances Holstein sacrificed the proper execution of foreign 
policy In order to avenge *hat he construed as constituting
Oq
an insult* ~ Intrigue, however, was not particular to Hol­
stein. Bismarck made use of it and quite effectively in 
conducting the affairs of the Second Reich.90
In spite of his intrigue and special privileges, Hol­
stein supported and worked for the implementation of the Bis­
marck i an s y s t e m . 91 Since the creation of the Second Reich In 
I87O, Bismarck worked for an enduring European peace based on
BE^Johannes Haller, Philip Eulenburg: The Kaiser*s
Friend, trane* Ethel Colburn Eayn© (2 volsV; How York: AT- 
fre<f A. Knopf, 1930). Hereafter cited as Haller, Eulenburg* 
Haller argued most effectively in support of Holstein*s in­
triguing nature* In fact Holstein implicated himself In The 
Holstein Papers which read like a scandal sheet of Bismarck- 
Tan and Wilhelm!an Germany*
8?Qtto Haramann, The World Policy of Germany 1890- 
1912, brans. Maud© A* Huttman (Sew York: Alfred A7 Knopf,
l927), p. 171• Hereafter cited as Hammann, World Policy.
8%  00 eh, Holstein Oracle, pp. Lj.lH-15, U53-55*
AO
7Craig, From Bismarck, p. [4O.
90j. Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck: The
Caprivl Era l890-lS9li (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958J,p. 322. Hereafter cited as Nichols, Caprivl.
9^-Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. J413.
1 9
an Intricate system, o.f alliances and alignments. The geo** 
graphic position of Gsrm.ar.ry, with her unnatural defensive 
frontiers, required binding alliances to insure any lasting 
protection.92 Any form of an alliance with Franc© remained 
impossible because of the French desire for ravano.be over the 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck, therefor©, turned to Aus­
tria and gained protection of the German rear with the sign­
ing of th© Dual Alliance in 1^79* Th© Chancellor negotiated 
th© Triple Alliance in 1391 between Germany, Austria, and 
Italy, but the Second Reich still faced the possibility of 
war on two fronts. Germany required, at the very least, th© 
assurance of Russian neutrality, which appeared impossible
to obtain in light of 'Russian and Austrian antagonism over
th© Balkans.^3 Bismarck felt Germany lacked any particular 
interest in the Balkans; therefore, he placed himself as 
mediator between Austria and Russia by forming the Dreikais- 
orbund of 1372. 9ti The agreement functioned until 1373 when 
it collapsed as a result of the near eastern crisis. Th© 
three Emperors revived th© agreement in lBBl, only to have
92Wllliam L. Longer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 
1090-1902 (2 vols.; Hew Yo rk 5 Si fr e d A • fen op f ,"*I"935) IT *
Hereafter cited an Larger, Diplomacy.
93(>, v, Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft
(Hew Yorks Longmans, Green and Co. , I%"2), p. 617 Here-.
after cited as Gooch, Studies.
^Raymond J. Sontag, European Diplomatic History 
1671-1932 (New Yorks The Century Co., 1933), PP* 6-9. 
Hereafter cltod as Sontag, European Diplomatic.
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It again collapse In 1887. Bismarck then negotiated the se­
cret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and supported the Medi­
terranean Agreement between Italy, Austria, and Britain.
Peace resulted as long as Bismarck refrained from favoring 
Russia or Austria more than the other, and as long as Brit­
ain continued antagonistic toward Bus si a and fri ©ndlv to the 
Tplola Alliance. Success depended noon how well Bismarck 
manipulated the alliances and the real or unreal ententes.9$
In 1335 Holstein horan to disagree with Bismarck*s 
policy. He opposed Bismarck and his son, Herbert, who be­
came State Secretary In 1385, on personal grounds. Holstein 
hated the domineering manner typical of th© family and more 
specifically the unorthodox manner In which Herbert ran th©
‘horeign O f f i c e . 96 xn the area of foreign policy, he opnosed 
Herbert’s pro-Russian tendencies, with Which th© Chancellor 
increasingly seemed to agree. More incomprehensible was th© 
pu rpos© b eh ir.d Bi srna rck * s e v e r Inc r a a &! n g a ys t am o f s. 1 liancea 
and treaties. As far as Holstein discerned th© Chancellor 
endangered the existence of the 'Triple Alliance by inces­
santly vacillating between Russia, Austria, Britain, and even 
France.9? Germany appeared to lack a consistent policy or
9^ tiang.er, Diplomacy, II, fy.59-60.
96o-ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 110. Holstein Papers,
II, 272-73.
97lbld., T, xii!, II, xiv-xv.
any reliable allies, who would promise support in case of 
war.^
Holstein first began to inaugurate an Independent 
foreign policy over the proposed marriage of the Prince of 
Bulgaria.*^ In I88I4 the pro-British Grown Princess Victoria, 
daughter of Queen Victoria, began a campaign to marry her 
second daughter to the anti-Russian Prince of Bulgaria, Alex­
ander von Battenberg. Bismarck had no Intention of antago­
nizing Russia for the sake of a royal marriage* Such an act 
Implied German support for Prince Alexander1s plans to halt 
the Russian design of extending her influence in Bulgaria. 
Holstein worked against the aggressive advances of Russia 
and simultaneously attempted to gain the support of the fu­
ture Kaiser, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, for the contin­
ued existence of Bismarck as Chancellor* He hoped to achieve 
his two objectives by encouraging th© support of the Batten­
berg marriage in Vienna and London by means of his corre­
spondence with the German ambassadors* In Berlin he attempt­
ed to gain support by Intriguing with Count Hugo von Rado- 
llnskl, th© Crown Prince^ Court Chamberlain* Radolinskl 
proposed that Herbert should condone the marriage, thereby 
winning the favor of the Crown Prince. Holstein remarked 
that went too far. The Chancellor would never voluntarily
"ibid., II, xlll. 
"ibid.. I, xlll.
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accept the possibility of such a fait accompli♦ His propos­
al would only alienate the Grown Prince and Bismarck, which 
must ha avoided if the Chancellor was to continue at his post 
under the new Kaiser Holstein stated: ”1 have some­
times gone beyond the intentions of the Big Capo, have occa­
sionally even used my ways In reaching his goals. But I 
have never consciously gone directly counter to his inten­
tions He believed that some other way must be devised
to oppose the pro-Russian policy.
The Rattenberg marriage failed to occur, but Holstein
continued to oppose Bismarck*s pro-Hussian policy. From
l q36 to 1390 Holstein worked constantly with Paul von Hatz-
faldt, his life-long friend and Ambassador to Great Britain,
attempting to bring Germany and Britain closer to ether.
They bell evecl that Anglo-German friendship would create a
counterweight to the Chancellor?s pro-Hussianism. 1°3 Hoi-
stein felt absolutely that
wo cannot let Austria be destroyed by Russia because we 
should then stand helpless between Russia and France5 
but that if we hinder Russian designs on Austria we must 
as a result; be prepared to face her hostility Instead of
100Ibld., II, xv-xvii•
101Ibld., XII, 192.
102Ibld. , II, xvil.
103lbld., xlv, xvi•
For""a detailed account of Holstein* 3 independent 
policy with Hatzfeldt see Helmuth Krausnick, Holatelns 
Geheimpolltlk in der Ara Bismarck, 1666-1890 (Hamburg: 19i|l).
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flattering her in a way that disheartens the other 
Powers— ingland as ell as Austria — and increases Rus­
sian arrogance *1^
Both Holstein and Hatzfeldt failed to comprehend the
purpose behind German policy* The Chancellor moved toward
Russia to win the Czar’s friendship, thereby the Deace of
Europe. If forced to a decision, Germany must always side
with Austria over Russia, geographic position demanded It as
did the French desire for revanche.^®^ Holstein would never
have misconstrued th© Chancellor1® policy if Bismarck had
kept his subordinates informed as to the purpose of his ac-
ti 0113. 106
The pro-Russian policy led to the negotiation of the 
Reinsurance Treaty. Signed in 188?, Germany assured Russia 
of support In th© Balkans and benevolent neutrality in case 
Russia had to defend C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .^87 Holstein exerted 
his limited Influence against the concluding of the Treaty 
but without success. He definitely felt It contradicted the
^ ^ ^Holstein Papers, II, 328.
^^Jlbiu.., xiv-xv.
Alfred Francis Pribram, England and oh© Inter-* 
nation al Policy of the European Great Powers 137T-1yllt TOx-
ToraT" au^riirc 1 - 5 7 ^ 7 p v 7 ^ r w & r ~ T i e v e -
after cited as Pribram, England and Europe.
^ ^ B olstein I'apera, I, xiii•
IQ^iUrold Temper ley and Lillian M, P on son (ed* ), 
Foundations of Brlfcish P'oreny; Policy from Pitt (1792) to 
Sail a bur y (lffiOlT ~olF"Doc\men t a Old and New (Cambridge s 
tHe Univers 1 ty Press! 1 ^ 38') , 'pTTSfy'•"""" Hereafter cited as 
Temperley, Foundations.
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Triple Alliance and constituted a major mistake by Bismarck, 
but he supported and helped conclude th© Mediterranean Agree­
ment with Britain in the same year.^® The latter provided 
that Great Britain, Italy, and Austria should maintain th© 
status quo in the Mediterranean* At least the Russian ad­
vances received a partial counterweight in the tenuous Brit­
ish agreement *109
During the last three years of Bismarckian rule, 
Holstein persisted in violently criticizing th© Chancellor's 
foreign policy*^® Ho matter how much he criticized, he 
acted on the basis of what he understood as the best inter­
ests of the Peleh* His patriotism cannot he doubted. HI- 
Holstein "loved Prussia, loved the German HeIeh like a mother 
and like a b r i d e * W h a t e v e r  actions Holstein took, h© 
felt he was justified* The object was the welfare of Duets eh- 
land.113
The death of Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm in 1888 
brought to the throne the immature and vain Kaiser
lO^Holsteln Paper®# X, 127* II, xii-xv. 
on tag, European Diplomatic* op. .1,1-1+2*
^^Holstein Papers, IT, xv*
UlTrotha, Holstein als Hens eh, pp. xvii, xv.
TIP
"■^Maximilian Harden, Koepfe (ip vols.; Berlin: Ver-
lag Erick Reiss, 1910), I, 130-31• Hereafter cited as 
Harden, Koepfe*
^^■^Trctha, Holstein als Fensch, p. 96.
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Wilhelm 1 1 . ^ ^  The personality of the new Kaiser Indicated 
that a conflict was inevitable with Bismarck over who was to 
control Germany* In 1890 the fatal crash came, and Wilhelm IT 
dismissed Bismarck as German Chan cell or . ^ 5  Holstein real­
ized that the Kaiser was the more powerful; therefore, he 
remained at his post instead of resigning with the Chancellor 
and his f o l l o w e r s B o t h  Herbert and Bismarck expressed 
surprise when they learned that Holstein planned to remain, 
but they suffered a greater shock when they learned that th© 
Vortragender Rat worked against the renewal of the expiring 
Reinsurance Treaty.
With Bismarck's dismissal there existed little oppor­
tunity of renewing the treaty. In the Foreign Office only 
Holstein remained fully aware of the nature and history of the 
treaty, and he opposed it.^-® At th© basis of Holstein *s arguments
lll+Brlch Eyck, "Holstein as Bismarck's Critic,” 
Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in honour of 
G ♦ ' P * (fooch, C. S . , ed. Arshag Shann er Sarkiasion^Bon^on: 
Longmans, 196Y), pp. 263-61+. Hereafter cited as Eyck, "Bis­
marck 1s Critic."
■^Sjjichols, Caprivi, pp. 13-11+.
■ ^16> T h e r a  w a s  SOme controversey over whether or not 
Holstein was directly Involved in any intrigue to cause the 
fall of Bismarck, but apparently Holstein was cleared from 
any direct involvement. See Ibid., pp. 263-65•
^^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 1+15-18*
^^Langer, Diplomacy, I, 3-5•
There is a great deal of controversey over whether 
or not th© Reinsurance Treaty was Inconsistent with th© Triple 
Alliance, and if the failure to renew led to the Franco- 
Russ lan Alliance. Supposedly th© German-RussIan split began
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against renewal and of his foreign policy was the mainte­
nance of the Austrian alliance and the benevolent neutrality 
of Great Sri tain The Reinsurance Treaty violated both
these principles. By supporting Russia in the Balkans Ger­
many antagonized the British and contradicted its obligations 
to Austria under the terms of the Triple Alliance. Russia, 
he felt, possessed control of German policy. The Russians 
forced Germany to follow their dictates by threatening to 
reveal the secret treaty to Vienna. Once the Austrians dis­
covered the nature of th© agreement, they would drop th© 
Triple Alliance, and no power in Europe would trust Gerrna- 
ny.l20 Holstein's arguments convinced the new Chancellor, 
Count Leo von Caprivl, and the Kaiser not to renew th© 
treaty,3*21 Bismarcks were furious and never forgave Hol­
stein, ^ 22 but by that time the opinion of th© Bismarck fam­
ily was of less significance. Th© dismissal of the first
at the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck failed to recognize 
and support th© claims of Russia, not 5n 1090. Also the Med­
iterranean Agreement seemingly made the Reinsurance Treaty 
non-operative. If the Reinsurance Treaty was ineffective by 
1890, the strong criticism against Holstein for having used 
his influence in seeing that the Treaty lapsed would apnear 
as being somewhat unjustified. See Temperley, Foundations, 
pp. I+5U~55» and Herbert Henry Asquith. The Genesis of tfaeTwar 
(New Yorks George H. Doran Co., 1923), pp. 27-2& Here after 
cited as Asquith, Genesis.
^•^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. i+18-20, 510.
^•^Holstein Papers, I, 127-31.
^2^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 1+18-20.
I£?2?HoIgtein Pagers, X, 131-32
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Chancellor and the lapsing of the Reinsurance Treaty ended 
Blemaroklan rule and inaugurated the sixteen year period 
known as the "Holstein Era, " ^ 3
*^?Eyek, "Bismarck's Critic," p# 265
CHAPTER II
FRIEDRICH VOR KOLSTIEN AND GERMANY 1890-1901
After 1390, Holstein exerted his greatest Influence 
on th© direction of German foreign* policy.^ His power had 
suffered under th© limitations established by Bismarck, but 
following the old Chancellor * s dismissal, Holstein became an 
active formulator of policy.3 The Yortragender Rat, as the 
most competent official held over from Bismarck^ adminis­
tration,^ provided th© knowledge necessary to conduct the 
affairs of the German Foreign Office and insured the conti­
nuity of the traditions of German foreign policy.3? Chancel-
*Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. Lj20.
^Hermann Frelherra von Eckardstein, Lebens-Erlnnerun-
gen u. Polltlache Denkwurdigk e 11 en von Botschaftsrat (3 vois.;
Leipzig: Paul Llst"i 1919-21), 'l, 12-16• Hereafter cited as
Eckardstein, Er1nnerungen. Johannes Haller, Philip Eulen- 
burgs Th© Kaiser * a Fri end, trans • Ethel Colburn" Wayn« T5 
voIs•; New York: Alfred A • Knopf, 1930). Hereafter cited
as Haller, Bulenburg. Both Eckardstein and Eulenburg argued 
that after 1890 Holstein possessed nearly absolute control 
of policy and, at the very least, his direction was In pre­
ponderance. They also felt his influence was more negative 
than positive.
^Holateln Papers. Ill, xl.
4-Erlch Brandenburg, From Blamarck to the World War» 
trans. Annie Elizabeth A dams (ton cion : £Txford lln I varsi ty
Press, 1927)# p. 23* Hereafter cited as Brandenburg, From 
Bismarck World.
5$ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. ij.26.
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lor Gaprivi and the new State Secretary, Adolf Hermann Mar- 
schall, lacked any extensive knowledge of foreign affairs and 
were forced by circumstances to depend upon Holstein for ad­
vice and g u i d a n c e T h e  three Chancellors, who followed 
Bismarck, depended not only upon Holsteinfs knowledge and ex­
perience, but, much more significantly, they relied upon his 
Ideas and guiding p r i n c i p l e s T h o u g h  he lacked breadth and
a
flexibility in his judgments,■ his superiors always consulted 
him on important questions of policy before final action.^ 
Holstein, by drafting and revising memoranda, influenced and 
advised officials ranging from German ministers and ambassa­
dors to th© Chancellor and even the Kaiser as to questions 
of foreign policy.**-* His varied personal contacts, his quick 
apprehension, and his cunning** made Holstein indispensable 
to the German Foreign Office.*^
Holstein, though he exercised considerable power, al­
ways felt that his influence was extremely limited. His pow-
^Gooch, Studies, p. I30.
?Ho1btein Papers, ITT, x:t •
^Raymond James Son bag, Germany and England, Background 
of Conflict l8fj.S-l691i (New York! D. Appleton Century, Co., 
r ?3 8), p • 308. Here a fter cited as Sontap, Germany and England.
^Haller, Kulenburr,, TI, Apoendlx I, 298.
IQibld.. 297.
11,
►
Craig, From Bismarck, p. 38.
'Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. Ijljfl. 
12,
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©r, h© said, mainly consisted of correcting, guiding, and 
restraining policies previously inaugurated. He believed he 
had very little opportur?tj to Initiate any independent ac­
tion and was far from the director of German foreign r alley, *3 
Whether Holstein was correct or not, he employed various 
means for maintaining M s  position in the government. This 
was best exemplified by bis estrangement from Bismarck and 
insane fear of the old Chancellor’s return to power.^ Hol­
stein had won the antipathy of Bismarck when he had remained 
in the Foreign Office following the old Chancellor’s dismiss­
al and when he had failed to gain renewal of the Reinsurance 
Treaty.^ Holstein reasoned that if Bismarck ever returned, 
h© would immediately lose his post and power.^  His appre­
hension was r e a l , b u t  ho still employed the threat^ of
l'3narry F. Young, Maximilian Harden, Censor Germania© 
(The Hague: Mertinue Hijhoff, l^ fj’JT,pp. 85*8% fferea’f ter
cited as Young, Harden.
^Haller, I-ixlonburg, 1, 28k.
^ Holstein Pap erg, ITT, 333*37.
^^Gocch, Holstein Oracle, pp. h?6-27.
17Faller, Fuicnbnrg, T, ?3k.* ■   .... itn,,3 *
1893^4- Holstein, went almost Insane with fear that 
th© Bismarcks would return when th© comic journal Kladder- 
deutsoh ran a series of articles satirizing HolsteTn" ‘ahS two 
otherForeign officials as being the motivators of German pol­
icy. Holstein always despised to be in the public eye and 
was positive that Bismarck was behind the articles, since th© 
old Chancellor was the only person who hated bin so violent­
ly. He was so taken with fear that he challenged Herbert to 
a duel which rover took place. Gooch, Holstein Oracle, 
pp, 1427-29. Kuerenberg, Rmlnenz, pp. It£-17,
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Bismarck1s return as a reason for submitting his resignation. 
Holstein would only consent to withdraw his resignation if 
the government adopted an antl-Bismarckian attitude or com­
plied with his views on policy. The Chancellors, except in 
1906 when Holstein fs resignation was unexpectedly accepted, 
complied with his demands since the Foreign Office xfas too 
dependent upon the Vortragender Hat to even consider his re­
signing. The result was that Holstein remained an influen­
tial force in the direction of policy.^
After Bismarck resigned, Holstein was expected to 
obtain a higher position in the German Foreign Office. He 
was asked to succeed Herbert Bismarck ae State Secretary but 
refused on the basis that he was unqualified to perform, the 
parliamentary and social duties required of the post.2^ Hol­
stein never deni red to appear In the public eye, and felt
he could best serve the Belch by remaining an Tindcr-Secre­
pp
fcary* His aversion to public and special distinction was 
so strong that not until I89B was he willing to accept the 
title of Flrklicher Oehrimrat and Fxcollercy.^ Title and
rank meant very 1?tile to him as he derived satisfaction from
l^Holstein Papers, I, xv. Gooch, Holstein Oracle,
PP. f 1.3 2-33"
20Ibid., p. hi?. 21Ibid., p. ’.hO.
2-Troths, Holstein als Fensch, p. 73*
23cooch, Kolstein Oracle, p. h
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involvement In the important work of the German Foreign Of­
fice.^ From 1090 until his death in 1909 Holstein’s domi­
nant concern was with the direction of Gerr an foreign pol- 
lay.25
In I8O.J4. Bismarck had inaugurated the Imperialistic 
policy of Feltpolitik, The Chancellor had reluctantly en­
tered the colonial race and he had always maintained that 
Germany was first a continental r o w e r N e v e r t h e l e s s #  Ger­
many# during the later years* of FI smarckiar control, became 
increasingly engrossed with obtaining territory in Asia and 
Africa•^  Bismarck and his successors realised that the suc­
cess of German colonial expansion depended noon the willing­
ness of Britain to condone Germany’s imperialistic desires.^® 
They also perceived that British support would maintain peace 
and guarantee German security In E u r o p e *29 No one realized 
this more than Bismarck and Holstein*30
'During 1889 Bismarck had hoped to gain Great Brit­
ain’s support by offering her a defensive alliance. The
2%loh, "AwIb Affair," p. 3fJ.
2^Goooh, Holstein Oracle, pp. li20-2f.
^Pribram, Fn gland and Fur ope,» pp* 29-30,
2?La«ger, Diplomacy# I, h-5, II# 7°-*, ?9?.
^Pribram, England and Europe, pp, 2°-31*
^Brandenburg, From Bismarck world, pp. 33-3h«
3®Trotha, Holstein air T-rnsch, p# xix#
British had rejected the 31 though they had realized
the need of (reman support, Britain always felt that an 
alliance was not mandatory to the .maintenance of peace and 
the success of her struggle with Russia in the Far Fast and 
France in Africa# Both Germany and Britain needed the sup­
port of the other, but the British felt they needed it less32 
since isolation and naval rower still had its merits* Nev­
ertheless, the question of the success or failure of Anglo- 
German co-ooeratlon dominated European diplomatic affairs 
between 1990 and the outbreak of World War 1.33
In 1B90 Germany’s refusal to renew the Reinsurance 
Treaty emphas ized her need of British friendship. Oanrivi, 
the Kaiser, and Holstain3^ rec o g n ized the truth of Bismarck’s 
comment that Germany1a proper relation with Britain was one 
of "traditional f r i e n d s h i p . Caprlvi and his successors 
duly sought British support to strengthen the Triple Alii- 
ance.y° British policy was to support those powers with whom
3 ontag, Europe an PI •plo'matto, p. hf».
3 0‘■Herbert Perris, Gf3marry and the German Emperor (New 
York: Henry Holst and Co.," t9l2), p.TJSb* Hereafter cited
aFerric, Gorman Emperor.
33gf-ooch, Holstein Oracle, p. h.HH*
3^!Iq1 stein Papers, TTT , 171.
35yd. r Becker, Fuerst Buelow urtd England 1997-1909 
(Greifswatd, 1929), p. 57* Her after cited as Becker, Fuerst 
Buelow*
3^Lady Gwendun Cecil, Life of Robert, Fargo is of 
Salisbury (I4. vols.; Londons Hodder and Stoughton, I§2T~32), 
i'V, 36^-06# Hereafter cited as Cecil, Salisbury*
she had least to quax»rel* In 1390 the British had no dis­
pute vrith the Triple Alliance 3? and agreed to conclude a num- 
her of colonial agractionts with G e r m a n y * O n  this basis 
Anglo-German relations appeared satisfactory though the two 
governments were not without disagreement* .Distrust and ill- 
feeling developed from an inability to agree on terms of co­
lonial agreements* The Germans believed that .Britain’s re­
fusal to grant greater colonial concessions resulted from 
iior desire to impede German ambitions i or a colonial empire.39 
German dissatisfaction with Britain over colonial 
affairs drove her in 1394 to attempt to regain Russia’s 
friandahip• The Germans had difficulties in regaining 
Russia’s support as the Russians had moved closer to Prance 
since 1390* Russia had sought French support since the fail­
ure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty and the growth of Anglo- 
German friendship* The result of the Pranco-Hussian friend­
ship was the conclusion of the Dual Alliance of X39!i * ^  
Prance, no longer isolated, possessed an unwilling ally in 
Russia and once again threatened GermanyT s wostern border*
‘Viscount urey of F&lioden, Twenty-FIve Years Xo92- 
1916 (2 v~ols•; London: Frederick A. Stoke s Co., W32'T, 1,
7-b, Hereafter cited as Grey, Twenty-Flve*
J ifribrum, Rn;;Iund and Purope* pp. IjB, >2*
 ^o
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Japanese and the British, who maintained cordial relations 
with Japan, and failed to weaken the Dual Alliance.^
German foreign policy indicated by 1 that Germany 
had failed to win British friendship, isolate France, or ob­
tain any real hop® of Russian friendship.^-® Much of th© re­
sponsibility for th® German failure resulted from th© inter­
ference of the Kaiser in foreign affairs and the lack of co­
ordination between the four major instigators of policy--the 
Kaiser, th© Chancellor, th© State Secretary, and Holstein 
Ho individual was more aware of this fact than Holstein who 
placed the blame on the meddling Kaiser.
Holstein supported the Kaiser during the early years 
of his reign and hoped that Wilhelm II would restrain th© 
power of the Bismarcks• Th© Vortragender Rat was soon dis­
appointed and became on© of the Kaiser*s most violent crit­
ics.^ He condemned Wilhelm II for interfering in foreign 
affairs, inaugurating policies contrary to those in existence, 
and not informing the German Foreign Office of any policy 
change.^ Th© impulsiveness of the Kaiser and his indiscre-
^Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, pp. 69-71.
Wlbid.
^%oppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany (Hew York: Th©
Macmillan Co., 195U), PP« 302-3$3. Hereafter cited as Pinson, 
Modern♦
^Craig, From Bismarck, p. 37*
^ Holstein Papers, II, xvii-xix. ^ I b i d ., III, 612.
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fcions in private conversations, as well as emotional speeches,
Holstein stated, "The Kaiser is a conceited child; he is not
the chief danger in th© life of Kaiser Wilhelm II is that 
he Is and remains absolutely unconscious of the effect 
which his speeches and actions have upon Princes, public 
men, and the masses* The life work of ©very Government 
of Wilhelm IX must be to counter this danger and as far 
as possible to nullify these effects* A task which soon 
wears one out*>6
Holstein attempted to curb th© interference of th© 
Kaiser and to rectify the lack of unity in foreign affairs^ 
by forming a number of friendships with individuals from 
whom Wilhelm accepted advice*^ Through such friends, Hol­
stein discovered the attitude of the Kaiser on important 
diplomatic questions and hoped by advising these intermedi­
aries, who in turn advised th© Kaiser, to win acceptance of 
Foreign Office policies* The first such intermediary was 
Count von Waldersee who was followed by th© more important 
Count Philip Eulenburg, "the Kaiser*s Friend*w Eulenburg 
enjoyed the confidence of Wilhelm II for most of the 1890*s
only damaged the position of the Reicbr^ by creating feel­
ings of suspicion and distrust among the European powers*^
within th© realm of reality"^ and
53lbide, I# 190* bid*, IV, 200.
^Holstein Papers, III, 612-13* 
^Craig, From Bismarck, p* 37* 
^Haller, Eulenburg, I, 230-91. 
59Ibld*, 280-82, 307-310.
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and was replaced by Count von Buelow in 1897, when the lat­
ter became State Secretary.
During the middle 1890*e Holstein became more con­
cerned about the increasing interference of the Kaiser and 
Initiated new methods for limiting Vilhelm's actions.^ Hol­
stein favored strengthening the position of the Chancellor 
in opposition to the Kaiser, but Eulenburg continued to favor 
curbing the powers of Wilhelm II by Indirect advising. In 
opposition to Eulenburg the Vortragender Hat directed Hohen- 
lohe to take a strong stand against th© Kaiser hoping that 
such action would create a balance of power between th© 
Chancellor and fcilhelm II. Holstein's plan failed, and the 
Kaiser continued to disrupt foreign affairs,82 particularly 
Anglo-German relations. 63
H e  years 1890 to 189U marked the highpoint in Anglo- 
German friendship,8!j. but succeeding events and th© actions of 
the Kaiser caused constant tension and mistrust between the
60Ibid., IT, 83.
^PbicL It was this difference of opinion on the 
part of Eulenburg and Holstein that eventually led to the 
dissolving of their friendship In 1899.
6% bid., I, 310-11, 31 <5, 337-38, 3U5-U6. Holstein 
Papers , ITfV I»32n • 1.
^3banger, Pi plomacy, I, 210.
^ G .  P. Gooch, History of Modem Europe 1873-1919
(New York: Henry Holt and "cm\T93i(T; p. sob: n i ? e a i w
cited as Gooch, History.
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two governments Though the Kaiser attacked the British
in his violent tirades, he continued to hope that Britain 
would join the Triple Alliance or at least consent to an 
Anglo-German a l l i a n c e H o  always desired the best of re­
lations with the British in spite of his actions to the con-
A *7
trary. * His
• • • jealousy of Great Britain, her empire, and her 
fleet was a cardinal reason both for his being constant­
ly attracted to England and for his desiring to become 
hor colonial and naval rival•
Th© fact still remained that the Kaiser increased world ten­
sions
Holstein criticised the Kaiser for creating, world 
tensions, but he agreed with Wilhelm II that an alliance with 
Great Britain was for the best Interests of Germany. Hol­
stein felt that in 189U an Anglo-G@rm.an alliance was not im-
^Langer, Diplomacy, I, 200, 210.
66Edvard Frederic Benson, The Kaiser and English Ha­
lations (Hew York: Longmans, Green, an 'd Co. ,r"T?3£), p.l^l?•
Hereafter cited as Benson, Kaiser and English.
6?xhia., p. i6o.
^  'Eugene K. Andevson , 'Eie FIrst Horocoan Crisis 190k- 
1906 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930T, n. §?1. 
Hereafter cited as Anderson, First Horocoan.
^^Slle Halevy, A History of the English People in the
Nineteenth Century, Volt W T ~ n  iperTaYism an<1 'the Rise oF“
Labour, trans. E. I. Watkin {6 vols•; Mew’YorC: Barnes and
Noble Inc., 1961), V9 112-13* Hereafter cited as HaleVy, 
Imperialism.
v>
mediately m a n d a t o r y . Th© formation of th© Dual Alliance, 
which created a counterbalance to the Triple Alliance, had
minimized th© need of Britain to maintain the European bal­
ance of power and assured Europe of relative security. In 
these circumstances Germany was able to fellow the policy of 
th© "free hand" and, far the time being, was less concerned 
with the threat of a European war and free t:o follow an im­
perialistic policy.
Holstein perceived little danger in Germany* s policy 
of pursuing imperialistic ambitions in Turkey, Africa, and 
the Ear East if Germany maintained firm support to the Triple 
Alliance and friendly relations with both Britain and Rus-
7 o
sia. fc- In fact lie advocated support of Russia in the Far 
East. Such a policy might gain Russian friendship and em­
phasised British isolation, which had increased with the 
formation of the Dual Alliance. Bore important, Holstein 
felt, was that when Britain realised, her is ole. t .1 on, her 
leaders might be more willing to support th© Triple Alliance, 
possibly more apt to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, and
^Friedrich MeIreeke, Her chi cht e d c s Deutscfr- 
rngllschsn Buendnlsproblems 1 8 9t^»T§QlHTMun 1 ch: R • Tldenbourg, 
1927)", 'pi °7 . Hereafter cited as Me in© eke, Peg chi cht e.
7^Becker, Fliers t Hue low, pp. 57-50*
^^Gerhard Fitter, FEe te^’inde von der Verschregeeten 
BnpJLlachen Freundschaft 1895-1901 TFrelburgi Emil Grosz,
1919! p>"\7* Hereafter cited as ^1tt?'r, tcvcnde. Hol­
stein Papers. Ill, 520, 555-56. ~ ™
la
consent to German demands for colonial concessions in return 
for German friendship,"U
By 189)4. Holstein asserted that Germany was no longer 
obliged to court the support of th© British, but that Brit­
ain was obliged to court the support of the German Empire. 
The British, he believed# would eventually recognise their 
isolation and seek German support for which Britain would 
have to pay In the form of significant colonial, concessions 
and by joining the 'Triple Alliance, intll Britain sought 
German assistance, Germany was m e r e l y  to wait as the British 
must eventually seek Germ.an support. Germany, In th© mean­
time, could make the best of her posltfor hr increasing her 
colonial possessions, winning Russia*s friendship, and per­
haps bettering relations with France .*^ 1
Holstein, by December, 189$, realized that Britain 
had failed to move any closer to Germany. He honed to gain 
British support by threatening Britain with a Continental 
league thereby forcing her to realize the need of German 
support#*7^  111© Kaiser had earlier threatened the British
with a Contirsental League, but- the Vontragcnder Rat had de­
veloped the idea and first gave it official formula!I or in a
^Becker, Fuerst Buelow, pp. 57-58.
"^Eugene Fischer, Holsteins Drosses Hein (Berlins
Deubs eh Ye r! agsge sells cha ft7 T925TT p# W"* fierea ft ev n 1. te d 
as Fischer, Hein.
7^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. 14.36-37•
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memorandum dated December 3®, 1895*?^ In concise terms Hol­
stein argued that Hritain would never solve her differences 
with Russia and France. Since Britain would always refuse 
to forsake India without a fight, she would always be opposed 
by the Dual Alliance. Because in India, Britain faced the 
threat of Russian advances in Persia and French advances in 
Egypt. Britain1 s differences with the Dual Alliance would, 
force her to support the Triple Alliance if peace was to 
prevail and If Britain hoped to maintain her colonial domi­
nance In Africa and the Far East. The problem was how to 
force Britain to perceive her Isolation and dire need of the 
support of the Triple Alliance. Holstein felt that the threat 
of a Continental league was the necessary means for pres­
suring the British Into seeking the assistance of G e r m a n y .77
The Ideas of Holstein on Anglo-German relations con­
tained a number of mistaken judgments and fallacies. His 
fundamental fallacy was the unshakeable belief that Britain 
would never conclude an agreement with France and Russia.78
7^Langer, Diplomacy, I, 233*
^7rfaylor, Mastery, p. 366. Johannes Lepsius, 
Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimrne, (eds.), 
Die Grosse Folltlk der Europaelachen Kablnette, 1871-191U (UO 
voIs * in $0j Ber1in: Deutsche Veri&gsges©1ischaft, 1922- 
1927), XI, 67-69* Hereafter cited as G. P. E. T. S. 
Dugdale (ed.) and trans. German Diplomatic Documents 1871- 
19lit (it vols.j Hew York: Harper and " Bro tHorsT, 19^8-1931),
II, 372-7U* Hereafter cited as Dugdale, German Diplomatic.
7%olgteln Papers, III, it82n. 1. Hammann, World
Policy, p. llil.
Hatzfeldt warned Holstein that Britain very possibly could
work out an agreement with the .Dual Alliance, but the 
Tortragender Rat failed to heed the Ambassadorfs a d v i c e * ^
A second fallacy was the idea of coercing Britain into the 
Triple Alliance• Instead of gaining support* the policy of 
pressuring the British backfired, and Germany lout any hope 
of Britain * s friendship*
Holstein’s hope for an alliance was also doomed to 
failure because the Kaiser’s interference in foreign affairs 
caused Germany to appear to shift her support from first on© 
power then to another* This appearance of vacillation cre­
ated oh.ly feelings of mistrust on the part of other powers 
and eventually led to Germany * s isolation*^
The foreign policy of Lord Salisbury was another 
factor that prevented an Anglo-German understanding* Salis­
bury distrusted the Germans and hoped to avoid an alii m e ©  
with Germany unless there appeared no other means for in­
suring British security#®*- The I rime Minister also possessed 
unbounded© onfidence in Britain’s ability to maintain her inde-
7^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 1;5>7*
®^Pinaoa, Modern Germany, p# 303#
®*Langer, Diplomacy, I, 25h• Cecil* Salisbury,
IV ,  3 6 1 . '
8?“J# L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain 
(3 vols* 5 London * MacmxIIanTan<f Co., 193JJ) , ii, Her©**
after cited as Garvin, Chamberlain*
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penderce by relying upon her powerful nsvy.°3 With such 
views, Salisbury prevented Britain from joining the Triple 
Alliance and frustrated Holstein1s hope for a British alli­
ance.^
In addition to the Prime Minister*a opposition the 
views of Hohenlohe, Buelow, and the actions of the Kaiser 
prevented the conclusion of an Anglo-German understanding.
The two Chancellors, Buelow and Hohenlohe, in opposition to 
Holstein and Hstsfeldt, favored better relations with Russia 
rather than with Britain. A British alliance was desirable, 
they thought, but not a necessity as Hatzfeldt and Holstein 
believed. Buelow also supported the German naval program, 
which only antagonized the British, and refused to curb the 
outbursts of the Kaiser or M s  interference In foreign 
affairs.
The actions of the Kaiser particularly prevented a 
British alliance and resulted in unnecessary damage to Anglo- 
German relations. He caused significant damage In 1895
^Cecil, Salisbury, IV, 87-88. Lillian M. Penson, 
"The Hew Course In British Foreign Policy 1892-1902,” Trans­
actions of the Royal Historical Society (London: Office of
Royal HisTorical Soclety, 191^ 3) XXV, fourth series, 12^-25. 
Hereafter cited as Penson, "British Foreign Policy”•
^•Sontag, European Diplomatic, p. 61. Langer, 
Diplomacy, II, 791.
^Buelow, Memoirs, I, 55-56. Prince Bernhard 
von Buelow, Imperial" Sermany, trans. Marie A. Lewenz (Hew 
Yorks Dodd Mead and Co.,~T9lit), pp. 57-58. Hereafter cited 
as Buelow, Imperial Germany.
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during his visit to Great Britain. The Kaiser, while In 
Britain, had several discussions with Lord Salisbury at Cowes. 
During; these discussions a personal antagonism developed be­
tween the two leaders from a misunderstanding over when one 
of their meetings was to occur. The antagor.1sm of Salisbury 
and the Kaiser created distrust between the t\^ ro countries 
and disturbed Anglo-German relations until the Prime Minister 
resigned in 1902.86
Kaiser Wilhelm II caused unrepairable damage to 
Anglo-German'relations when he despatched the Kruger tele-
lf.3
gram.u t In 1R96 the Jameson raid on the Boer Republics led 
the Kaiser to send a telegram congratulateng the President 
of the Boer Republics, Paul Kruger, on the Boers defense of 
their country from invasion. The Kaiser and the German pub­
lic believed uhat the raid was authorized by the British 
government and constituted an act of aggression. Britain was 
furious over the telegram and asserted that Wilhelm I I  had 
Interfered in the internal affairs of the British Empire.
The incident caused such antagonism that both Britain and 
Germany were never able to restore their previous state of 
good relations.^8
^Brandenburg, Prom Biamarck World, pp. 73-76.
Holstein Papers, IV, 12?-?3*
87Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 85.
86Langer, Diplomacy. I, 22-30, 233-38, 25k.
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Following the Kruger Incident,Holstein believed that 
the problem facing; German foreign policy was how to regain 
Britain1s lost friendship and ultimately obtain an Anglo- 
German a l l i a n c e . 89 Holstein and the German Foreign Office 
realized that the threat of a Continental league was inef­
fective in winning British f r i e n d s h i p . T h e  Germans, there­
fore, modified their antagonistic policy toward the British 
by refraining from any unfriendly action until the effects 
of the Kruger telegram had passed. They even made an attempt 
to win Britain’s friendship by adhering to benevolent neu­
trality In South Africa and Egypt* ‘Though German policy 
succeeded in obtaining British support, much of Britain * 3 
friendship was lost or at least limited by Germany1s support 
of Russia in the Far E a s t .91
After the Sino-Japanese Mar, the Far Eastern question 
dominated international relations as China, instead of Turkey, 
became the "slck-msn" of the world.^2 In 1897 the Germans 
took the initiative in the threatened partition of China by 
concluding a confusing agreement with Russia. Germany, in 
return for her support of Russia in th© Far East, obtained a
^ Holstein Papers, IV, 22.
9°Ibid., 35-36, 37, lil, 22-21*., 6Uii, 659. Holstein 
expressed his support for a greater consideration of th© 
British In letters on the above pages.
9lLanger, Diplomacy, I, 282-83, 297. Anderson, First 
Morocco, pp. 56-57.
92<j*ayior, Mastery, p. 391.
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coaling station at Riau-Chow. The Russians followed by oc­
cupying Port Arthur*^3 These ©vents emphasized Britain’s 
Isolationist position, and led Salisbury In 1898, in order 
to protect British Far Eastern interests, to enter negotia­
tions with Russia to hinder further partition of China* The 
Russians refused Salisbury’s suggestion having no reason to 
conclude an agreement that restricted Russia’s Imperialistic 
alms in the Far Sast.^f- It appeared that Holstein’s policy 
was working. Germany gained concessions in the Far East 
and Russia’s friendship, while Britain became more aware of 
her isolation. Holstein believed that if Germany continued 
to adhere to the "free hand", Britain would eventually seek 
German assistance.^5
The British, though they sought the support of Russia 
in 1898, adhered to the strong belief that Isolation was not 
as great a threat as was asserted by th© Germans.96 Salis­
bury believed that British isolation was a possibility but 
was not a fact in 1898 or as long as he was Prime Minister.^
^Brandenburg, Prom Bismarck World, p. 101-102.
^Temperley, Foundations, pp. 1499-500. Dugdale, 
German Diplomatic, iif; ao-.-----
^ H o l s t e i n  Papers, IV, 10. Langer, Diplomacy, II,
U99.
96lbld.. 791.
97Cecll, Salisbury, IV, 85-86.
If Britain maintained a strong navy98 and worked to preserve 
the balance of power,Salisbury felt, peace and the best 
interests of Britain were possible of atta inmen t.5-®® Th© 
Prim© Minister, in order to avoid isolation and the conclu­
sion of an alliance, hoped to obtain th© support of other 
powers by concluding limited agreements over specific issues. 
He refused to conclude any undefinite, general alliance based 
upon future, undeterminable contingencies ♦5-®5- A general 
understanding was impossible in light of th© unobtainable 
sanction of Parliament and public opinion.5*®^  ‘The Prime 
Minister asserted, "the possibilities of the situation must 
decide" British policy.5'®3 The result of Salisbury’s policy 
was that Britain appeared to vacillate between support to th©
^ Arshag Channer Sarkission (©d.), Studies in Diplo­
matic History ill a tori ographv in Honour of g T P\ GoocK, C. H. 
Dam© Lillian M. Person, ^Obligations fiy*T*r©aty: Their Flace
in British Foreign Policy, IB96-I9H 4.,** (London: Longmans,
1961), p. 83. Hereafter cited as Person, "Obligations"•
®®Gooeh, Studios, p. 62.
l®®John Dean Bickford and Edgar N. Johnson, "The 
Contemplated Anglo-German Alliance: 1890-1901," Political
Science Quarterly, XLIT (March, 1927). 22. Hereafter cited 
as Johns on, * Con tempi ated" •
5-®1Penson, British Foreign Policy,11 pp. 129-30.
102Cecil, Salisbury, IV, 8 7 .
103l.i Ilian K. Pen son, "The Principles and Methods of 
Lord Salisbury’s Foreign Policy," The Cambridge Historical
Journal (19351# V, 10U-105. Hereaftercited as Person, 
^Principles11 •
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Dual Alliance and th© Triple Alliance.*®^ This wavering of 
support caused the other powers to distrust th© British, but 
Salisbury’s policy succeeded in preventing Britain from con­
cluding a German alliance and avoided upsetting the balance 
of power.
Other .members of the British cabinet were more appre­
hensive than Salisbury over the position of Britain.5*®^
Chief among these was Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary 
and a strong advocate of an alliance with Germany.5-®? In 
1896 Chamberlain and the cabinet ministers, the Duke of 
Devonshire and to a lesser degree the nephew of Lord Salisbury, 
Arthur Balfour, felt Britain was In eminent danger of Isola­
tion and should consider concluding an alii an ce*5-®8 The 
British, because of differences with Russia In the Far East 
and Franc© In Africa, decided to consider an alliance with 
Germany.5-®^
The discussions for an Anglo-German alliance took
1(% b l d .
105Robert W. Seton-Votson, Britain In Inrope 1739-191ii 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1555)»PP. 59i*-95. Sere-
after cited as Seton-Matson, Britain.
5®®Langer, Diplomacy, IT, 530.
10?Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 251*-55.
*®®Langer, Diplomacy, II, 193, 1;85-88, 530.
Johannes Preytr, Deutschland und England in ihrer 
Polltik und Press© 1m Jahre I‘gQI . (SerltnT Emil "liber5 rg, 
W W H T  r:. 307 Here aft er ' c¥ t © d as Drey or, Dev? tschl an d.
place between March and May, I898. H ®  The proposed Tinder- 
standing was for a. defers ire alliance til th mutual agreement 
as to a common policy in China but also in other areas. Once 
the British and Germans had stated the general terms, th© 
remaining discussions concerned the arguments for and against 
the conclusion of an agreement•5-5,5*
More Important than the detailed discussions was the 
manner In which the negotiations were conducted and the in­
fluence of the individuals Involved upon th© discussions.
5 5 C)T h e r e  was snd still is a great dispute as to who 
exactly inaugurated the alliance talks, th© British in th© 
person of Chamberlain or the Germans In the persons of 
Bckardsteln and Hatzfeldt. According to Chamberlain, it was 
Eckardstein who first suggested an alliance. Garvin, Cham­
berlain, III, 278-79. Hatzfeldt attributed the id©a to 
Chamberlain• G. P., XIV, Part 1, 202-2014* Pribram stated 
that It was of 111;tie significance who offered the alliance 
since both states desired some form of an agreement. Mhrarn, 
England and Europe, p. 69. However, It was very important 
for "those" "Hi s torian s who felt that if Germany refused a 
British offer the German government was at least Indirectly 
responsible for not accepting It and possibly avoiding World 
War I. Even more important was the real nossibllity that an 
alliance was never offered and that what developed Into the 
consideration of an alliance was a result of the actions of 
an individual not directly connected with either government, 
hanger, Diplomacy, II, 531. Such an individual was the mys­
terious PrelKerr Von Eekardstein, who worked behind the back of 
and with Hatzfeldt trying to maneuver both governments into 
th© concluding of an alliance. As the negotiations from 
1898 to 1901 progressed, th© secret diplomacy of Eekardstein 
becomes more evident and more condemnable. For a condem­
nation of Eekardstein1s rol© In the 1898 negotiations see 
th© significant not© of Balfour in Blanche Elizabeth Campbell 
Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour (2 vols.; 
New York: G.’ P* Putnam1s Sons,193?)", I, Y87-T9T. Hereafter
cited as Dugdale, Balfour.
^^Langer, Diplomacy, II, l4.9J4.-96.
Chamberlain served as the leading British negotiator instead 
of Salisbury* who was ill in the Sooth of France, or Balfour, 
who was acting aa foreign S e c r e t o r y . T h e  Colonial Secre­
tary conducted th© negotiations wl th Tiia close friend and 
wealthy financier, A M m d  de Rothschild, who desired to pro­
tect his Far hasten) interests, and Hermann von Kckardstein,^ 3  
an extreme Anglophile and avid supporter of at) alliance•’5*^ 
Fckardstein, with the support of Rothschild, served as the 
intermediary between Chamberlain and -Zlausfeldt, the Geman 
representative in the alliance negotiabione. In agreement 
with Rothschild and Chamberlain, Fckardstein arranged a 
meeting between the Colonial Secretary and Kat&feldb to dis­
cuss the possibility of an agreement * ^ 5  The discussions 
began and throughout their duration Hckarusteln agitated 
vehemently for an understanding, so much oo, that he exag­
gerated th© desirability of Britain aund Germany for an al­
liance ,3-16
11?Garvin, Chamber!ain, TXT, 2hh.
111-’Baron Hermann von Eckardstein was not 1 n active 
diplomatic service of the German Government until 1696 but 
was, nevertheless, active in German diplomacy. In 189& he 
was appointed Counsellor of Legation and Mrst Secretary In 
the London Embassy be tween 1699-1902. Holstein Papers, IV, 
113n. 3* The Gorman Foreign Office relief unon 'Sctear3sfcein 
because of his social connections with the British cabinet. 
His wife was the daughter and heiress of the millionaire fur< 
nitur© manufacture Sir Blundell Maple, who supplied hokard- 
stein with his social connections and supported M s  specula­
tion on the stock exchange. In 1905 following a scandal, 
Eckardsteln was divorced. Buelow, Memoirs, II, Jj.6-1*?.
^^•Garvln, Chamberlain, III, 255-57#
115lbld., 2^6-57. 116Ibld., 25li-7^.
During th© alliance negotiations Hatzfeldt became 
suspicious of Chamberlain * s actions and disliked his forward 
business-like manner of conducting diplomatic affairs. 
Hatzfeldt*s suspicions were also shared by the directors of 
German policy in Berlin.^7 Buelow, who had become State 
Secretary in 1397 and near director of German nolicy, was 
never enthusiastic about an alliance with. Britain and tended 
to accept the advice of Holstein,^® who, at this time, ad­
vocated a policy of listening to the British suggestions but 
not to make any definite commitment . ^ 9  Buelow argued against 
an alliance since it would antagonize the Russians arid 'hinder 
Germany1 a imperialistic policy in the Far Fast. For an al­
liance to bo acceptable, he felt, the British Parliament must 
approve the measure, which was impossible due to the antag­
onism of public opinion. Present circumstances indicate d that 
the best policy was to wait as Britain would eventually re­
turn seeking an alliance. In the meantime Germany was to 
continue to express interest in an alliance but only in order 
to avoid antagonizing the British.****-® the policy of th©
"free hand" was still the most profitable and remained Buelow fs
W i w a . , 2*7.
Otto Eammarm, Zur Verges chi cht^ <3es '-eltkrl ere.
(Berlins Feimar bobbing, 1919), p • '/FT Sereaf te"x* "cl ted as 
Hammann, Zur Vorg.es chi cht e ♦
H9Buelow, Imperial Germany, p. £3.
120G. p., XIV, Part 1, 20!;-207, 227-29. tenser, 
Diplomacy, II ,1|97# p03.
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policy during the alliance discussions between 1398 and 
1901.121
Hi© Kaiser agreed with Buelow on the alliance ques­
tion, even though he had personally pressed Salisbury in 
1896 to conclude an alliance.^22 As the Kaiser stated, the 
chief concern was for a British alliance that would protect 
Germany*s European position and not protect Britain*s inter­
ests in th© Far East. He felt that Germany had no desire to 
antagonize the Russians and the French by3*23 concluding an 
agreement with Britain. Germany was not in need of an alli­
ance; therefore, Hatzfeldt was to refuse th© offer but to do 
so without antagonizing the British. Th© Ambassador was to 
emphasize the hop© for a future British alliance and express 
a willingness to conclude minor colonial agreements. 3*2 -^
Th© Kaiser and Buelow also agreed with Holstein,3*2$ 
who was just as skeptical of Chamberlain's offer. Holstein 
always distrusted the British3*26 arj& felt they desired only
3*23.gecfcer> Puerst Buelow, p. 65.
122por the interesting details of this almost attempt 
on the part of the Kaiser to work out an alliance see the 
following. Benson, Kaiser and England, p. 122.
3*23i,anger, Diplomacy, II, 500-501.
121*2* £•» XIV, Part 1, 208-209. G. P. Gooch, 
Before th© War, Studies in Diplomacy (2 vols•; London: Long­
mans, Green and Co., 193&-38), I, 201 • Hereafter cited as 
Gooch, Before the Mar.
3*25>B©ckar, Puerst Buelow, p. 270.
^ Holstein Papers, IV, 77.
to involve Germany in conflicts with the Dual Alliance.^27 
At the present time, he believed, British support was unnec­
essary and would not be needed as long as friendly relations 
existed with Russia* He was also certain that Britain, at 
some future time, would conclude an alliance vrith Germany 
since Anglo-Russi an antagonism required Britain always to 
seek German support. The "free hand” was still the legiti­
mate policy. He declared, Germany was and would remain for 
a reasonable time the arbiter mundi, that is as long as she 
preserved, her independence by not siding with any other
power.w^28 Germany must continue to work for the removal of
the small colonial disputes between the two countries-^^ and 
simultaneously "preserve the existing desire for friendly 
relations for the purpose of a possible later rapprochement. ”3-3$
The British were more eager for an agreement than the 
Germans, but they failed to agree on a common policy toward a 
German alliance. The differences between the British leaders 
arose over how far Britain was willing to go in the protec­
tion of her Far Eastern interests.^31 chamberlain expressed 
a desire, plus an equal amount of eagerness, to conclude a 
binding alliance that proposed to protect the two nations
colonial and European interests.3*32 Even so, the unwilling-
127Ibld., 75. ig&Tbld.. 63n. 1 .
12<?Ibld.. 68-69. U Oibia.. 72.
13lLanger, .Diplomacy. II, 509-510.
U 2(>arvin, Chamberlain. Ill, 255.
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ness of the Germans and th© refusal of Salisbury to conclude 
such an encompassing alliance led Chamberlain to realize 
that an agreement was impossible.^33
Salisbury, though he desired to protect Britainfs Far 
Eastern interests, believed Britain was strong enough that 
she would not have to conclude a German Alliance.^3U There 
was no reason to forsake British freedom of action by binding 
herself to Germany. As Salisbury stated to Hatzfeldt, "You 
ask too much for your friendship." The Prime Minister also 
opposed an alliance with Germany because of the manner In 
which the Germans and Chamberlain conducted the negotiations. 
Salisbury never condoned the alliance discussions even though 
Chamberlain kept the Prime Minister informed of the negotia­
tions.^^ Bike Balfour, who termed the negotiations "ama­
teur," Salisbury expressed little faith in the secret diplo­
macy of-*-3& Eckardsteln, Rothschild, and Chamberlain. He 
preferred that all discussion b© conducted through regular 
diplomatic c h a n n e l s .**37 Sine© Salisbury opposed an alliance,
133Ibid., 291, 29H-95.
^Ij-Fribram, England and Europe, p. 70. Langes?, 
Diplomacy,IX. 505-506.
13hbid., 51k.
UO.Aigdale, Balfour, I, 189-191. Balfour gave one of 
the most humorous and probably most accurate pictures of th© 
diplomacy of th© 1398 alliance negotiations. It also appeared 
that his version was generally the manner in which all th© 
alliance talks from 1898 to 1901 were conducted.
13?ibid.. 189-190
Chamberlain and Eckardsteln had little hope of coneluding an 
agreement•^3®
The Kaiser, before the alliance discussions ended, 
committed another one of hia blunders that damaged Anglo- 
German relations* Both Germany and Britain stipulated that 
the alliance negotiations were to remain secret, but the 
Kaiser Informed Czar .Nicholas II that Britain had offered 
Germany an alliance* To the F.aiser *s surprise, the Czar 
replied that Britain had offered Russia an alliance in Jan­
uary, 1898* The Incident reaffirmed the danger involved in 
Hilheln’s Interference in foreign affairs and Increased Ger- 
manyfs distrust of the British. Britain’s distrust of the 
Germans also increased whan she learned that the negotiations 
had been revealed to the Russians,^39
In spite of the Kaiser’s blunder, the alliance nego­
tiations ended on a positive note* Both nations expressed a 
sincere desire for better relations In the future * Tho
major task was to remove th© Ill-feeling between the two 
governments by solving their colonial disputes*^1^ Such was 
predominantly the opinion of the Germans, ’who hoped to gain
138lbld.
3-39<}arvir)> Chamberlain, III, 135-69. Brandenburg,
From Bismarck borid, pp. "IT-IT-
^°Taylor, Mastery, 378.
1W-G. P., XIV, Part 1, 209-212. Dugdale, German
Diplomatic,~~IlT~, 25.
colonial concessions*^*^ Th© British, b«c#u#« they faced th# 
threat ot Bussla to th# Far bast* Franc# In th# Faahod* art* 
sis* and th# Boer® in fouth Africa *^*3 consented to grant 
Q m m i m f  colonial ooneastions In return for support, 'Th# 
British* therefor®# agreed to negotiate an Anglo-fteman 
agreement over the Fortugues# Africtm coltmle®*^1^
In 1398 Portugal faced possible financial collapse* 
which raised the question of the disposal of her Afrlcon 
colonies. On Oamariyh request Great Britain and Germany 
eon eluded an mgr octant in August* 18 98* partitioning th# 
Fortuguea#© African oolonles*^1^  Germany* soon after th© 
conclusion of the under# banding* bo came dissatisfied with th# 
British because they refused be implement the agrecirsent• Hi# 
Frit!rh had failed to enforce the under#bonding because Por* 
tugal and Britain had concluded a #caret treaty which trval**
1 dated the agreement with Germany the manner and clreum-
stance# revolving around the conelusion of the Arglo-Geraon
^^Brandenburg* From Bfemarcfc World, pp. 103* 106, 111,
lls3ciooch* Studies, p* 61,1* banger, Jlplomaey* II*
569-70. '
^Mubtd* * 569# Brandenburg* Frow* Bt ewarck World*
p# 119.
1^ 4Singer* Diplomacy* XI* $?2»2k*
^ ^Ibld.. 619* 621-1:5* 0. ?. Gooch and Harold
Tamper ley* lyltl ah Joomttenta on th# Origin# of the War 1398-
191k (11 v ^ T r T o H l S T r ^ a ^ a ^ t F r ^ t m ^  W T i e 5 7
X9I0-36)* I* 98-99* Hereafter cited at j£5. j).
agreement provided only superficial means for bettering the 
two governments relations .^-7
Another area for Anglo-German co-operation arose from 
difficulties In Samoa. In 1893 civil war broke out between 
native claimants for the Samoan throne, The 1 stands, at th# 
time, were under the administration of Germany, the United 
States, and Great Britain. Th© Germans perceived an oppor­
tunity to gain colonial possessions and demanded partition 
of the islands. Salisbury opposed such drastic action and 
desired to frustrate the opportunistic demands of the Kaiser. 
In st>1 to of Salisbury’s objections an agreement was signed, 
hut not before the Kaiser’s violent attacks against the Prime 
Minister had delayed the negotiations^*® and unnecessarily 
strained the two governments relations. V 9  The» Germans felt 
th© Samoan Agreement indicated the ability of the two nations 
to co-operate, but in actuality the Pressure and method of 
German foreign policy only hindered better relations
In October, 1899, the Boer War broke out and empha­
sized Britain’s need of German neutrality.^b^ The British,
^^Gooch, Holateln Oracle, p. Iy56.
^^Langer, Diplomacy, II, 620-214..
^^Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 129.
B. D., I, 130. ' 1
•^P^Langor, Diplomacy, II, 62l i • Pribram, England
and Europe, pp. 77-70,
■^^•Langer, Diplomacy, II, 6214..
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in order to assure Germany1s friendship* invited the Kaiser 
to visit Britain during November* 1399.^*?^ Filhelm II agreed 
to the visit not having beer In frlta!n sine© th# dlsasterous 
meeting at Cowes in 139?*
Before the Kaiser departed for Britain, he and Fuel dr, 
who was to accompany the Emperor* received detnlled instruc­
tions from the German Foreign Office as to the policy toward 
the British* The German Foreign Office believed that possi­
bly the British, as a result of the Far Be stern and f'outh 
African situations* might offer an alliance* Holstein was 
parti©vlarly apprehensive and advi sed that if Chamberlain 
p\’rgfstod an arrcement not to act too optimistic* **u#low 
and the Kaiser were only to remind, the British that from th# 
present situstion etr©upi»taneee might develop where co- 
o pe rn 11 on won 1 d. be u a efrl for both governments #X?lf As In 
t • ■'# p# at, Hoi st#in be!f e vrd,
Germany, now that the art tsti on for revanche bee loot 
its immediate political importance, faces no visible 
danger of war fror #r»y direction, and world erdenr^r her 
peaceful security and make her own position worse if she 
undertook to support “tv-lard* whether bv parti clpatl on 
in war or by alert neutrality* • • as long as Germany1a 
relat* ona vi th Pus si# remain uncharged, ah# will rot 
accept an agreement which Is visibly directed against 
Fu b s I#.1"
1  t .'o
*-'c~jtod#raon* First lorooeo* p* 61*
-'•-’hanger* Diplomacy, IX* 666*
^>Ub u#1o w * Memoirs* 1 * 365-60*
^BPiiolgteln Faper#* IV, lb6-77*
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Holstein*s position and German foreign policy was merely a 
repetition of the views held during the alliance negotiations
of 1898
vJhile In Britain, Wilhelm II and Buelow met at Wind­
sor with Chamberlain Instead of Salisbury, who was absent 
due to the recent death of uls wife- Chamberlain, as the 
British representative In the following alliance discussions, 
proposed,l>( probably with some encouragemont from Bekard- 
stein,^^> a defensive alliance directed against Russia be­
tween oreat Britain, Germany, and the United Sbates7 ^
Buelow and the Kaiser responded by following Holstein ' a ad- 
vice^°^ and reaffirmed th© desire for limited agreements over 
particular Issues. Chamberlain was kept friendly so as not 
to endanger a future British alliance and the possibility of 
gaining colonial concessions. The alliance negotiations were 
unsuccessful, but th© bindsor meetings were a success In 
bettering Anglo-German relations and demonstrating to th© 
British public Germany's friendship and neutrality in the
^%ooch, Studies, p. 6^.
Langsr, Diplomacy. II, 65b-£7.
^>®Baron von SewardstoIn, Ten Tears at the Court of 
St. James 1895-1905 (London: Thornton Butterwort"S,*l92X),
p. 15T7* Hereafter cited as ''ekardsteln, Ten Years.
3- 5 9 ? ip sir; d © n be. w , wrom Bismarck World, pp. 137-38.
■^^Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War 191k 
(2 vols •; New York: Charles ScrTPner^T^ons, “1^3^77 1728-29.
Hereafter cited as Schmitt, The Coming.
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Boer War.^1
The alliance discussions were far from ended vhen th© 
Kaiser had returned to Germany. Chamberlain, supposedly 
under the impression that Buelow and the Kaiser desired an 
understanding,162 announced in a sueech at Leicester on No­
vember 30, 1899, that the peace of the world depended upon 
the "natural alliance” between Britain, Germany, and th© 
United States--"© new Triple Alliance.11 Public opinion in 
both countries expressed astonishment and condemned the ab­
surd Idea. It was generally felt that the Colonial Secretary 
had committed another blunder by continuing to Interfere in 
foreign affairs.*^3
Holstein and the German government were just as 
shocked as public opinion by Chamberlain1s suggestion and 
agreed with Buelow1s views, as expressed in his Reichstag 
speech of December 11, 1 '99•^0)4 Buelow, possibly fearing 
German Anglophobia end desiring the naasa,^ of the Second 
Nava 1 0111, copimonucd on ^ e m a ny 1 s fr? en dly reio fcions Tri th
1(1 banker, Diplomacy. II, 657-58.
l^e’Sarvin, Chamberlain, III, 510-11. Garvin argued 
in his biograuuy of Gh»w;>^pl5Tu shat tho Colonial Secretary 
had been led to believe by Buelow that he desired him to 
speak nubilely on the aliiance que??ti on• Thus Chamberlain 
vras acting in accord with the wishes of the Gorman govern­
ment* For the opposite view see duelow, Memoirs, I, 370-71•
163Garviu, Chamberlain, TIT, 506-509.
^■^Eckardotein, Ten Year a . p. 11)6.
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Britain. He made no mention of the Leicester speech* Cham­
berlain was furious and felt Rue low and. the Kaiser had misled 
him as to their intentions as expressed at Windsor. 'The in­
cident, aa in so many past instances, strained Anglo-German 
ralatf ons *
During December, H99, the Bundesrath affair occurred 
to mar the relations of Britain and Germany. The British 
had stopped the German mail steamer Bundesrath in an attempt 
to halt supplies from going to the Boers. The Germans were 
outraged, particularly the Kaiser who protested, violently* 
Eventually, the British released the steamer, and the strain 
ii) rel&tlons passed.”°'J
In May, 1900, the problem of the Far Bast returned 
to dominate the concern of the world rowers* ^ 7  Groups of 
Chinese nationalists, known, ©s Boxers, feared the partition 
of China and had rebelled against the foreigners#^® The 
world powers interpreted the Boxer Rebel11 or as ar indication 
of the collapse of,China and an opportunity for gaining colo­
nial concessions. The me lor European powers, plus Japan, 
Russia, and the United States, on the pretext of protecting
^°^Garvin, Chamberlain, III, G10-11.
IbGLanger, Diplomacy, II, o60-b2.
167Ibld.. 692.
168Fen~_chon Chang, The Diplomatic Relations Between 
China and Germany Since 1898 (Shangha!, Chiral The Commer- 
oTaT”Pr e s s i 19 3'6T , p • 63.
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foreign interests and foreigners threatened in the legations 
at Peking, agreed to send Count von Waldersee as Commander- 
In-Chief of the military forces to crush the Boxer Rebellion, 
During the lengthy struggle to suppress the Chinese, the pow­
ers soon became aware that Buss!a was primarily interested 
in inereaslng her influence in China, particularly In Man­
churia. Even Germany perceived Hussia*s plans and attempted 
to work more closely with the Bri t l s h , ^69
By August, 1900, Russia’s aggressive policy led Ger­
many to seek a Eastern agreement with Britain, All in­
dications pointed to th© conclusion of an agreement since 
both governments were on good terms and, to a degree, desired 
a formal alliance* Only Salisbury voiced a skeptical note, 
but he eventually agreed to conclude an agreement* Th.© re­
sult was the Yangtze Agreement of October 16, 1900. ^>70
The terms of the Yangtze Agreement were confusing, 
but th© two countries agreed to maintain the open door in 
China, particularly in the Yangtze Valley, The Germans inter­
preted the agreement as applying only to th© Yangtze* Ger­
many* s interpretation limited the effectiveness of th© under­
standing for the British, who hoped to employ German support 
in halting Russian aggression in ©11 of Chin a.^71 Holstein 
agreed with the German interpretation and felt the under**
^  ^ Larger, Diplomacy, II, 69lp"95>, 693-700,
^7^ibld,, 700-701, ^71«paylor, Mastery, p, 393*
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standing would better relations with Britair.^72
By the end of 1900 Anglo-German relations indicated 
the continuation of closer co-operation between the two gov­
ernments* In Great Britain the Marquis of Lans&owne, who 
had recently become Foreign Secretary, desired the best of 
relations with Germany and was more receptive than Salisbury 
toward an alliance ,^ -73 jrs Germany Buelow had become Chan­
cellor in October, 1900, *^7U- and, though he was more pro- 
Russian than British, he still favored an alliance with 
Britain*^75 At th© same time Oswald von Richthofen had be­
come State Secretary and was easily dominated by the pro- 
British Holstein.^76 g-j the beginning of 1901 Anglo-German 
relations indicated a real prospect of Britain and Germany 
concluding an alliance.^77
IT^Hclsteln Papers, IV, 209*
^*73^aXavy, Imperialism, V, 121-22. 
X7Uoooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. ii5>2~5>3* 
^75b u ©1o w , Memoirs, I , 55*
^76(joocXi# Holstein Oracle, pp. lip3-5 
^77jjaXevy, Imperial ism, V, 121-22.
CHAPTER Ill
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE FIRST PHASE 
OF THE 1901 ATTEMPT AT AN ALLIANCE
In January, 1901, relations between Oreat Britain 
and Germany were of an except*.onaDyfriendly nature and re­
flected hopes felt ir, 'both rations for Increased co-operation#^ 
The Marquis of Lansdowns, the new British Foreign Secretary, 
Buelow, and Richthofen, the German State Secretary, all ex­
pressed hope of maintaining and strengthening present re­
lations by seme fern of a future alliance# Responsible par­
ties in both countries hoped to continue their co-operation
through solving the questions that faced the powers in the
p
Far Hast and particularly the problem of Russian aggression 
in China# ^
Russian occupation of Manchuria, as o. result of the 
Boxer Rebellion, had caused the world powers to express ap­
prehension over the frequent rumors that Russia planned to 
make Manchuria a protectorate* Th© Russians had denied th©
^Meinecke, Gesohtchte, p. 177#
2Thomas Wodehouse Leigh Newton, Lord Lanadown©, A 
Biography (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929)', p. 19?# Here­
after cited as Newton, Lans&owne. O# ?#* XVI* 36$# B# D#,
II, 20. ~ ~  ~
^Melneoke, Oesehlchte, p. 176#
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ruiaors and claimed that when the Boxer threat ended, Bussian 
troops would be removed from Manchuria*^- The Times reported 
on January 3# 1901, that Russia had concluded a secret agree­
ment with China providing for special concessions, if not a 
port©atorate, in Manchuria*^ Th© report caused the European 
powers, Japan, and the United States to express greater ap­
prehension over Russian aggression and the possibility of an 
impending partition of China* The involved powers immediately 
inquired as to th© validity of the rumored agreement and 
attempted to form a policy to halt Russia* The British 
planned, if it was necessary, to rely upon the Yangtze Agree­
ment of 1900, which they felt assured German support in 
stopping Russian aggression*^
Tiie tense situation in the Far East caused the Brit­
ish and German governments to consider for the third? and 
final t im e ®  the possibility of concluding an alliance*9 As
**B. D . ,  I I ,  X.
5<Jreat B r i t a i n ,  B r i t i s h  and  F o r e ig n  S ta t e  Paoers,
XGVI (1 9 0 2 - 1 9 0 3 ) ,  882,  1TH51 l e r e a F t e r  c l  t e d  "as B S .  P.
6G. P . ,  X V I I ,  3 1 1 -1 2 n . * .
" ^ J u lie n  A m e ry , A t  th e  H e ig h t o f  H is  P o w e r, V o l .  IV  o f
Th© Life of Joseph CfaarnFer 1 a in * J* L .^ arvTr (h/vol s *; London 5 
Macmillan and Co., 1^3^-1951) * IV, ll^ l • Hereafter cited as 
Amerv, Height of Power*
ftThe fact that th© 1901 attempt at an alliance was 
the last such attempt caused many German historians, following 
World War I, to believe that the War could have been avoided 
if Germany had been more receptive to an alliance in 1901* 
Keineck©, Fischer, and the Anglophile Eckardstein held the 
above view*
^G ooch , H o l s t e i n  O r a c le , p* 5i|-9*
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I:i 1-998 and 1 ' 9  the ;■ 1 tua tl or. In China served as* th© basi. 
Con ohe dl sens ;;i on of an undors tandlng. ^  The d on per to 
Britain1 s Pan vastern 1' a.; :;ta lea Chamberlain^ and :he
h;ke cd Sevens lvlve. to di.sou as the possibility of an under-
r.of■,'d*. .• et ,1 i \\, JL o*.l .*, .i ■' w  *.*i U  J. w»e U C.' .i-I.* v-i. j >.1.*-^. J  .*» ^  i 1 *. £ - <> .>• .a. <- i w  .»*» % 4
1 P<-. r-; ' ' © *,_>1 1 " #
Teknristein was Fir;.;t Secretary in the Teraaan Fmbassy 
11Ir: London oral had a n v o  1 a a an 1 n termed 5 ary between 'Britain
"J A
Langer, Diplomacy, II, 71j.l* Brandenberg, From
Pi anarch Tirld, p p T T J F T .
^Julion Araory, !r» his biography of Joseph Cfoaniboi*- 
lain, stated that th© Chamberlain Papers contained no trace 
of hi,; ItQl ne^otUfi^s, Amery, height of Power, P* I3?n. 1. 
This raises th© question of whether dKamberlaln really had 
ereeh to do vith the IPX negotiations, since •.• Is papers deal 
quite extensively with the alliance questions of 1898 and 
1809 and only informal. :? on cn ObarJborlalrf 3 role in the
1901 attempt comes from th© highly unreliable record of Kck- 
ardstein# In fact h chard s to* n mr. le only alight reference to 
Chamberlain In the negotiations, particularly after March,
1 ?0I,
The only reference to th© 1901 discussions in th©
halfour biography— the source of this reference was not ^iven-- 
stated that Chamberlain was "chiefly” responsible for Initi­
ating tlio bailee » Dugdale, Pallour, T , 276* Though unreliable 
in most areas, Fischer stated that Chamberlain, because of 
ills two earlier failures at an alliance, was not particularly 
interested ir an alliance in 1901 and that the pro-German 
Lonsdown© was then Foreign Secretary and In control of for­
eign policy* Fischer stated that even Bckardstetn and Hol­
stein realised this c. s It woo with Lars 3 down© that they con­
ducted the 1901 discussions# Fischer, Fain, p# 211* The 
few doc uraen t s i r 13 • 9 • on the alliance question also made 
only a few references' to Chamberlain# B. D* T, II#
•^ .Amr-ry, Height of Power, 17, II.}. 1-?}.9* 
x3b:o1s twin Papers, IV, 113n# U.
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and Germany during two Tvnevions attempts to T»esVn an aqree- 
ment.^ Ecteerdsteln, le sincerely desiring an under­
standing between Germany and Britain, was an indi­
vidual with strong hones of replacing Batzfeldt as Ambassa­
dor.*^ Durlr.g the 1,901 regotlatl ons, Eekardstelr as
the chief German negotiator and act*»d as the unofficial head 
of the German Embassy# The Eirat Secretary o b t a r>en h* s in­
fluential position because the illness of Ratyfetdt r>r* vented 
him from fulfilling his duties as Ambassador and forced him 
to roly uoon Eokardstein • In such a position ^'ckordsto: n 
worked for an alliance by altering diplomatic correspondence^ 
and distorting the views of both the British and German gov­
ernments on the* question of an understanding.^7 The foreign 
offices in both Berlin and London viewed him. with suspicion
LL.Young, Harden, p. 16l*
-^arnery, Height of lowera IV, 1K2. Holstein
Papers, IV, 296.
f* I
ADIt has been f 1 rmly ostablisbed that Eekardstefr 
changed, dispatches that H&tzfeldt instructed M m  to send to 
her 1 In. The problem is knowing how much, and when did Eck- 
arasteln make these changes since he always signed Hatzfeldt** 
name* There is also the fact that many of the dispatches 
sent were signed by Hatzfeldt, but Fckardsteln wrote them.
For a more detailed dlscuasion and examples of Ickarustelnf s 
forging of documents see G. P., XVTT, lb Graver,
Deutschland, pp. 7-6, 6In7 1, 71*72, 110-11, Hitter,
T.egerde, pp. 26-29. !;ckardstelr», Ten Tears, o, 198.
-^71anger, Diplomacy, IT, ?27-2^.
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but failed to curb his a c t i o n s . I n  these circumstances 
Eckardstein played a major role in the 1901 negotiations and
was probably responsible for in 11i& P5 n;. the alliance disous-
a- 1°s i on. a • * '
On venuery 1 C  , 1001, Eckardotcir. ret vi th Chamberlain 
at Chatsworth, the country estate of the i'ulre of Devonsbirej^ 
Hie two men discussed the world position of Orest Britain 
and Anglo-Go m a n  relation s « Chamberlain stated M s  v lews that 
the British policy of "splendid isclation" ue? obsolete and 
said that Britain must obtain allies, ei ther France and Pus** 
si a or from among the Triple Alliance powers• An agreement 
with Germany, ha said, and an association with th© Triple 
Alliance was preferable; however, If such an arrangement 
proved unlikely, an agreement with Russia was a real possi­
bility* Chamberlain told Eckardstein that he would work for 
a German understanding,^*- but for the present an Anglo-German
iQ
Ceton-I 'ttfcscri, Lritslr., p. 5 . i t elo;;, J'teolrs,
iv, 314.0-ia.
^ G o o o h ,  B e fo r e  the War, XI, 8, Amery, H e ig h t
of f over, IV,
r Mckards tel o, Erl an c run gen , II, 23p -36.
In light of the frill ah Do curat nts, in which Laos- 
down© stated that Eckardstein offered an alliance on March 18, 
1901, and that there trt; no records of s sug/ret tier, die sua­
sion, or negotiation of an alliance until March 18, 1901, 
there is th o possibility that there *:&s no discussion of a l ­
l i a n c e  at a l l  In January, 1901, and if there was, it was 
offered ry Eckardstein, wno is the only source of information 
for the negotiations from January to March, 1901* B* D., II, 
76-79* The fact that IcksrdsteIs iU aired an alliance to the
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agreement, over Morocco would serve as a basis for a later 
alliance between the two governments* Negotiations would be 
possible a . r - soor: Salisbury luff Tor the Fouth of Trance,
of oer w b i c h e  and L»rsdowr*e voill M. in control and could 
conclude on agreement* The Colonial iecrctar;, except for 
M s  suggestion of a lor ocean agreement, wished, that hie com­
ment a be considered as ac-ader.de :r y  nature and a- &  possible 
sub j e c  t. a" or further di n  e us sioru^
Lckarclsteln Informed. hot of c lit of h i s  con vers at Ion 
with Chamberlain an-1 followed the Ambassadorfs Instructions 
by notifying Berlin that the British were Interested in con­
cluding an alliance with Germany• ^ 3 Eckardsteir? and Hatz-
point that he would Mei upresent individual opinions and 
documents and as a result of his part In the negotiations In 
larch and lay £tf* Chapter ivj" only furthers the Idea that 
Eckardstein possibly suggested the Ides of an alliance to 
Chamber Is in* hekards ttin ir&y have even manuf acturtd M s  en­
tire record of the negotiations during January to March, 
ltd, since he was the only Individual i.n the Terpen side 
who talked with the British* Whatever the role of Eckard- 
s teirj, those sent I aien tc cxpr i stc d as tu oat of Thaa:BerlaIo 
seemed to correspond with what would have been the opinions 
of the Colonial Secretary* Larger, Diplomacy, XI, 71?•
^hekardsfctir, lan Years, p* If6* Fck&rdst-eIn,
Brlnnerungen, II, 237* G* P* , XVII, llt-16*
must be remembered that Eckardstein was th© sole
interne diary between the I M i i M  Fore-1 gr C f ;f lee sxd M.tzfeldt 
and the German Foreign Office until Kay 20, 1901, when H&tz- 
feint talked with Ban M  o ora . Io such di cun.siuncea all the 
information concerning the position of Germany and Britain 
c n t h t  u 111 *.uo c e c<u. t. ~ Ojf* - t-AiUt1 C* sw. Cm. ■ tl ‘©liable re­
porting of Eckardstein* What Lansdowne and the British under­
stood as the position of I err. any depended ^uo what Lekard- 
stein told them just as what Katzfeldt, Holstein, and the 
1 trr<;.an Fore I go* Office bcliev <. d or toe British position also 
depended on what Eckardstein reported.
7 1
feldt, according to the former, were enthusiastic over the 
possibility that ©vents might lead to an alliance. With 
such a hope in mind, Fatzfeldt s*nt r,oizt M n  a nrivate tele­
gram, which he composed *n such a manner cu ;o avoid arousing 
the Votragendor Rat * n onsr-iclous nat-u.ro , Tht inhassador had 
no desire to provoke Holstein1 a distrust of Ohamborlain and 
Salisbury, who, he felt, would r<ev*-.con?r;.-: t to an alliance. 2U 
Hatsfaldt telegraphed that Ghamh :rlain had cunf i rmed hir> be­
lief that the Mitt sh woulG over, hue lly aerk Herman assistance 
if the latter continued to express cr Interest In better re­
lations. If, however, an agreement proved Infeasible with 
Germany, the British would very possibly turn to Russia. He 
knew that Holstein would agree that at present an alliance 
was premature, but Chamberlain seemed to concur with this 
view and hoped that a special, agreement over Morocco might 
lead to a future alliance. For a time with the departure of 
Salisbury to th© South of France Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and 
tne pro-German members of th© cabinet would b© in control of 
British policy. In such a situation, Hatzfeldt stated in 
closing, th© British might seek an alliance.25
The German Foreign Office was skeptical about the 
possibility of an understanding. Buelow advised that, for 
the present, Germany should continue to wait until the Brit-
^•Fokards to In, Mr Inns mu;-: on, 17 , 237. Eckardstein, 
Ten Years, p;p. 1614-85.
%>Ibld., p. 187. G. P., XVII, 16.
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1.*h too}? the initiative in monos Ire* an alliance* He onnosed 
an agreement oven Morocco since a sim1 lan understanding over 
the ^ontunuea© African oolo^l es had failed to ^^eate better 
relations with, the British or tangible advantages for the 
Germans. Germany, Bn©low believed. show Id continue ho ex* 
ores* Interest In the British desire #or an agreement and 
always affirm the poesiM 11 tv of a future understanding*^
Buelow agreed with Holstein in the letter*s belief 
that Britain would not soak an understanding with France or 
Russia* Such an idea, Holstein felt., was a complete fraud 
and nonsense* He asserted that possible concessions to 
S’rance and Russia in return for support would merely confirm 
the declining power and prestige of tb** British Emoire« At 
the present time, he felt, an Anglo-German alliance was im­
possible as Britain was unwilling to concede th© necessary 
concessions to obtain Germany*s support and such an agree­
ment would imply the Involvement of Germany in a British war* 
As in the past, Holstein said, Salj sbury was of the opinion 
that the Germans asked ^oo much for the!■* friendship* He 
believed that, before eonsiderat1 on of an understanding was 
possible, Salisbury1s ill-treatment of Germany must be re- 
mo v©d, in spite of the friondliness of the always sua; -uct 
Chamberlain* Adhering to the oollcy of the “free hand*1,
26Amery, Height of Power, XV, lJ.i7. G. P., XVII,17-l8> « _  _
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Holstein stated, "we can wait, time is on our side."27
Richthofen, the State Secretary, agreed with Hol­
stein ’s views on Eckardsteinfs report of a possible alliance.
He told Buelow, "’Let England come to us* The spectre of a 
Russo-Engllsh alliance appears to me, after numerous conver­
sations with Holstein, nothing but a spectre*f
The alliance negotiations were suddenly halted by the 
fatal illness of Queen Victoria. The Kaiser, on hearing the 
news of his grandmother’s Illness, rushed to London against 
th© wishes of both the Foreign Office and members of the Ger­
man royal family.^ The Foreign Office feared that the Kai­
ser would antagonize the British and, more Important, accept 
or offer an alliance. Holstein, hoping to curb th© Kaiser’s 
actions, telegraphed Eckardstein to caution th© Emperor 
against discussing an alliance or any other major problems 
with the British ministers. Eckardstein met th© Kaiser on 
his arrival on January 20, and related the substance of his 
conversation with Chamberlain, as well as th© warning of Hol­
stein. The Kaiser was quite optimistic about th© possibility 
of an alliance; however, he agreed only to discuss Anglo- 
German relations in general terms*3^
27Amery, Haight of Power. IV, lt*8-U9. G. P., XVII, 
22-23* Eckardstein, ErInne run r en, II, 261-62. Eckardstein, 
Ten Years, p. 187.
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 1}.60.
^Eckardstein, Er 1 nn e run gen, II, 239-Lj.O.
3°Ibld., 25U• Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 188-951
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The Kaiser, following his arrival, telegraphed Buelow 
that his reception in Britain was overwhelming. Both th© 
British public and royal family were greatly touched by his 
rushing to the bedside of his ill grandmother. H© was also 
pleased with Eckardstein*s report that Britain desired an 
alliance and agreement over Morocco. On th© basis of Eckard­
stein *s reporting, the Kaiser believed, contrary to the views 
held In the Foreign Office, that Britain would reach an 
understanding with Franc© and Russia if an agreement with 
Germany proved Improbable. The Kaiser felt, however, that an 
Anglo-German alliance appeared quite possible.31
The Kaiser’s optimistic report increased the appre­
hension of Buelow and Holstein that Vilhelm II might concede 
or offer an alliance. Holstein and the Chancellor, to avert 
any rash action by the Kaiser, dispatched telegrams to 
Vilhelm II, Eckardstein, and Count Paul von Mettemich, th© 
Foreign Office representative traveling with the Kaiser, 
counseling against appearing too optimistic If the British 
hinted at the possibility of an alliance.32 Buelow advised 
the Kaiser, employing the arguments of Holstein in a lengthy 
and subtle d i s p a t c h , 33 that he was correct in believing that
^G. P., XVII, 19.
3^1bid.. 22-23. Holateln Papers. IV, 217-18.
Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, pp. 'I55~5>7.
33compare Buelow’s dispatch G. Fh, XVII, 20-21, and 
Holstein’s G. P., XVII, 22-23.
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the British were considering a German alliance and pointing 
out the need for such an offer to come from London. To ob­
tain an understanding, the Chancellor advised that the Kai­
ser should appear interested but not too eager In the conver­
sations with the British. The British, he argued, would, in 
future months, feel their growing isolation and be willing to 
grant greater concessions in return for German support. The 
Kaiser, he suggested, should remain optimistically non­
committal. 3U-
Holstein added, In a dispatch to Eckardstein, that 
he should do his “best with the British Ministers, or anyhow 
see that something Is at once done to make them, insist on 
courteous treatment for the Kaiser."3? The Vortragender Rat 
always distrusted the British and felt that much of the op­
position to the Kaiser came from the British royal family 
and Salisbury.3^
The Kaiser complied with the wishes of the Foreign 
Office and conducted himself in the proper manner throughout 
his stay in Britain.37 Even so, th© Kaiser hoped for an Im­
mediate alliance and told Metternlch that he disliked the 
policy of waiting. He quipped prophetically, “he gained
3(4-Amery. H.lpcht of Power. IV. 1U9. G. P.. XVII. 
20-21. ~  “
"^Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 190.
36rbia. Eckardstein, Erlnnerungen, II, 261-62.
37 Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 158.
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nothing by continually vacillating between Russia and Great 
Britain. He would lose his balance and fall between the two
stools."38
During his lengthy visit to Britain the Kaiser had 
several discussions with British cabinet ministers and the 
new king, Edward ¥11, who, at this time, favored an under­
standing with G e r m a n y .39 Wilhelm II, in his conversations 
with the British, refrained from discussing an alliance ex­
cept in general terms and restricted his comments to requests 
for better relations between the two nations. II© also at­
tacked the Russians for their Far Eastern policy and empha­
sized, as much as possible, the isolated position of Britain* 
'The British must realize, the Kaiser said, that the balance 
of power resided in Germany’s twenty-two army corps. The 
British, in spite of the Kaiser’s statements, welcomed the 
presence of VMlhelra II as an indication of better relations 
between the two countriesJ*®
The suspicious Holstein, even with the positive re­
ports of the Kaiser’s visit, commented on January 30, that 
he hoped Wilhelm II would not remain too long in Britain, 
thereby avoiding a possible alienation of the British as had
38G. P., XVI, 295.
39phllip Magnus, King Edward th. Seventh (London!
John Murray, 196Lp), p. 272. Hereafter cited as Magnus,
Edward the Seventh.
k°G. P., XVII, 23-29, XVI, 291, 295-96. Eckardstein, 
Ten Years, ~pp7 191-92, 195-96.
resulted at Cowes In 1395* Holstein warned Eckardstein 
. igalnst
some .English politician or other, for example Salisbury 
(of whom I shall always have a lively recollection on 
account of Samoa, the mai1stearners, etc.), If it oc­
curred to Salisbury for example, to exploit the candour 
and compliance of His Majesty in order to secure some 
binding promise. It is your /Eckardstein/ business, 
dear Friend, to watch carefully for ©very indication of 
this in London officia! circles in order that proper 
precautions may be taken ir. time,^**
In. closing Ills dispatch, Holstein indicated the great extent
to which the German Foreign Office depended upon Eckardsteinfs
reporting, when he said, f?but wha t th© British ministers may
be concocting, if we /tTbe 3erlin Foreign Office/ can't see—
you probably can.
Hi© effect of the Kaiser’s visit, regardless of Hol­
stein’s reservations, resulted in the friendliest relations 
between Great Britain and Germany since the Kruger telegram, U3 
Both the British and Germans t ooit advantage of thoir friendly 
relations by co-operating in solving the growing difficul­
ties in the Far East.^ By the end of January Japan, Britain, 
and Germany were still unable to ascertain the validity of 
the reported January 3 agreement between China and Russia. 
The three powers continued to wait for further developments 
until^ February 7# when the British received the terms of
kb b l c U , p. 191;. ^2Ibld.. p. 193-9!;.
U-3liangei>, Diplomacy. II, 718. Vtijbld., 719.
the Russian-Chlnese Agreement from the Japanese Ambassador, 
Count hayashi• Hie Japanese government also requested that 
a joint declaration be sent to China warning her against con­
cluding agreements with any power, unless approved by the 
remaining powers involved in the Boxer hostilities# The 
Japanese felt that such a move would prevent Russia from 
pressuring China into concluding any agreements. W 1
Lansuowne communicated the Japanese request to Eck­
ardstein, who was to ascertain whether or not Germany would 
send a similar declaration. Both Eckardstein and Eafzfeldt 
dispatched telegrams to Berlin relating Lansdowne’s nessage 
and advised the Foreign Office to comply with the British 
and Japanese request. If Germany cent a dirct refusal, 
hatzfe'ldt telegraphed, Britain could very easily seek an 
understanding with the .dual Alliance and end all prospects 
for an Anglo-German all lance* *1*7 Hatzfeldt sent another 
warning and recommended compliance with the British and 
Japanese wish but not to the point of antagonizing Russia or 
appearing to support, too strongly, the British in th© Par 
.bast# Nothing must occur to endanger Germany’s alliance 
policy, which iiatzf ©Idt reaffirmed as follows: T,w© must
wait until th© British will support us unconditionally, and 
in the meantime Germany should remain on a good footing with
d . II, 3£-36.
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Russia *w^  Buelow agreed unequivocally wi th Hat»feldt * ^  
Holstein, in a series o.f telegrams to Buelow and 
London, stated Germany*:? policy in the Far Fact and replied 
to the British.and Japanese request for action against Ghina* 
The Vor t ragender. 17at agreed to send a mild warning to the 
Chinese, but, in so doing, Germany, for the time being, must 
avoid antagonizing Russia over* Manchuria* He hoped the Ger­
man warning would satisfy the B r i t i s h * B u e l o w  agreed with 
Holstein*?? policy and added that any stronger support of the 
British in China world so inflame public opinion that a fu­
ture traders tending might prove impossible * Si
Or February 11, Holstein developed in more detail 
his views on German policy in the Rgtr Bast and or the alli­
ance question. Holstein telegraphed Hatzfeldt that he agreed 
that relations with Britain required the minimizing o.f dif­
ferences between the two nations* He and Hatzfeldt had often 
discussed the question of an Anglo-German understanding and 
he felt that
an alliance, In which each party deals with a single ag­
gressor and the casus foederis only arises when there is 
more than one foe, has many attractions for the thought­
ful statesman, but would unfortunately be in direct con­
flict with German opinion to-day* The systematic cam­
paign against England, which began after Bismarck’s re­
tirement, Is largely due to the intolerable personality 
of Salisbury, whose antipathy to the German Emperor and 
sympathy for Franc© have shaped English policy during
k8lbid., XVII, 30-33. ^9Ibld.# 33.
^°Ibld.,XVI, 315-16. Gtbld., ,316-19.
BC
the la at decade* Tills policy revealed itself as brutal
and u n t r u s t w o r t h y * 52
H© also believed that the difficulties over the Samoan ques­
tion, the Bundesrath affair, and Salisbury’s action at Cowes 
in 1895 exemplified the unwillingness of the British Prim© 
Minister to co-operate with Germany* More harmful to Anglo- 
German relations, Holstein said, was Britain’s refusal to 
implement the agreement for the partition of the Portuguese 
African colonies* In addition Britain failed to acknowledge 
Germany’s neutrality in the Boer Var* He believed that pub­
lic discontent, over Britain’s failure to co-operate with 
Germany, diminished 'the possibility of an Anglo-German alli­
ance* An inderstandir.g, he felt, would only lncrea.ee th© 
public attacks against the Chancellor and thc !< aiscr for con­
cluding an agreement that yielded little merit and caused 
German subservience to Irltloh i n t e r e s t s *  £3 The attitude of 
the German public, wrote holstein,
could not be altered 'by assurance but only by facts, 
namely if the defensive treaty, apart from a fully- 
secured -reciprocity, carried with it direct advantages, 
not mere promises* It must be emphasized that the offer 
of an alliance cannot proceed from Germany* For first,
I do not believe that England will make acceptable con­
cessions so long as Salisbury has a say, and. I think it 
unworthy of a Groat Power again to b© told: You ask 
too ranch for your friendship* And secondly, alter all 
our experiences with Salisbury, he could quit© well in­
form St* Petersburg of our offer and its conditions and 
a3k: i/hnt do you offer? In spit© of Lansdowne * s desire
^uooch, Holstein Oracle, pp. U61-62. G. 1:., XVII,
3 3 -3 7 . -  ~
53lbid.
for an alliance, the opposition of Salisbury demanded 
Germany to wait until the English guaranteed the terms 
of complete reciprocity and agreed upon instantaneous 
concessions--colonial possessions.
Until these terms are met England must he satisfied 
with the German policy of neutrality which Germany can 
not go beyond. Such is the position ir TTra. No 
power desires war arid the combined action of England and 
Japan along with German neutrality will serve to keep 
Russia in check as far as Russian aggression concerns 
Germany. There exists no present reason to unnecessarily 
antagonize Russia and particularly not to save and pro­
tect English Far Eastern interests.
Englandfs position, owing to Japanese co-oprat5. on 
and the certainty of the neutrality of th© Triple Alli­
ance, is exceptionally good and can only become worse. 
Thus an alliance with Germany is unnecessary for the; 
attainment of her present aims. The German people could 
only be convinced by positive facts that a treaty did 
not serve English
Holstein believed that there was no rear: on for Trite in or
Gerrasr.y to conclude an a 111 an ce, but h c fe 11; an vndtrstnodIng
i'es desirable and possible, if Frit©In would meet Terr any* s
terms. Tie policy of the ftfrec hand” was rtill the roof
profitable'. Buelow, 5n his marginal conrerts or Fclfltein,s
dispatch, agreed with, the Vcrtr a gender V  a t* s v i e w s  on the
alliance and Far Faff err quest? ons.^5
quest* or of an alliance as they were for r^.rc tore erred with
^Gooch, Holstein Oracle, H61-62. G.F., XVII,
33-37. ' ~
p p .  2 0 1 - 2 0 2 .
-JIbid. Holstein, Buelow, und the Germans ex;
similar sentiments in the followings G. P., XVI, 320-2£>
IV, 210-3.9, and 1'cfcrrcfeteir, Ten Tears,
pressed
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faced Britain and the other powers was the obtaining of an 
agreement on the amount of the Chinese indemnity, which was 
to pay the expenses of the powers in suppressing the Boxer 
Rebellion* Bermany hoped to obtain British support for her 
demands in the indemnity settlement by co-operating with 
Britain, as much as possible, in the Far hast* The British 
also desired German support but for the more important prob­
lem of halting Russian stress ion In Manchuria. 57
The nowars had rot learned until February 28, that 
the notes warning China syairst concluding separate agree­
ments had failed to prevent Russia from forcing the Chinese 
to conclude an agreement over Manchuria. To prevent the im­
plementation of the Manchurian agreement, th© British and 
Japanese, who were seriously considering military action 
against Russia, hoped to obtain the support of Germany in 
opposing the Russians. The German government replied to the 
British and Japanese inquiries as to Germany’s policy in the 
Far East by reaffirming the position of neutrality. Th© 
German® were opposed to any action that would antagonise th© 
Russians, but they hoped to influence the Japan©®© and Brit­
ish to take a strong stand against the Russians. The Ger­
mans possibly desired to involve Britain In a Far Eastern 
war thereby forcing the British to seek German assistance In 
the form of an alliance. To the dismay of the Germans, the
83
British failed to take any strong action against the Russians 
and continued to wait for further developments*^
The British finally decided to act or- IVt.rch 6. Lana- 
downe inquired whether Germany, In the interests of peace# 
would consent to a joint declaration that if war broke out 
between Japan and Russia that such a conflict would be lo­
calized* Great Britain and Germany would remain neutral as 
long as no other power, meaning France# intervened in th© 
war* The British suggestion resulted from a fear of a pos­
sible war and that Japan might conclude a separate agreement 
with Russia that would leave Britain isolated* In any case 
the British, as a result of the South African War, needed 
German support in order to protect their Far Eastern inter­
ests*^
Holstein, in reply to Lansdowne’s request, tele­
graphed Eckardstein that he opposed a special agreement, 
whereby Germany and Britain would declare neutrality in the 
ease of a Russo-Japanese war, because in all special agree­
ments
the danger was greater than the advantage. By such a 
treaty we take sides against Pus sia 5 n fee 511 tat?rg a 
Japanese offensive* bhereas German action against Pus-
£%ckartietelr!, (Ter rearc. rr. 201-22. f». II,
3 5-1(1 , U3-l',5 . o. r ., XVI, 326-hO. HolstelrfPapers,
IV, 2X9. “
$9C. p., XVI, 31:1-1.’?,, TVTT, l>0-l<ln.*#*. Our dale, 
German Diplomatic. Ill, 12*0. B. D., I, 332, II, k3-b5»
?!-£6.
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sia that would be a breach ox neutrality is impossible, 
so long as v© can get no guarantee from the British,
For that reason we shall make our declaration of neutral­
ity separately . . . • England is obviously trying to 
make use of us without binding Itself to anything--which 
i t won ’ f. succeed in doing.
In a further comment on Germany1 s Per Eastern uolie?r Holstein
stated s
We can11 go beyond benevolent neutrality, as the very 
restricted agreement of October 16th ^fangtzo AgreementT* 
provides no Anglo-German solidarity in case the Rus­
sians and the french Doth attack us,In Europe on account 
of our proceedings in Eastern Asia.®i
These views of Holstein expressed the attitude of th© German 
government toward th© Far Eastern situation*62
In the same dispatch to Eckardstein, Holstein re­
lated th© circumstances under which Germany would follow an 
aggressive policy toward Russia and gave a definition of th© 
terns for an Anglo-German Alliance. Holstein stated:
1 may observe for your ^ckardsteln/ personal opinion 
that the position ^/bene volant neutrality in the Far &&at/ 
would be very different if there were a defensive al­
liance between Great Britain and Germany. This .might be 
to the effect that each contracting party should fight 
one adversary on its ovm account, the treaty to come in­
to fore© as soon as there were two or more adversaries.
If in that case, England, probably with Japan, fought 
Russia alone, w© should he neutral unless and until.
France joined in, which in that case it would certainly 
not do. Indeed, England and Jaoan would be so superior 
go Russia that the latter would give way without fighting 
when it came to the point.
But, meantime, you must on no account raise this
foEckardstein, fen Tears, pp. 202-20%* 
bid.
o 2g . i>, XVII, l*o—1.1, XVI, 3i|i, 5•
idea. It must come from them, and of this there is no 
prospect so long as Lord Salisbury is involved*
Ny personal view is that Germany could more easily 
accede to such a gmoral defensive acresmcut than to a 
special agreement, concerning, sav, Morocco, in which 
the danger would be the same and the advantages less.
But I repeat, you must -Of raise th$ s now, if only be­
cause I don* t trust Toud Salisbury not to make use of a 
German overture 1 n Petersburg*
If only we could 'pacify ov.r nubile opinion in th one 
single real roatr-.rl rl advantage that we hav' got from 
association with Great '^rit-ain• She Zanzibar agreement, 
where m gland got the 1 ion1 a share, has left a. *vad im­
pression, so has the Portuguese agreement which is s till 
unrealised* Freiherr von Richthofen has just been in to 
show me the savage attacks • • • against count von 
Duelow, who is aceused of too greaf comp1iance wit b. the 
hnglish proclivities of the Kaiser* For tnis reason too 
I TlARN' -TLY hope Fngland will meet us In the Chinese in­
demnity and customs question. fork for it all you can*®3
baring March the Far Fas tern situation remained un- 
6bchanged ’ until huelow delivered uis Keichstag speech of 
A V
March The Chancellor stated that the October 16, 1900,
Yangtze Agreement was nin no sense concerned with Manchurlatt 
and ntho fate of that province was a matter of absolute in­
difference to Germany. n^r'J Until Buelowr s speech, the British 
had interpreted the Yangtze Agreement as Including Manchuria 
under the provision insuring the integrity of On na,;j? but 
the German incerprstation destroyed Britain’s belief that 
she could depend on German support for halting liussian ag-
63lbid., t>p. 203-20!;. Eckardstein, Sr 1 nnerung en ,
6M -  ]>•» I. 3;i2, :
f‘-’I bid. , XX, 27. 
Frold., I, 332-33.
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gression in Manchuria*^ The British contested the German 
interpretation, and a long dispute followed over the proper 
interpretation of the Yangtze Agreement* The dispute in­
creased the distrust between the two governments, but it was 
In this atmosphere of distrust and tension that Eckardstein 
offered Lord Lans&own© a defensive alliance*^
68
Langer, Diplomacy, II, 722* Taylor, Kastery, 395*
69B. D., II, 27-29, 3U-38, 1|6, 60-61.
CHAI’Ti R IV
FHIEDHICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE SEGOND PHASE 
OF THE 1901 ATTEMPT AT AN ALLIANCE
On March 19, 1901, Eckardstein telegraphed both th© 
Berlin. Foreign Office and Holstein that Lansdowne had offered 
Germany a defensive alliance.^ In actuality Eckardstein had 
offered the Britt sh an alliance and, in so doing, had acted 
against official instructions, Which stipulated that Eckard­
stein was to wait until Britain took the initiative by 
offering an alliance*2 Eckardstein reported that the British 
had mad© the offer in order to avoid the suspicion of Hol­
stein, who would have violently condemned him for having gone 
beyond his instructions.^ As early as March 9, Holstein 
stipulated that "on no account*1 was Eckardstein to suggest 
the possibility of an understanding*^- Holstein repeated th© 
warning as late as March 17, the day before Eckardstein for-
h -  £•> XVII, ]il-!i.2.
2,ails March 13, 1901, meeting was the first record 
in the B. D* concerning the 1901 alliance question* B, D.,
II, 60-51,~"69. hanger, diplomacy, II, 729-30. ~  “
3Eckardfsteln, Ten Years, p. 208. Eckardstein,
Erlnnervmgen, II, 273*
Hbid., II, 3H'-15. Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 203-
201*.,
87
98
mally offered an alliance. Holstein said, WI forbid you 
expressly, my dear friend, even to breathe a word about an 
alliance. The proper moment, if it ever comes, is certainly 
not now.” Eckardstein had. not received Holsteinfs March 1?, 
warning until after he had offered an alliance, hut he knew 
that he was not even to mention an understanding.5
Before Eckardstein offered an alliance, he attempted 
to prepare the Berlin Foreign Office for the announcement of 
a suggested a g r e e m e n t H e  telegraphed Holstein on March 10, 
that Chamberlain had informed him that British proceedings 
with the Germans had been communicated to the Russians9 
therfore, Hal is bury was considering accepting the Puss Ian 
proposals for co-operation in China* Kcknrdstein may have 
felt that by employing the threat of a Russo-British under­
standing he might obtain the support of the Berlin ForeJgn 
Office for a British alliance. Chamberlain continued by 
stating that, except for the leakage of information to the 
Russians,? Britain "would gladly approach Germany with, far- 
reaching proposals which would assure it as great advantages
„  rt
an, or even greater advantages then? ourselves. ■ The Coloni­
al Secretary still believed in the principle of an alliance,
f-d: ckardstein , Ter Yenra , p. 207.
% b i d *, p. 20 0. Eckardstein, Brinnerungen, T X., 200-Si
?Ibid., II, 277-70. Amery, Height of Power, IV,
153• Eckardstein, Ter Years, pp. 20lT-?Q5T
8Ibld., p. 205.
but he would not initiate any action for an agreement, as in 
1099, since "he was not partieularly anxious to burn ills 
fingers a second time#"9
Holstein expressed apprehension over Kckardsteinfa 
report of leakages to Hussis, but he reaffirmed his beliof 
that Go m a n y  must not take the initiative in seeking an al­
liance with Britain.^ Ho informed Eckardstein that
it seems to me very significant that the British Gov­
ernment, while trying to push us forward, /fhe British
desire for German .opt against Puss5 a in the Far 
East*7 says nothing about any alliance. Salisbury is
riore than ever the ruler of England.
If the British are driven h r Salisbury and Ohl.ro! /5ie 
Times reporter who favored a Ruaso-British agreement/
into' going with Russia, let them try it. Xt 1 3 th© 
treaty of the wolf and the lamto.^ *^
Holstein felt that a Russo-Brltish agreement was improbable 
and that the possibility of such an agreement was not a suf­
ficient reason for offering the British an alliance. ^
Eckardstein disregarded Holstein1s instructions and 
offered the British an alliance. Lord Larsdowne was skep­
tical of the German offer, particularly when Eckardstein 
stated that his suggestion was not authorised. Eckardstein 
told th© Poreign Secretary that he was speaking with only 
limited authority. sdewne, though with reservations, In—
9fhe truth of Eckardstein18 March 18, 1901, report 
is doubtful. Ibid.
lOibtd., pp. 2C5-206. ^ I M d .. pp. 206-207.
■*-2Tb'i d. EcknrdatcJn, Erinnerungen. IX, 279.
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terpreted th® offer as being legitimate.2-3 In Berlin Hoi* 
stein and the Foreign Office shared Lansdowne1s skepticism 
and particularly doubted Salisbury!s support for an agree­
ment, but, like Lansdowne, they accepted Eckardstein fs re­
port as fact. 11* Thus th© actions of Eokardsteir. led both 
th© Germans and the British to be. 11 eve that the other eagerly 
sought an alliance. In the official sense there was not 
a 1901 attempt at an Anglo-German und e r s t a n d i n g . Once 
this was known the alliance discussions seemed ridiculous 
and lessened the importance of the negotiations as the final 
opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding. 2-7 This also 
gives rise to the highly speculative question that possibly
there might have been an Anglo-German agreement If Eckard­
stein had not suggested an understanding in 1901. Whether a 
later agreement was possible or not, the alliance discussions 
In 1901 were Important for the participants involved, and 
both nations seriously considered the possibility of an un­
derstanding.^^
^  3 r  v t t  f f w  1 rs^, P. *5
? h'Q G G ch , St-UCii OS , p . ( / •
^Amery, Height of I over, IT, Ib^ j.
•i^Gooeh, Kolste! n Oracle, p. L6H. Dreyer,
Deutschland, passim. r
-i?Langer, Diplomacy, II, 729.
XVII, XVIII, passim. B. D., I, II,
passim.
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Gurlrg a conversation or March 1 %  Faradowne reported 
th°t Hoknrdf? tel n h.n.d offered^ an alii a n B e f o r e  Hakard— 
stein hoi. m.\ g r a t e d  or An hi ©-German ur»d ©ms tandl ng, he and 
Lars down e d5 scussed th© a* trrti or in the Far Kant— the avert- 
Inn* of a Phsso—Tamaror.© war, the German Intorpret.at* or of* 
the /»•-■'recmen t, an d the ^mropsl.hil* o.f Angl o —9-o m a n
■^j&ckardsteinf 3 plan for an alliance was ©van more 
encompassing• At the same time that he offered Britain an 
alliance, Eckardstein suggested to the Japanese Ambassador 
in London, Boron HavashI, that h© offer* Lord Laris-down© on 
Anglo-Japanese-German alliance directed against Russia in 
the hr* East # Oermanv, said Fekardsteln, was Interested and 
would support such an agreement. Lekardstein said in his 
Memoirs, Eckardstei.n, Ton Ycqpg, pp. 210-11, that he hod 
suggested an Anglo-Japanese-German alliance in order to 
stimulate bans down©f s interest 1.n an Anglo-German alliance 
and to prevent Japan from concluding a Far Eastern agreement 
with Russia. Baron Havashl followed Eckardstein * s advice 
but only suggested an alliance between Japan and Britain 
to Lansdownc. Fckordoteln, Tan Years, pp• 207-11. Ja^an 
and Britain eventually reached "agreement In the Anglo- 
Japanose Treaty/” of 1902* h e  original * loo for mi Anglo— 
Japanese-Gerraany treaty cam© from Eckardstein and raises the 
quest;! on, if Kokands tel n hod r>ot mad© the suggest!on possibly 
Great Britain would have been forced to seek support from 
only Germany ins beau of Britain concluding the agreement with 
Japan, in 1902.
For the most author!tire treatment of Tickardstain1 s 
role In b.hr Anglo-Japanese n,r©aty negotiations see A* M.
Vooley (ed. }, The Secret hemoirs of Count Tadaau llayashl 
(Londons f,v-©leieh V a«k, ipi.9) , p"' • 119 -'*> ?7 20T-2TTTh here­
after cited as Poolev, hemolrs Hayashl.
^Kckardstain1 s and Lanadowne1 s version of the March 19^  
1901, conversation are completely different. Both attributed 
the initiative to the other, but apparently the bansdowne 
version of th© alliance was the more accurate. EcknrdsteinLs 
version was important, ivwevti-, since it was the basis upon 
wPiioh the foreign Office and Holstein acted In the 1901 al­
liance question.
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action in the Far Feet* Bansdown© reported that Fckardstein 
said that Germanj vas unable to take any act/!.or) in China but 
that s h e ^  would consider "an understandirq; of a '■none durable 
and extended character*’ w5 th Brl t a i n * E c k a r d s t e i n  stated 
that such an undorstandiny mi'let be of n purely defensive 
nature• It was to be directed a/al nst the Aliianr*^ and
would require any adherent o" the ayrcement to provide sup­
port when two or more powers attacked an adherent of the al­
liance* Eckardstein said that hritian would benefit most 
i r om t/.ii. alliance since Germany wovia be required to defend 
BritainTs scattered Empire* Lord Lansdown# replied that 
Germany's lengthy frontier with Russia was just as vulnerable*
Bansdown* was receptive to the Idea of an alliance* 
but he felt that several problems would have to be solved be­
fore th© conclusion of an a g r e e m e n t * ^3 He believed that
such a contract seemed * * * to entail the adoption of
an identic foreign policy by both rowers tn all their 
external relations, because every complication in which 
one of the two might become Involved t.1vht drsz the, 
other into th# quarrel • • * it was far from easy to 
distinguish between the case in which a country was 
acting on th# defensive and the case in which It was not. 
The first blow might be really struck in self-defense; 
or, conversely, an attack might be brought on by pol­
itical action of a deliberately provocative character*
How were our mutual obligations to be defined so as to 
meet all such cases fairly?**!
In addition to those problems, Bans&own© felt, Eckardstein*a
offer f,was a novel and very far-reaching one, which wovli
21B. 0., IX, 60-61. 22Ibld.. 61.
23ibld., 60-61. 21+Ibld., 61.
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require careful examination•11 He told Eckardstein that un­
til he consulted his colleagues he was unable to give any 
encouragement as to the conclusion of such an agreement.
Eckardstein1s record of the March 18, conversation 
is much more optimistic than Lansdownefs version, Eckard­
stein telegraphed that, after discussing the situation in the 
Far East, Lansdowne proposed a long-term defensive alliance. 
According to Eckardstein, Lansdowne said:
He believed that several of his most influential col­
leagues would favor the idea. England w^s now at a 
turning point and must make up its mind as to what line 
it would take in the future. But, should such an idea 
be put into concrete form by the Cabinet, no official 
proposal would b© made to Germany until there was some 
certainty that Germany would be disposed in principle 
to accept it.
I /5ckardatein7 replied that I was not in a position 
to tell him whether and to what extent the Imperial 
Government would favour such a proposal when made. If 
he would put forward a definite idea I would not fail to 
report it to Berlin.
I shall of course sit still and see whether Lord 
Lansdowne comes forward wi th anything in th© next few 
days. I should however, be grateful for precise in­
structions as to my reply as soon as possible.
My impression is that th© Cabinet hare, including 
Salisbury, are really now at a parting of the ways as 
to their future policy in general and as to China in 
particular, and that in the course of th© next few days 
w© shall know definitely.26
Eckardstein*s version of th© March 18, conversation was not
an accurate account, but it was the basis upon which Holstein
and th© Berlin Foreign Office considered an alliance with
2%bid., 61.
“ Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 207-208. G. P.,
XVII, lj.l-l+2. “  “
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Britain after March, 1901.
Buelow and th® German Foreign Office gave serious 
consideration to Eckardstein1s report. Eh© Chancellor was 
receptive to the idea of an alliance, but he said it would 
be difficult to obtain the support of the Reichstag for such 
an agreement. Among th® problems Involved was th® attitude 
and relationship of Germany's allies in the Triple Alliance 
toward an understanding. He also objected to Germany having 
to protect the threatened colonial possessions of Britain 
while German colonies were in no such dangerous position. 
Buelow said that the German government was no longer enthu­
siastic about obtaining colonial possessions, but the German 
public would b© difficult to conciliate If Germany did not 
receive a share of any future colonial acquisitions by Britain. 
The discussions should continue, the Chancellor stated, if 
the proposed alliance assured only th© security of present 
possessions and provided that Germany might receive future 
colonial concessions from the British. In th© meantime 
Eckardstein was to inform the British to approach the Aus- 
trlans. If th© Austrlans were willing, Germany would be 
ready to negotiate, and possibly Japan might be drawn Into 
the agreement.^7
Buelow also agreed with Holstein * s views on the pos­
sibility of an alliance. ^  Holstein informed Eckardstein
27lbld., XVII, kl~b5>
Brandenburg, From Bismarck World, p. 161.
95
that the present moment if as decisive as Germany and Britain 
were at the parting of the wavs* He felt an alliance was 
possible, but there were obstacles* The current propaganda 
for a Russo-German agreement in Germany was possible to over­
come, but the most difficult obstacle to an alliance was the 
distrust between Germany and Britain. The British, he said, 
had recently become distrustful, but Germany has had such 
cause since Bismarck offered the British an alliance in 1887.
Holstein stated that German policy since 1 S8 7 had 
favored neither Russia nor Britain more than the other* The 
natural allies of Germany were Austria and Britain, but until 
the support of both were obtained it was necessary to main­
tain friendly relations with Russia.
Holstein then informed Eckardstein of Germany’s terms
for an alliance. Be said:
To facilitate an exchange of views and to conciliate 
public opinion, it would be more practical to give th© 
rapprochement the character of an accession by England 
to the" ^rigie' Alliance rather than an Anglo-German 
aliiance. °
Austria would gladly support such an idea, and to further 
facilitate negotiations the discussions should be transferred 
to Vienna. Chamberlain’s charge of leakages to Russia would 
then be removed, and possibly some positive and useful agree­
ment might be reached. Holstein felt that it was improbable 
that Salisbury was willing to offer any positive proposal,
^Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 208-209.
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but if the Prime finister was serious a possible agreement
might be obtained by conducting the negotiations through
Vienna. If the negotiations progressed, Japan might even
*? njoin the alliance.
Eckardstein feared that, if he informed the British 
thet the negotiations would have to be transferred to Vienne, 
the British would feel that Berlin was not serious about an 
agreement. The alliance discussions would come to an end, 
and all of his work would have been for nothing. He, there­
fore, failed to notify Lansdowne of the important stipulation, 
but he kept the Austrian Ambassador informed of the alliance 
discussions just in case th© negotiations were transferred 
to Vienna.3^
On March 23* Eckardstein reported that he had an­
other profitable conversation with Lansdowne.32 According 
to Eckardstein, Lansdowne stated that he had submitted a 
memorandum for a possible defensive alliance to Balfour and 
Salisbury. Th© Prim© Minister agreed to support a strictly 
defined defensive agreement, but Salisbury stated that all 
eventualities must be seriously considered and that a method
3°lbld. Eckardstein, Erlnnerongen, II, 28I-8I4..
3^Ibld., II, 236. Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 210.
3^Th© only record of this conversation Is in th©
G. JP. XVII, I46-ij.6, and is based on solely Eckardstein1 s re­
porting. The meeting probably never took place and the sub­
stance of the conversation probably occurred on March 18, 
1901. For a more detailed discussion see Longer, Diplomacy, 
II* 730, and B. D., II, editorial note 61.
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be devised for removing the opposition of Parliament to a 
long-term understanding.33 Eckardstein*n reporting \*as In­
correct as Salisbury definitely op osed an alliance. 3k 
Eckardstein had possibly distorted the views of th© British 
Prim® Minister in order to obtain Berlin’s support for an 
agreement•35
Th© discussion then turned to the specific terms of 
the proposed alliance. Lansdowne, according to Eckardstein, 
asked if Germany would consent to an alliance, and Eckard­
stein replied in the affirmative if Britain joined the Triple 
Alliance3^ and accommodated Germany in solving the out­
standing questions facing the two nations. The British For­
eign Secretary then enquired if th© agreement was to b© a de­
fensive alliance or did the terns of th© agreement stiplulate 
that the casus foederis arose only when on© of the parties 
to the understanding was attacked by two or more powers. 
German:/, said Eckardstein, preferred the latter. Lansdowne1 s 
next question was whether th© agreement was to be secret or 
approved by Parliament? Eckardstein replied that th© agree-
33pugdal©, German Dt plomatlc, III, 1U1-U2. G. <P.,
XV XI , ij.6—ipd. B . £). , 'jx , 0<£l.
3% b l d .. 66-69.
35jjuKdftX«, German Diplomatic. Ill, llil-L.2. G. P..
XVII, !4.6-ii«. B.""d:V"TI, Vf. ---- - “
36 vhi 3 appears to he false. At this t m^e the British 
w©r© unaware that the German terms called for Britain to join 
the Triple Alliance.
raent must be approved b y  Parliament. He also added, that the 
inclusion of Japan might be profitable* To avoid the suspi­
cion of Berlin, Eckardstein telegraphed th© Foreign Office 
that he had not suggested transferring the negotiations to
Vienna as the discussions had not developed to that extent.37
*•
Buelow agreed with Eckardstein*s replies to Lans­
downe fs questions -and informed him that the next step was to 
wait until the British presented further suggestions for an 
alii ance*3® In addition to Buelow* s Instructions Holstein 
reminded Eckardstein that in order to avoid confusion and a 
misunderstanding the first real offer of an alliance mast 
com© through Vienna* Another advantage to negotiating In 
Vienna was that Genaany would be more assured of British 
support to the Triple Alliance and would discourage the Brit­
ish from the idea of an Anglo-German alliance* The Vortra- 
gendcr Rat warned Eckardstein that he was to refrain from 
any action until Britain agreed to hold discussions in Vienna* 
Eckardstein continued to disregard Holsteinvs instructions 
and failed to inform Lansdowne that the negotiations were to 
be conducted in Vienna*
On March 26, Holstein complained that the alliance 
discussions were not progressing. He felt that the opposi­
tion of Salisbury to an agreement had delayed the negotiations
37q, p* XVII, h6-h8* Dugdal©, German Diplomatic,
III, 11* 1-U 3*
38ibld.. Ill, 11+3-UU. 0. P., XVII, 1*8-1*9.
and that as long as Salisbury remained in power an under­
standing was impossible* Germany could only wait until the 
Prim© Minister passed from power, and then an bfreement might 
be concluded with the other cabinet ministers who wore more 
favorable toward an a l l i a n c e . 3 9
On March 27, Holstein gave a more detailed exposition 
on the possibility of a British alliance in a memorandum 
dealing with the Far Eastern situation. At present, he said, 
Germany wished to maintain the best relations with Russia 
and would, therefore, continue her policy of neutrality in 
China. The opposition of Britain and Japan was sufficient 
to stop Russian aggresion.HO Ha stated:
All would be quite different If England would make up 
her mind to link herself at some time with the ?rir.-la 
Alliance, and if Japan came in also as a pendant to 
England. In this esse England, who both. lr: Asia and 
Europe is genuinely for a defensive policy, would serve 
as a counterweight to Japanfs restlessness; but even If 
not, that new alliance would be so strong that the 
feelings of the other Powers would become lees important 
to us than at this moment, when it is advisable to let 
Japan go her own way, even in company id th England. The 
Japanese would reply to any German attempt at a 
rapprochement by asking if we would help them to enter 
Korea or get the Russians out of Manchuria. On this 
basis no understanding would be possible.
As far as Holstein was concerned, these were the terms upon 
which an alliance was possible. Buelow agreed completely
3 % c&ar date in, Krlnnerungen, II, 323-2lj.
^ G .  P., XVII, 3^0-51 • Dugdale, German Diplomatic,
III, lUO-HT. ~  --------
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with Holstein’s views and had his memorandum dispatched to 
all the major German Kr-ibass5.es as a statement of German pol­
icy in the Far East and on the alliance quest ion. The Chan­
cellor commented on the Tortragencler FatT s memorandum, n 1 For 
Baron von Holstein. Many thanks for this masterly memorandum, 
with the conclueions of which agree at all po5nts.1M*! ^
At the ©nd of March, while the Germans waited for 
further developments in the alliance discussions, the British 
cabinet were seriously considering the merits of an alliance. 
On March 20, Lansdowne drew up a memorandum based on Eckard­
stein fs offer of an understanding with Germany. He circu­
lated the memorandum among the cabinet ministers, who were 
generally in favor of an agreement but who also expressed 
apprehension over the indefinite and far-readlug character 
of the proposal. The British felt that before the n egotia- 
tlons continued, if at all, more precis© information was 
needed concerning the multi-contingencies involved in such 
an agre©ment.^-3
Lansdowne returned to the alliance question on 
March 29*^  During his conversation with Eckardstein h©
^Dugdale, German Diplomatic, X U ,  1.UC-M. 3 • P.,
XVII, 351. ~ ~
W b . D., II, 62, 61*.
Wilbld., 62, 6U-65.
Between March 16, 1901, when the alliance was of­
fered, and March 29, 1901, Eckardstein reported many conver­
sations concerning th© alliance, but Lansdowne only recorded 
one other meeting of which he did not relate what was discussed.
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suggested that the alliance discussions be postponed for a 
time. He had made very little progress on the question 
since March 13, as Salisbury was ill and unable to discuss 
the matter. Lansdowne was also aware of Salisbury’s oppo­
sition to an alliance and was reluctant to discuss the matter 
with Eckardstein until he had consulted the Prime Minister* 
Eckardstein agreed to postpone the alliance discus­
sions* He accepted the illness of Salisbury as a valid ex­
cuse for delaying the negotiations and told Lansdowne that 
there was currently a strong anti-British attitude in Berlin 
and that the sentiment of the Helenstag was not favorable 
toward the British. As ho was going to Berlin, It was best 
to delay the discussions until after the Easter holidays*U5 
Eckardstein informed the German Foreign Office that the Brit­
ish had postponed th© alliance discussions, but ho did not 
give as a reason the objections of Lansdowne. He said that 
the interference of Berlin by sending the Stuobel mission to 
London had caused th© British to postpone the discussion of 
an alliance.^
To a certain extent, Eckardstein was correct in 
blaming th© postponement of the alliance negotiations on 
Berlin's sending of the Stuebel mission* The special mis­
sion had beon sont in late March because of a report by
Wlbid., 62.
s-Gkeka^dsfcein, l.n i'egra. pp. 20V-210. tokard-
stein, BrInnerungen, II, 288-90'."
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Count von Waldersee, who had stated that the British were
hindering a quick solution to the Chinese indemnity question 
and the general problems in the Far T n s t A c t i n g  on the 
basis of Valdernee1s report, Buelow and the raiser, who was 
apparently unaware of the alliance negotiations sent to 
London Or. Oskar Stuebel, Head of th© Colonial Department, 
to obtain a quick settlement of the Chinese indemnity ques­
tion and the claims of German citizens for losses suffered 
in the South African W a r H o l s t e i n  was not In favor of 
the Stuebel mission, but he told Eckardstein that at the 
time th© success of the Stuebel mission was more important 
than the alliance question, particularly for the Kaiser and 
Buelow#
The Stuebel mission failed and, as Eckardstein 
stated, strained Anglo-German relations at the important 
moment when an alliance was under consideration#51 The Brit­
ish were highly displeased with Germany for raising th© in­
demnity and South African claims questions. They were par­
ticularly annoyed at Germanyfs failure to notify them that a
k^Ibid#, II, 209-90# Eckardstein, Ten Years,
p. 212#
bBG. P., XVII, 50*51. Ritter, Legend©, pp. 27-28,
32. ~ ~
^£L# L *» XVII, lGC-lCln. For inf ormation or the 
Stuebel mission see G. P_., XVI, 392-Jj.OO.
^Ojijckardstein, Srinnerungen, II, 292.
^1Ibld., II, 239-92.
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mission was being sent and when the more important issue of 
a war in the Far East was t h r e a t e n i n g . 5^ Eckardstein claimed 
that the British dissatisfaction over the Stuebel mission 
prevented the conclusion of an alliance when all that was 
necessary for an understanding was the signing of the agree­
ment* He definitely had exaggerated the extent to which the 
negotiations had developed, but he was sincere in his con­
demnation of th© Berlin Foreign Office for sending Stuebel 
to London. In fact Eckardstein was so disturbed by Berlinfs 
action that he submitted his resignation, which was not ac­
cepted.^ He probably submitted his resignation in fear 
that Dr. 3tuobe1 and Berlin would discover his unorthodox 
role in the alliance discussions, and his fear of discovery 
was possibly a reason for his willingness to postpone the 
alliance discussions on March
During April one of the Kaiser’s outbursts against 
th© British further hindered th© possibility of an alliance 
and worsened Anglo-German relations. Eckardstein had re­
ported that one of the British cabinet ministers felt Ger­
many was untrustworthy as she constantly sought Russia’s 
friendship. This accusation, the failure of the Stuebel
^ Holstein Papers* IV, 222-23.
53Eckardstein, Er inn©rungen* II, 286-92. Eckard­
stein, Ten Years* pp. 211-14...
Changer, Diplomacy* II, 73^*
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mission, and Britain's refusal to oppose Russian aggression
in the Par East led the Kaiser to refer to the British cab­
inet ministers as "unmitigated noodles•" The British 
learned of the Kaiser's accusation, and the result was a 
further strain in Anglo-Norman relations. Th© incident, as 
well as the Stuebel mission, might have been avoided if the 
Kaiser had been informed that an alliance had been under 
serious consideration.55
Th© Kaiser's displeasure with Britain resulted, in 
part, from his dissatisfaction over British policy in the Par 
East. Th© British had continued to refrain from any action 
In spit® of reports of an agreement between Russia and China 
over Manchuria. Britain appeared content to allow the Jap­
anese to halt the Russian by sending repeated threats that 
force would be employed unless Russia repudiated the Manchu­
rian agreement. Finally on April Russia notified the pow­
ers that she was no longer considering an agreement with 
China Germany had hoped that Britain might unite with
Japan and become involved in a Far Eastern conflict against 
Russia. In such a case Britain might have had to seek German 
assistance and possibly in the form of an alliance. British 
laxity in acting and th© Russian announcement prevented such 
a situation from developing and lessened th© tension in th©
^Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 215-16. G. P.,
XVII, $ l - $ 2 n .  «•*. B. D., tl, 55-56, 63-6 5.
56g. p., X V I ,  3lp6—14.8, 351-53. B. D., I I ,  14.7-52, 
60-65. “  “
105
Far Fast, 57 but these events had little affect in discour­
aging Lckarustein from continuing to seek ar3 Anglo-German 
alliance.'
In early April, 1901, Holstein returned to the ques­
tion of a British alliance. He informed Eckardstein that 
when the alii ance negotiations resummed there were two major 
points that must be agreed upon before an agreement could be 
conduced. If any member of the proposed alliance suffered 
attack by two or more powers, the remaining 'powers must come 
to its aid. finally, the negotiations were bo be con- 
uucted through Vienna, thereby gaining the support of public 
opinion for an alliance. He felt public opinion had to be 
considered in this matter and stated that if th© alliance 
discussions were to succeed it was on the above terns, Hol­
stein also warned that any further4 postponement and delay was 
not desirable*5^
Eckardstein replied to Holstein's dispatch that bans- 
downe would probably raise the question of an alliance at 
any time. The reason why discussion had not resumed was be­
cause the British distrusted Germany, but Eckardstein added 
that with time th© distrust would be removed and negotiations 
would r e s u m e .60 Eckardstein met with Lansdowne on April 9,
D., 1, 332. ^Langer, diplomacy, II, 727.
^hok&rdstein, hr i nn c. run gen, II, 331 •
6oIbid., II, 333-37. G. p., xvn, 50-51.
Eckardstein , ¥en Years, p. 21lj •
srtd told the British Foreign Secretary that the time had come 
to resume the alliance negotiations. Lansdowne replied that 
such an important question was Impossible of dl scvsn?or un­
til Salisbury returned to Britain fron his tr'a to the South 
of France.^1 The Prime Minister res not scheduled to return 
until Fay 10.^2
Eckardstein ago In talked with Lans cl.05.me on April 13* 
The British Foreign Secretory told '“’ekardste!n that he would 
not discuss an alliance until the brine Minister returned. 
Eckardstein ther reminded Lansdowne that the alliance dl s- 
eu r s I on s were unof.fi cial and that Falser ”1 Xhelm TT men rot 
•arere of the details of the regotl s tl or s « Lansdowne asked 
lost how far was the Falser aware of the discussions? Fckard- 
stein replied, after he "hummed and ha* d a great deal", said 
Lansdowne, that the ideas so far expressed agreed, with the 
Kaiser's opinions as judged by individuals close to Filhelm II. 
Eckardstein gave Holstein as an e.r&rple, and apparently, 
Lansdowne had never heard of him.^3
Eckardsteinfs report is almost a complete contradic­
tion of Lansdowne* s version of the April 13> meeting. Fck- 
ardstein said that Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and Devonshire 
all desired an alliance and that even Salisbury would prob­
ably favor an agreement. "Times have changed,” he said, and
61b. p., TT, 62-63. 62s. P.. -VI1, 5!jn. ».
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the discussions would nos^ibly resume ner:t wee1^. Hot sine© 
th© initial of**er of an ©1 llance on f'nrch 1 %  had Hcknrd- 
stain reported such an optimistic turn In the negotiations#^ 
Lansdowne, however, reported that "he had refused to discuss 
the subject and stated that he had .orown quite skeotiesl of 
hckardsteln1s repeated attempts to ronow the alliance nego­
tiations# He stated that much of what Eckardstein said was 
not authorised# In fact, he believed, Eckardsteinfs views
"jSS 3QT) prop re e ru *ft ‘The British Foreign Secretary also 
expressed grave doubts that anything would result from the 
negotiations# In principle, he felt, an alliance was a good 
idea, Mbut when each side comes, if it ever does, to formu­
late its terms, we shall break down; and I know Lord Salis­
bury regards the scheme with, to say the least, suspicS on•n65
As a result of Eckardstein1s reporting,Holstein woe 
under the impression that the discussions were progressing*
H© telegrsohed Kokar&stein reemrhast zing and explaining why 
the negotiations must proceed through Vienna# Holstein said 
that th© discussions must be held in Vienna in order to dis­
pel th© Austrian apprehensions, *diich resulted from th© e n ­
emies of the Triple Alliance proclaiming that Germany planned 
th© partition of th© Austrian Empire# The Austrians were to
6-4Eckard31c5r , '"'rinnerungen, II, 13-• Anery,
Height of Power, IV, l£g~.
65b . d . , II, 63-6!)..
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have a leading role 1 r th-:- nsgoti at long In ordrr to roagsurt 
Austria1a friendship. Eckardstein, as in marg* urevlaus In-
f r
stances, failed to .follow Holstein’s advice. D
On April 1 %  Eckardstein reported that both Britain 
and Japan showed a growing interest In a far Has tern agree­
ment with Germany. This was particularly true of the Jap- 
anese,^ In reply to Eckardstein*s report Holstein warned 
that such an agreement was against the interests of Germany. 
If the three cowers concluded such an understanding, which 
was certainly the desire of Britain and Japan, there would 
no longer €>xlst any inducement for the British to join the 
Triple Alliance. It was Britain’s isolationist position in 
the Bar East that would force her to conclude an alliance 
with Germany. Eckardstein was to refrain from encouraging 
the Javanese that a Fas torn agreement was possible until
the conclusion of a defensive alliance with Britain.
By late April or early Kay, the Berman Foreign Office 
realized that the negotiations were not progressing. Salis­
bury was still out of the country. Lansdowne had been ab­
sent from London for seme time, and a brief illness kept him 
from any work at the Foreign Office. Eckardstein had also
■3-. P., XVII, 53. • Ougdale, German Diplomatic,
i n ,  ikb* ~~ —
^Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 218-19.
^%bi&., p. 219• Eckardstein, Eriimerungen, II,
32*1-14 2.
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journeyed to Berlin* Since no progress seemed possible, 
Germen policy was to continue to wait until the British re­
turned to the subject of an alliance and avert any incidents
that might strain relations between London and Berlin.^9
With Salisbury’s return to Britain on Kay 10, the 
German Foreign Office sent elaborate instructions to London 
in preparation for the resumption of the alliance discussions* 
Buelow1s instructions were very similar to those of Holstein 
The only difference was that bolstein favored an agreement 
more than Buelow.
Holstein stated th© German policy on an alliance 
with Britain in a long, detailed, and hypothetically argued 
memorandum. He said that British adhesion to the Triple Al­
liance would create such a strong alignment cf powers that 
peace would be assured or success in the case; of any war. 
Such an alliance required, that, if any signer cf the pro­
posed agreement was attacked by two or more powers, the re­
maining powers, who were party to the agreement, would a id 
the attacked power. Under such coucltions, neither the Ger­
man nor the British parllancntnry bodies coy la object as 
both Germany and Britain were assured of support in case of 
an attack. These terms would remove the fear that either 
Britain or Geincny would fall to grant support and remove
69Holstsln Papers. r.', ZZ1-21?. 
70q. P., XVI, Lt?6-27.
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Anglo-German distrust# An An*rlo-German ssremont, Holstein 
stated, was impossible since it mfcht increase Austrian dis­
trust of Germany. In fact the rmgeti at1 one mist proceed 
through Vienna in order to dispel the Austrian fear that 
Germany planned the partition of the Hapaburg Monarchy fol­
lowing the death of Fmperor Francis «Tosenh# By going through 
Vienna, Holstein said, neither Germany nor Britain would, have 
to fear that any information would ness to the Hussions, 
fhese were the only ter ns for an agreement and must not be 
varied from, in any wav#71
Bokardsteln reported on hay 15, that he had. dis­
cussed. an alliance vi th L a n s d o w n e # 72 He said that Salisbury 
had agreed, at least in principle, with the cabinet minis­
ters in favoring a defensive alliance with Germany, but men­
tioned that the Prime Minister had objections to th© Inclu­
sion of Austria and Italy in th© a r r a n g e m e n t#73 Salisbury
71Eckardstein, Krinrerunger , IT, 3L<L|-1j7*
72fhere is no record of this conversation In the B. D.
U p .  Q. , II, 6!l-65;.
Bckardstein had been informed to tell the British 
that the agreement was to be between Britain and the '"Ik* I ole 
Alliance and not solely with Germany. Eckardstein di d not 
specifically state when he informed Britain of the stipula­
tion nor does th© B. J. Indicate. Lansdowno*3 first refer­
ence to the sti pulatton made on v ay Ft• It appears that
between March £9, when the negotiations were te Kip OFfii'i 1 y 
postponed, erd May ?3i Fckar*d.stcin informed the British that 
the alliance was to include Italy and Austria# Since Lans­
downe did not record this conversation, it sesms more than 
likely that the B . Dm do not contain the complete documents 
of tbs 1901 sllt*aree question or that the meeting never took 
place#
Ill
felt that th© addition of Austria and Italy complicated a 
probable treaty. For example, what would be the responsi­
bilities of Britain In case Italy and Austria suffered attack? 
Britain must know definitely her responsibilities if such 
questions arose in Parliament, Th© Prim© Minister particu­
larly disliked the idea of uniting with th© rather weak 
Slavic state of Austria and the Latin on© of Italy, Lans­
downe, reported Eckardstein, expressed confidence that Salis­
bury1 s objections could be overcome and that the time had 
arrived to put th© terms in a written form,?4 Th© terms 
would then be discussed point by point, but as before th© 
discussions were to be of a purely academic nature with no 
binding obligations, Eckardstein also remarked that th© time 
was still not appropriate to suggest transferring th© nego­
tiations to Vienna,*^
Hatzfeldt reported in a separate and later dispatch 
that he was highly skeptical of Britain1s supposed willing­
ness to conclude an agreement. It was particularly doubtful 
that Salisbury favored an alliance and even more doubtful 
that Lansdowne could persuade the Prim© Minister to accept
7^The views reflected by Eckardstein as those of the 
British and particularly of Salisbury seem highly distorted, 
if not false. The British were not so favorable as indi­
cated nor had the discussions developed to that extent, 
Langer, Diplomacy, II, 732,
75|>ugdal©, German Diplomatic, III, ll|5-46, G* P,, 
XVII, 57-60, Eckardstein, Er1nnerungen, II, 349, ~~
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the Idea, Since neither he nor Eckardstein had discussed an 
alliance with Salisbury, it was too early and too dangerous 
to consider putting any views in a written form. The dis­
cussions had not progressed to that extent, Hatzfeldt said 
that Germany should not push the discussions but wait until 
th© British acted, since rushing the negotiations would only 
create distrust,^
Holstein and the Foreign Office agreed with Hatzfeldt, 
As Holstein stated there was no merit In discussing detailed 
questions and putting any ideas on paper until Britain agreed 
to join the Triple Alliance, An Anglo-German agreement, he 
said, was not desirable since such an understanding failed 
to provide Germany with protection. For example if Austria 
and Italy were not Included in the alliance and Germany 
aided her Triple Alliance partners in a war, Britain might 
state that she was not required to support Germany when the 
latter was obligated to the Triple Alliance, British adhe­
sion to th© Triple Alliance would also assure peace since 
the other powers would not risk a war for fear of fighting 
both Britain and th© Triple Alliance, Once Britain realized 
this fact and consented to join th© Triple Alliance, Germany 
would agree to put matters on paper. As to Salisbury’s ob­
jections, Holstein said, he was merely trying to avoid any 
definite obligations, German policy was to continue to wait
76G. P., XVII, 63-6U.
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until Britain returned to the subject and agreed to accept 
the German terms, Holstein warned that the British were not 
to be rushed or pushed unnecessarily,^
Th© alliance discussions resumed on May 20,76 Lans­
downe met with Hatzfeldt, who had recovered from an illness 
which had prevented him from meeting with the British Foreign 
Secretary since early in January, During their brief dis­
cussion they planned a meeting for May 23, at which time 
they would discuss the alliance q u e s t i o n , Eckardstein, at 
this time, was not in London and was unaware of the scheduled 
meeting, until he returned to the Foreign Office on May 22,
On that same day Eckardstein, having found out about Hatz- 
fel&t’s planned meeting with Lansdowne, discussed the possi­
bility of an alliance with the British Foreign Secretary* 
Immediately following their meeting, Eckardstein met with 
Hatzfeldt and attempted to persuade the Ambassador not to 
meet with Lansdowne on the next day, Eckardstein offered 
three times to write a note to Lansdowne explaining why the 
Ambassador would be unable to meet him, but Hatzfeldt re­
fused, Eckardstein probably feared that Hatzfeldt would 
discover his unauthorized role in offering and discussing an
77Ibld.. 60-65.
7h_bld. , 63-61).. Eckardstein, ErinnerunRen, II,
350.
7% .  D., II, 71-72, 76-79. Holstein Papers, IV,
255-57.
alliance.
On Hay 23, Eckardstein telegraphed Holstein the sub­
ject of M s  May 22, meeting with Lansdowne* In the most 
optimistic tones Eckardstein stated that the alliance dis­
cussions had resumed and that Britain had accepted the Ger­
man t e r m  for an alliance. Even Salisbury recognized that 
”splendid Isolation** was no longer possible and only objected 
to an alliance on minor points, which could easily be over­
come* Eckardstein concluded by asserting that he had ar­
ranged th© May 23, meeting between Lansdowne and Hatzfeldt 
Holstein’s reaction to Eckardstein1s report was one of skep­
ticism that Salisbury had agreed to an alliance,®^
Th© most important discussion of the 1901 alliance 
negotiations took place on Fay 23, between Hatzfeldt and 
Lansdowne* The Ambassador, as a result of Eckardstein*s re­
porting, was under the impression that Britain had practi­
cally agreed to an alliance and that they were avrar© of th© 
Goman alliance terms• Hatzfeldt, therefore, merely re­
peated the German terms, Th© alliance was to be between 
Britain and the Triple Alliance with the casus foederis 
arising when any one signer of the agreement was attacked by
8°Ibld., 225-26.
Eckardstein, Srlnnerungen. II, 351-52. Eckard-
stoln, Ten Years, pp* 219-26•
82G. P., XVII, 67n. -***.
83Holateln Papers. IV, 225-26.
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two or more powers. Public opinion, stated Hatzfeldt, pre­
vented an agreement which would fail bo insure support to 
Austria and Italy. The basis of German policy was to support 
Austria, and, if this had not been the case, Germany could 
have easily come to terms with Russia. It was only th©
Austro-Russian conflict of interests that prevented a Russo- 
German agreement. At the present time, Hatzfeldt said, un­
less Britain agreed to join the Triple Alliance, it was use­
less to discuss th© more detailed questions of such an agree­
ment *^4
Hatzfeldt had stated that the agreement was to be 
solely with the Triple Alliance. Lord Lansdowne was some­
what shocked at Hatzfeldt1a statement since he was under th© 
impression that the proposed agreement was not necessarily 
between the powers of the ‘Triple Alliance and Great Britain. 
Lansdowne "told Count Hatzfeldt that this proposal seemed • •• 
to go further than maything which we had yet discussed. 
Eckardstein, hansdown© said, had earlier informed him that 
Austria and Italy were to ba included In an agreement, but 
he had not explained that Britain was merely to join the 
Triple Alliance. The British Foreign Secretary said that, 
if Britain was to join the ‘Triple Alliance, she would need 
to know the terms of that agreement. Hatzfeldt replied that
8,ki. P., XVII, 65-67. B. D., II, 611.-65.
8%bid., 80.
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there w a s nothing mysterious about the terms of the Triple 
Alliance«
Hatzfeldt1s proposal, Lansdowne felt, would make It
difficult to clearly distinguish when on© of the parties to
the agreement was attacked or merely defending itself* The
implication was that each of the parties to the agreement
possessed the right to determine the foreign policy of the
other party. Th© British could not accept such terms as
public opinion would not accept such a limitation upon her
liberty of action* The many objections of Lord Salisbury
also prevented the possibility of such an agreement, but
Lansdowne told Hatzfeldt that he would submit the proposal
to the Prim© Minister and cabinet
On the day following the May 23 meeting Lansdowne
sent a note to Fekardstein requesting a ’promised memorandum*
On May 22, Eckardstein had promised the British Foreign
Secretary, without the sanction of the Berlin Foreign Office,
a memorandum, containing the detailed alliance terms of the 
AAGermans*00 Eckardstein received Lanadowne's request, but 
as he was leaving London he gave Lansdowne ?s note to Hatz- 
feldt*^ ‘"Tie Ambassador was completely ignorant that such a
d6Ibld., 6Ij.-65, 80-83. Ritter, Legende. p. 37. 
67b . p ., It, 66.
38I M d .. IX, 69-70. Holstein Papers. IV, 225-26. 
892* £•» II* 70. Holateln Papers. IV, 225-26.
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document had beer promised and Informed Lansdowne that he 
!mew nothing about such a document and that, until he talked 
with Eckardstein, he was unable to supply any Information on
the na 11 e r •
Hatzfeldt telegraphed. the Foreign OffI.ce about his 
May 23, meeting and. informed only Holstein of Lansdownef r 
request for Fcknrdsteln1s promised memorandum*^ He told 
Holstein that Eckardstein had definitely gone beyond Berlinfs 
instructions*and. was intriguing against him in hope of re­
placing him as Ambassador.^2
In the meantime Eckardstein had learned what had 
passed at the May 23, meeting and spread the -rumor that 
Hatzfeldt had gone beyond Berlin*3 instructions in the nego­
tiate oro with LanodouTie. Eckardstein even made a trip to 
B e r l i n ancj informed Holstein and other officials that 
the old end mentally weak Ambassador was unfit for his post* 4^- 
Hcraarkable as It may seem, Holstein believed Eckardstein in­
stead of his life-long friend. Count Hatzfeldt. In a letter 
to the Ambassador, Holstein answered Hatzfeldt*s charge that
90B. D., II, 70. 91G. P., XVII, 65-67n. ***.
92Holstein Papers. IV, 225-37.
9 3 i b t d . . 2 3 1 - 3 1 + •
91ttbid., 225-31+. Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 220- 
21. Eckardstein, Erlnnerungen» II, 299-3^0•
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Eckardstein was intriguing against him* He said:
Everything I know of his /^ckardstein7 activities tends 
to show that he wants to help you. *ftius during the long 
time when you were completely out action, he did not say 
a single word about your condition in the Ministry here, 
not even to me
had he, /?■ c k ar d stcirj not been present, tbr. Kaiser would 
by now have sent someone else to London to uake over
I^must warn you most definitely against breaking with 
^ITckardsteln/
Ilia Majesty, and I . . • also the Chancellor, regard
f \ i - c kf r6 stein j  as the r. tccesary official complement in 
view of your physical immobility.^!?
As a result of Hatzfeldt’s age and illness, Holstein also 
believed that the Ambassador had "summoned Lord Lansdown© to 
come to terms with Germany at the May 23 meeting.*1^  Bckard- 
stein had also informed Lansdown© that Hatzfeldt had gone 
beyond his instructions on May 2 3 * ^  Lansdown©, acting on 
the basis of Eckardstein fs information, believed that Hatz- 
feldt had "pushed matters rather too far and too f a s t " 9 8  and 
"that Hatzfeldt *s Intervention had led to a good deal of 
misunderstanding, and that he must have represented my con­
versation with him as indicating much more alacrity on our 
part than w© have actually exhibited.11 ^  The result of
95>Eolstein lapera, 17, 227-23.
> ^5* ilolstola Papers. IV, 23-i*3*~•
Eckardstein, Srlnne run seen, III
9?B. D., II, B7. 98Ibld., 31.
"ibid., 70.
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Eckardstein1 s intrigue100 was that Count Hatzfeldt was even­
tually removed from his post as Ambassador to Great Brit­
ain.10*
While Eckardstein conducted his intrigue$ Hatzfeldt 
requested Berlin for instructions on the alliance negotia­
tions. ho Is te in informed the Ambassador that Germany vras un­
able to provide Lansdown© with the terms of the Triple Alli­
ance and that to avoid any Indiscretion nothing was to ap­
pear in writing before Britain agreed* at least in principle, 
to the German terms* He then repeated the terms of an alli­
ance and his earlier instructions#10^ As to the British 
request for Eckardstein!s promised memorandum, Holstein tel­
egraphed that
there can be no question of a written memorandum for the 
present, that is, not until we are agreed on the basic 
principles. You would have to he specifically empowered 
from here before such a memorandum could be handed 
over.^°5
On May 2o, Lansdown© sent Hatzfeldt a second request for th© 
promised memorandum of Eekardsfcein as well as the terms of 
the Triple Alliance. The apprehensive Ambassador immediately
10°For one of the most scholarly and detailed treat­
ments of Eckardstein * a Intrigue against Hatzfeldt see Hein­
rich Freiherr von Hoyningen genannt Huene, Unterauchungen 
zur Qesohlchte des Due t a ch-Snglla chon Buendni a p r ob 1 ems , 139B- 
l^Sl lBreslau^ T95UT,"' ppY ~12cJn* !*.'%]. Hereafter cited" 'as 
ifueri©, XJntersuchungen*
10lHoXateln Papers, IV, 229-32.
102a. P., XVII, 67-S3.
103Holateln Papers, IV, 227-28.
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Informed Berlin of tiansdowne’s request^^ end asked for in­
structions os to what he was to tell Lansdowne concerning 
the promised memorandum and if he raised the question of an 
alliance. Hatzfeldt warned that if the problem was not handled 
with care there was a likelihood of alienating the British.*^ 
Holstein telegraphed the Ambassador on F&y 29# that
when the first written document in the alliance question 
leaves our hand, the first formal suggestion of sn alii* 
ance cones from us— exactly what ve wish to avoid. To 
decide on the principle whether an attack on the Triple 
Alliance should raise the casus foederis for Bngland, 
the Lnglish require nothing in writing. When England 
has expressed herself on the principle, written notes, 
for Instance on the meaning of the word attack, can be 
exchanged. Till then, in my opinion, we should give 
nothing in writing.^*
He added tliat, if Britain failed tc agree to the general 
principles of an alliance, Germany would have no proof that 
the intent’ons of the British were serious• There was an 
exception. If Lansdowns requested information on certain 
points, which indicated clearly that the Initiative came 
from Britain, then possibly Germany would supply the infor­
mation requested*
Hatzfeldt agreed with Holstein that the two govern­
ments should not put anything in writing or* that Germany 
should supply 'Laos do vine with the promised m cm or a ndiui, but he
10^G. P., XVII, 68-70. B. D., II, 70-71.
iO^O. P., XVII, 70.
^ hfeld. Gooch, Before the War II, 11.
1 0 ? G .  P . ,  XVII, 7 0 - 7 1 .
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felt that it was necessary to assure Britain1® continued in­
terest in an alliance. Like Holstein, the Ambassador be­
lieved that, if and when both countries agreed to the Prin­
ciples of an alliance, then a document similar to T?cknrd-
stein* a promised neporandim conl.i he exchanged and would be 
useful,^® Tn the meantime Hatzfeldt raid he would not men­
tion an alliance until the British had, and then the conver­
sations would remain academic as in the
While the Germans waited for the alliance discussions 
to resume the British were seriously considering the Gorman 
terms for an alliance, following th® May 2 3 $ meeting, T.ans- 
down© drew up a memorandum on the history of the 1901 alli­
ance negotiations# He submitted the memorandum to Salis­
bury and the eabinet^^ and directed Under-Secretary, T. H# 
Sanderson to draft a treaty based on the German terms# 
Sanderson drew up two slightly different and incomplete 
treaties. He stated that it was difficult to draft any de­
tailed or complete treaty without full knowledge of th© 
terms# This may have bean th© reason for Lansdown©* s anxious 
request for the terms of the Triple Alliance and for Kckard- 
stein*s promised memorandum* Sanderson felt that Britain 
would gain little from such an alliance, but his opposition 
to an understanding was not as strong as that of Lord
loeibld., 72. P. U., 11» 71.
109g . XVII, 73. 110E. d . , IT, 6!i-6£, 76-79.
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Galinbury.
The Prime Minister reviewed the German alliance 
terms and drew up a masterly memorandum in which he main­
tained his traditional position of opposition to any alli­
ance. Saila bury st ated :
It Is open to much question whether the bargain would be 
for our advantage. The liability of having to defend the 
German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier 
than that of having to defen3 the 7r1 tlsh Iales sralnat 
France • • • in its most naked aspect' the bargain won Td 
be a ‘bad one for this country.
As to th c threat o f Er i ti & h isolati on , 1 alls bury a r :-;;u © d on
the basis of historical precedent • Britain- could only be 
saved by control of the Channel and the seas, and never in 
her past haC any power beer; able to protect or old the Is­
land, nor was such protect5 on ever really necessary. Isola­
tion, he felt, was no great danger. lie questioned:
have we c. ver felt tf iat d.crpor practlcall?? • • . It Is 
TmpossTbTeTTor us Fo Judge whether tKe WIsola11 on" un­
der which we arc supposed to suffer, does or does not 
contain in it any elements of peril. It would hardly 
be wise to Incur novel and most onerous obligati, ora, in 
order to guard against a danger in whose existence we 
have r.c hi atopical reason for TeirevT"."lT3—  --------
Th© Prime Minister stated that an alliance was Impossible
because of ore importer! fact. In case of wav, Salisbury
said’
The English Government . . .  must o.epend on the view 
taken bp public opinion in this country, and nubile
, 66-6G. , fX 9
^ h b l d .
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opinion wonId be largely, if not exclusively, governed 
by the nature of the easua belli*^ 4^-
Aa far as ohe British were concerned, the opposition of
Salisbury ended any prospect of concluding an alliance based
upon th© German terms
Before Lansdown© informed the Germans of Sail©bury*s 
negative attitude, Eckardstein met with the Foreign Secretary 
and postponed the alliance discussions* EekardsteJr remarked 
that since Hatzfeldt had gone beyond bis instructions on 
May 2.3, that it was best to postpone any further discussion 
until a more opportune time* Lansdown© agreed and waited 
lor the Germans to resume the negotiations*^^
On June, ?', Lansdown© met with Hatzfeldt, but an 
alliance was not discussed* The meeting with Lansdowne was 
the last one for Hatzfeldt, who was soon to be removed from 
his post* The British Foreign Secretary felt that since 
Hatzfeldt was leaving any discussion of an alliance would be 
of littl© value• The Ambassador held a similar opinion*
He believed that, since Lansdowne had not raised the subject 
of an alliance, he would probably not do so In the future*^®
lli4.jb.1d *, 69*
^^•^Ibid*, 66-69. Dreyer, Deutschland* pp. 88-89.
116B. D., II, 71-72, 76-77, -0-83, 87-88.
117lbid., 71-72.
Papers, IV, 229—31*
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The British Foreign Secretory stated that he wan
quite cor tent to mark time for a while* I doubt whether 
it will be poss ible to make anything of what for con­
venience sake T would describe as *-he '"ok«- rdalelr rmo- 
posal, and if we are to consider some alternative form
of agreement, perhaps limited to rerticil^r eventual-
Inuring June, Eckardstein attempted to resume the 
negotiations, but Lansdowne refused saying that the members 
of the cabinet were too involved with parliamentary matters* 
He said that consideration of such a *'mom©ntuous,i question 
would have to wait until later* The British and the Ger­
man Foreign Office continued to wait for the other to resume 
the alliance discussions, but neither took the i n i t i a t i v e * ^ ^ !  
Holstein and the Germans were confident that the British 
would eventually seek an alliance with G e r m a n y .^22
p* U&9*
8^jj,* A>. , 11, 71-72*
^20b# b*, II, CO-0I4.* Holstein tapers» IV, 231-32*
X£1Ibld.. 71-72, 8O-83, 76-79, 69. G. P., XVII, 68f. 
X22G. P., XVII, 72, 71+. Gooch, Holstein Oracle,
CHAPTER V
FRIEDRICH VON HOLSTEIN AND THE FINAL PHAHE 
OF THE 1901 ATTTTPT AT AN ALLIANCE
On June 12, Holstein reviewed the alliance discus­
sions In a detailed and lengthy memorandum. After discus­
sing the alliance negotiations of 1887, Holstein commented 
on the nature of British foreign policy*^ He stated!
British policy, Indeed, rested on the conviction that a 
continental struggle was inevitable, and that Great Brit­
ain would profit by a conflict in which she took no part* 
In other words it was the business of other Powers to 
pull th© chestnuts out of the fir© for her* This catspaw 
theory, Which has gradually become a fetish for a certain 
school of English politicians, is beyond doubt th© cause 
of th© universal hatred of England to-day* Ho one likes 
being duped, and the people of th© Continent have grad­
ually reached the conviction that England is out to dupe 
them. Salisbury has carried out this policy more openly 
than any of his predecessors*2
Following an attack on the British Prim© Minister, Holstein 
continued by reviewing Anglo-German relations* He said that 
since the meeting at Cowes in lS9? the two nations relations 
had deteriorated until th© relationship was dominated by mis­
trust. The only satisfactory result of the past association 
between th© two governments was th© tenuous merit that arose 
from agreements over particular questions. Further limited
*G. p., XVII, 83-88.
2Ib 1 d. Gooch, Holstein Oracle, p. 1(66.
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agreements were Impossible, he felt, because such agreements 
failed to bring Germany any significant compensation#
Holstein continued by tracing the alliance negotia­
tions since I89S and reiterated the German terms for an al­
liance In 1901*3 He stated :
If we assume the Immense burden and responsibility of 
defending the British Empire, with all its colonies 
against all comers, the Triple Alliance must be regarded 
as a whole, just like the British Empire, so that for 
instance an attack on Austria or Italy by two or more 
Powers would call not only the members of the Triplice 
but also England into th© field# An alliance of England 
with Germany alone would make the position of the latter 
worse instead of better. For since the contents of the 
treaty would be published, her opoonents would know that 
if they attack Austria, and Germany goes to her assist­
ance, England will take no part# But th© inclination to 
fight with Germany would be greatly enhanced when it was 
known that In certain eventualities she is pledged to 
support Great Britain# At present w© feel strong enough 
not to hurry In the search for support# Moreover we be­
lieve that the current of events will probably one day 
bring Germany and England together# In times of excite­
ment we have avoided building dams which would impede 
the flow of the stream, and we will retain our freedom 
as long as we can*^
Holstein felt that there would be a definite advant­
age gained from transferring the negotiations to Vienna# The 
Austrian fear that Germany planned th© partition of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire would be removed, and such a trans­
fer would lessen Anglo-German distrust# Negotiating in 
Vienna, he felt, would have the support of public opinion in 
both Germany and Britain# He concluded that future alliance
3g . p ., xvix, 33-83.
h b l d . Qooch, Holstein Oracle, p. I467.
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discussions must b© conducted in Vienna, even if Salisbury 
opposed th© Idea. In th© memorandum Holstein had stated 
th© German terms for an agreement and reaffirmed Germany*s 
policy of waiting until th© British returned to the alliance 
question
Not until July did Eckardstein report that the Brit­
ish had ©gain expressed an interest In discussions with Ger­
many, but it was for a limited understanding over the growing 
problem of Morocco.^ In January Eckardstein had reported 
that Chamberlain had favored a limited agreement over Morocco, 
which might possibly lead to an alliance, but the Berlin 
Foreign Office had disregarded the Idea.7 By July th© af­
fairs In Morocco had worsened and the Sultan of Morocco,
Abdel Aziz, had claimed that Franc© planned aggressive actions 
against his sultanate. After the request of Abdel Aziz for 
support, Britain sought to discover the attitude of Germany 
on the question. According to Eckardstein, th© British de­
sired to conclude an agreement with Germany over Morocco
Th© German Foreign Office responded to Eckardstein*s
report by declaring German policy in Morocco to b© the main­
tenance of th© status q u o # ^  As Buelow stated, lfIn this
% •  JP./XVII, 83-88.
6Ibid., 333n. **. Eekardateln, Erlnnerungen. II,
2^8. Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 22l\.-2^ ~.
?Ibld. “Anderson, Morocco, pp. 11-15•
9G. P., XVII, 332-33. 333-39.
10Ibld.. 92-93, 339-U2.
128
matter we must for the time being maintain complete reserve 
and act the part of the sphinx"*^ Holstein echoed these 
sentiments by stating that, as long as the position of the 
powers remained unchanged, Germany policy was to refrain 
from any action. Such a policy, he felt, agreed with the 
British view as they as well as the French had no desir© to 
push the 1ssue.^ Morocco was not important enough for Ger­
many to risk a war over by concluding a limited agreement with 
Britain.^3 The negative attitude of Holstein and the Berlin 
Foreign Office prevented Eckardstein from resuming the alli­
ance negotiations on the basis of a possible agreement over 
Morocco.
By July th© Germans felt that the alliance negotia­
tions, which had begun In March were now ended, and that 
sometime in the future the British would return to the sub­
ject*^ Th© British, at this time, believed that the alli­
ance discussions were only postponed and waited for the 
German government to resume the negotiations.^
Eckardstein, during the remaining months of 1901, 
failed to achieve the resumption of th© alliance discussions.^
^ Xbld., 333* Longer, Diplomacy, II, TlpO.
J-Sq . p . ,  x v i i , 3 3 3 . 1 3I b l d . .  8 8 .
3-teckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 22[j.-25« Eckard­
stein, Erinnerungen, II, '558-68 •
D., II, 85. 16Ibld., 80-83.
XVII, 100-109. Eckardstein, Ten Years,
p • 2i|0 • — —
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He was prevented from conducting such independent action by 
Count Paul von Ketternich's strict control of the German 
Embassy in London* Metternich refrained from initiating any 
independent action and followed Berlin1s instructions on the 
alliance question.^ Me made no effort to broach the sub­
ject of an alliance and waited to receive any British over­
tures but neither the British nor th© Germans renewed the 
alliance negotiations•^0
The only reference to an understanding, before the 
alliance discussions resumed in December, came in August 
during a meeting between the Kaiser and King Edward VII at 
Homburg* In preparation for the meeting Holstein dispatched 
instructions to Buslow, who was to inform the Kaiser, as to 
German policy* On the subject of an alliance Holstein ad­
vised that Germany should wait until Britain again suggested 
an understending,which# in order to be acceptable, required 
Britain to join th© Triple Alliance* If the British made 
such an offer, he felt that th© opposition of Salisbury would 
prevent an understanding* Holstein instructed Buelow that 
the Kaiserrs duty was to preserve friendly relations with th© 
British and emphasize BrltainTs need for German supoort.
The Kaiser agreed to follow Holstein^ instructions•^1
l6Ibid. 19b . d ., II, 8U-86.
20 I b l d . . 8 0 - 8 3 .
F ., XVII, 92-9’i. Brandenburg, From Bismarck
World, p* T?0. Holstein Papers, IV, 235-36*
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The discussion of Wilhelm II and King Edward VII 
concerned the foreign policy of th© two governments, and as 
a result they referred to the possibility of an alliance*
Both leaders were disappointed that the alliance negotiations 
of March and Fay had not resulted in a formal understanding* 
The Kaiser was particularly displeased, and his comments may 
have damaged the possibility of resuming the negotiations* 
King Edward VII and the Hals or concluded the Hamburg meeting 
with a repetition of the old cliche for a desire of better 
relations and a future alliance**^
Following the Hamburg meeting, Holstein repeated his 
views on a British alliance in a lengthy memorandum on Ger­
man foreign policy* He attacked Salisbury asserting that 
the Prime Minister vas untrustworthy and desired to 1nvolv© 
Germany’ in a Continental war* Since Salisbury had no desire 
for an alliance with Germany, Holstein felt, there was no 
prospect for the conclusion of an understanding* Puelow and 
Fcttemicfc agreed with Holstein and believed Germany should 
continue to seek the friendship of R u s s i a *^3
In late October and early TTovember Holstein met with 
his close friend The Times reporter, Valentine Chirol* Hol-
^G. P., XVII, 92-9lj* Brandenburg, From Bismarck
World, p* T?0T Sir Sidney Lee, Kln& Edward vj'f", A Bio- 
graphv (2 vols*; London: Kacmillan~and Co*", l95S-2?T, T,
797-98* Hereafter cited as Lee, King Edward*
2% -  ii*» XVII, 98-101, XVIII, Part I, 20-28.
Dugdale, German Diplomatic* III, 155-56*
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stein and Buelow, who also talked with The Times reporter* 
hoped to obtain Chirol!s support for an Anglo-German alli­
ance. The Vortra&ender Hat believed that if Chirol would 
write articles for The Times supporting an alliance, the 
antagonism between the countries would be lessened, if not 
removed.
holstein told Chirol that Germany was becoming pow­
erful, and this fact reduced Britain's freedom to reject a 
German alliance• If the British failed to realize this fact, 
Germany might form a Continental league against Britain; how­
ever, Germany favored an Anglo-German understanding, which 
would assure the “pacification of lurope," Following a 
lengthy history of how Britain had caused Germany to distrust 
the British, Holstein discussed the 1901 alliance negotia­
tions of which Ch5.ro! was completely unaware. He stated 
that an alliance was never really considered as an actual 
possibility. Germany was not in need of such an agreement 
as she was on the best of terms with Russia, but the major 
obstacle to an understanding had been the opposition of 
Salisbury. As long as the Prime Minister remained in power, 
Holstein said, an alliance was Impossible, but he, huelow,
^Newton, Lansdowne, p. 201 • Sir Valentine Chirol,
Fifty Years in a Changing World (London: Jonathan Cape,
19271, pp. 293-96. Hereafter cited as Chirol, Fifty Years. 
Office of The Times, The History of The Times (h. vols.; Lon­
don: The oTficeTHf TEF~TTHl¥7 l 9 3 ? - ^ , n T l T  332. Here­
after cited as History of The Times.
132
and the Kaiser believed that tine would gradually bring the 
two governments together. Such an understanding would prob­
ably be concluded after he had passed from power, Holstein
felt that for the present, "All that could be done was to
leave the future open *
In a subsequent memorandum Holstein developed his 
Ideas further and reviewed the terms of a British alliance. 
Hie British were to join the Triple Alliance with the agree­
ment coming Into effect when one of the parties to the under­
standing was attacked by tif"> or more powers. Such an agree­
ment could maintain the world balance of power and could 
easily obtain the approval of public opinion since the agree­
ment would insure peace and no combination of powers would
consider attacking such a powerful alliance. Holstein said
that, unfortunately, such an understanding was unlikely 
while Salisbury remained In power; however, Germany could 
wait until a more opportune time for the conclusion of an 
agreement. Buelow approved Holstein’s memorandum and stated 
that the Vortragender Rat1s views supported Germany’s policy 
of seeking Russian friendship, while still hoping for the 
possibility of an alliance with Britain. Germany, the Chan­
cellor said, "must make hope glitter on the horizon," thereby
^^Qooah, Holstein Oracle, p. I4.68. J G. P>., WIT, 
101-106. History of The Times, III, 32L|.-29, 3k7-k®'
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preventing Britain from co-operating with Russia*^
Holstein1s hope of gaining British support through 
Chirol1s newspaper articles proved impossible when Chamber- 
lain, in a speech at Edinburgh, created an antagonism be­
tween Pritain and Per/; any that nearly equaled that following 
th© Kruger telegram*^7 On October Chamberlain spoke in
defense of Britain1s harsh methods in suppressing the Boors* 
British actions, th© Colonial Secretary stated, were still 
below th© precedents established by other nations in time of 
war* He gave Germany during the war against France in 1870 
as an example, but he also referred to th© war practices of 
other nations*28
German public opinion reacted violently and accused 
Chamberlain of attacking the honor of the Germany army* The 
Kaiser and Buelow, as well as Holstein, also expressed shock 
at Chamberlain *s speech. The issue disturbed Anglo-German 
relations from November, 1901, to February, 1902, and re­
sulted in Buelow attacking the British in the Reichstag as 
t*ell as th© Kaiser demanding a formal a p o l o g y . 29 chamberlain 
was lust as furious as th© Germans and felt that an alliance
26Ibld., 332-30. G. T-VTT, 1C6-IC9.
^Rlolctcln Papers, IV, 2!j7«
^Ganger, Diplomacy, II, 7?ll»
^ History of The Vimcs, III, 337-3’". G. I ., XVII, 
I9U-200. B." D., I, 261-felt. Holstein Papers. TV,
23< b -i|0 , 2I4.7 •
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with Germany was impossible.30 In such an antagonistic 
atmosphere an alliance appeared unlikely, but, at this time, 
Lansdowne and the British Foreign Office were again serious lj
*3 1considering a defensive agreement with Germany
Lan & d o vrti e belie v e cl tn a t the a 111 arc e d 4 scuss 1 on a had 
never been formally closed and was under the impress!on that 
the Germans would return to the subject in the fall. Since 
the Germans had not resumed the alliance negotiations, the 
British Foreign Secretary felt that he should again raise 
the question or that Germany might accuse Britain of sud­
denly breaking off negotiations in an unfriendly manner. 
Lansdowne had also received information that Germany was 
still interested in an agreement, and he felt that, to avoid 
any misunderstanding, the Germans should be informed of the
British posit!on.32
Th© British, began to reconsider an alliance with 
Germany in November. Lansdowne drew up an elaborate memo­
randum reviewing the 1901 negotiations and the possibility 
of an alliance with Germany. He also instructed Sir Frances 
Bertie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, to draw up a memorandum on th© merit© of an agree-
30:U , XVTT, 197-2G0. Eckardstein, Er1nnerungen,
II, 376-80. Amery, height of Power, IV, 169-70, 186-81. 
3*B. D., II, 76-79.
32ibid., 73-79. B. S. F. P., XCV (1901-1902),
PI;-”'5. -  _  _  -
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ment. Bertie and Lansdowne agreed that an alliance was im­
possible, and Salisbury was definitely opposed to an agree­
ment. Lord Lansdown© hoped that possibly the two governments 
might consider a limited agreement over a particular issue; 
however, Salisbury even opposed that idea.33 As Lansdown© 
.stated, an alliance with Germany was 11 a very stiff fence to 
ride at.”311
On December 19, Lansdowne met with Count Kettornich 
and Informed, him of the British position. During their con­
versation, th© two men reviewed the alliance negotiations 
since the discusslens began in March. Fetteroich agreed with 
Lansdown© that th© German terms war© for © defensive alliance 
between Great Britain and the Triple Alliance. The British 
Foreign Secretary staged that Britain desired an under­
standing, but th© opposition of public opinion and th© un­
obtainable sanction of Parliament orevented the conclusion 
of an agreement. He hoped that possibly some limited agree­
ment on a particular issue might be concluded. Mettemloh 
replied that ha was disappointed that the British had refused 
such a favorable opportunity for the conclusion of an agree­
ment. Such an opportunity might not again occur. The Am­
bassador remarked the b, since Britah) had refused to conclude 
an understanding, Germany would probably move closer to 
Russia. Both men agreea that at the present time eircum-
33b . d ., II, 73-79. 3l*.jbid. f 8l.
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stances appeared unfavorable for an agreement. As to th© 
possibility of a limited agreement, Ketternlch replied, that 
the Berlin Foreign Office was not receptive to such an idea 
and wit was a case of the *whole or none.'” Britain would 
not join the Triple Alliance, and Germany would not consider 
an agreement on any other terms. Thus ended the Anglo- 
German attempt at an alliance in 1901.35
Count Metternich communicated the substance of his 
conversation to the German Foreign Office, where it was felt 
that he had conducted himself in proper fashion. The Berlin 
Office expressed some shock that Lansdowne had again raised 
the subject of an alliance. They believed that the discus­
sions had ended In June when Britain had failed to renew th© 
negotiations*3^ Holstein felt that the alliance discussions 
had ended with Hatzfeldt* s recall and expressed some distress 
that the British had returned to the issue. He believed 
that it was a possible attempt on the part of Salisbury to
s n u b  th© G e r m a n s .37
The alliance discussions ended on a positive note 
and failed to indicate any great change in policy or rela­
tions on th© part of either the British or German govern­
ments. At the end of 1901 th© Kaiser and King Edward VII
3^1bid., 80-83. G. P., XVII, 111-15.
36ibid. B. D. II, 83-81*.
3^1 bid. , 3)(.-86.
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exchanged letters expressing a desire for better relations 
and a possible future a g r e e m e n t .3® The Chancellor and Lans­
downe expressed similar hopes.39 Holstein held a similar 
opinion and wrote Chirol that the public antagonism, which 
resulted from Chamberlain’s speech against the German army 
and Buelow1s retaliations In the Reichstag, prevented the 
conclusion of an alliance# In the letter to Chirol, he said 
that he always favored an understanding with Britain and 
that he would always work for better relations and the con­
clusion of an alliance between Great Britain and Germany.^
Holstein believed that the failure to conclude a 
British alliance, which he had doubted as being possible, had 
in no way hindered th© conclusion of an agreement In the fu­
ture or that th© failure required Germany to change her 
policy toward the British. Britain would again seek an alli­
ance with Germany and on German terms.W The main objective 
of German policy, he asserted, was to remain on friendly 
terms with Great Britain. British friendship was obtainable 
by removing th© antagonism caused by the Buelow-Chamberlain 
feud and avoiding all action that might cause further dis­
trust between the two nations. Germany, Holstein believed,
38a. P., XVII, 109-111. Lee, Kin* Edward, II. 
13I+-35. “
39b. d ., II, 83-8I*, 87-88. 
fy-°Ibld.. 8l*-o5.
kxIbid., 8t*-86. Holstein Papers. IV, 257-60.
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could look to th© future with optimism and th© real possibil­
ity of obtaining a British alliance.^
^Ibld. , IV, 257ff.
CHAPTKH VI
CONCLUSIONS
The alliance negotiations of 1901 between ^reat 
Britain and -rrmany failed to resii.lt 1 r an v.rd.erstanding. 
.During the negotiations Deman policy, to a great extent, 
was determined by r*riedr1 ch von Holet-elr*. ^.a fact tb at 
Holstein was merely a Voptragender Eat had very little ef­
fect In limiting his Influence and may have enhanced his 
ability to gain control of Goman policy. He was able to 
secure his extensive power as the Chancellors follow*rg Bis­
marck were not well-informed on foreign affairs nrd were, 
as a. result, forced to depend more upon the advice of the 
Foreign Office# An the most- informed Vortragender Bat In 
the Wilhelmstrasse, Folsteir obtained a considerable influ­
ence over the direction of foreign policy.
In 1901 Holstein determined much of the German policy 
toward an alliance with Great Britain. Buelow had placed 
the alliance question in the hands of Holstein, end the Chan­
cellor had generally followed the Yortragender Hat1s advice 
during the negotiations# In numerous dispatches and memo­
randa Holstein influenced Germany’s policy by stipulating 
and justifylrg the German terms for an alliance. His de­
tailed explanations of how the negotiations should be con-
1 3 9
IkO
ducted and his almost day-to-day instructions enabled him to 
maintain as strict a control over the alliance negotiations 
as could be exercised from the Berlin Foreign Office.
More Important than Holstein's method of influencing 
Germany's alliance policy was his influence on the success 
or failure of the alliance negotiations. Holstein always 
desired an alliance wi th Great Britain, but in 1901 he felt 
that such an understanding was improbable• He believed that 
the British would not accept Germany's terms and that the 
opposition of Salisbury would prevent the conclusion of an 
agreement. In addition the Vortragender Bat felt that there 
was no great need for © British alliance In 1901, and he was 
confident that Britain, at sore future time, would seek an 
alliance on German terms. His skepticism about the possi­
bility of concluding an understanding governed German policy 
and, at least from the German pclnt of view, prevented th© 
conclusion of an alliance with Great Britain in 1901.
Holstein's influence on Germany's alliance policy 
was not the only factor that prevented an Anglo-German under­
standing. Like Holstein, th© British were skeptical about 
the prospect of concluding an agreement, but the opposition 
of Salisbury assured the impossibility of an alliance. An­
other reason that contributed to the unsuccessful conclusion 
of an alliance was the damage to Anglo-German relations that 
resulted from the actions of the Kaiser. More detrimental 
to an understanding was the steady growth of a feeling of
llfl
distrust between the two governments and the antagonistic 
public opinion in both countries* These factors, plus 
Holstein's opposition, prevented an alliance in 1901 but did 
not necessarily mean that the conclusion of an aliianee was 
impossible during the period from 1901 to the outbreak of 
World War I .
A number of historians, besides feeling that Holstein 
prevented an understanding in 1901, believe that th© failure 
to obtain an Anglo-German alliance is th© greatest error in 
Imperial German foreign policy. They believe this because 
no other serious attempt was made to secure an alliance 
after 1901. These historians reason that, had an alliance 
been concluded In 1901, Britain would not have turned to 
Prance and Russia for support. As a result they suggest that 
1901 is the turning point in Anglo-German relations and that 
from that time World War I appeared inevitable. These his­
torians, however, misinterpret th© significance of the un­
successful alliance negotiations and Anglo-German relations, 
as well as European relations, In 1901 and following years. 
The failure to conclude an alliance did not result in a 
sharp break between Greet Britain and Germany. In 1901 and 
Immediately thereafter there was no Indication that Britain 
would move toward Prance and Russia instead of Germany and 
not conclude an Anglo-German alliance. In these circum­
stances Holstein's reluctance to seriously consider a Brit­
ish alliance and the failure of an tinders tending in 1901 did
lipS
not prevent a later agreement or make World War I inevitable* 
One of the remarkable aspects of the 1901 negotia­
tions is that Holstein was able to formulate much of th© 
German policy toward Great Britain. A mere Vortragender
Rat in the Berlin Foreign Office had obtained such, great in­
fluence that he could, and did, determine the course of Ger­
man policy in the alliance negotiations, whether or not 
Holstein's influence on foreign affaire was positive or 
negative will long remain a controversial question. What Is 
not controversial is that responsible individuals In the 
German government permitted such a person as Holstein to 
wield extensive power, without at the same time accepting 
a corresponding degree of public responsibility. Nothing 
better Illustrates the above fact than th© ability of Fried­
rich vor Holstein to avoid the responsibility for his ac­
tions while determining much of German policy in th© 1901 al­
liance negotiations between Great Britain and Germany.
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Ip vols. London: Loader and Stoughton Ltd., 1921-
1932.
This biography contains little on the 1901 nego- 
tiati ons but Is necessary for the consideration of 
Salisbury1s foreign policy.
Chang, Fcng-ehen, The Diplomatic Relations Between China and 
Germany Since l ^ B . Shanghai", China”: The Commercial
Fr csc, 1936. ^
Though general in nature, this work was helpful 
on German policy 11. China durii-g the Boxer Rebellion.
Chirol, Sir Valentine. Fifty Years In & Changing World. 
London: Jonathan Cape]J 1927•
Chirol presented bis rather contradictory version 
of the 1901 negotiations and the October and November 
meeting with Holstein.
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Craig, Gordon Alexander. From Tlsmerok to Adenauer: As-
pacts of German statecraft»~ BaltTmorel "uohns 
Hopkins Press, .
This work contains a brief chapter on Holstein 
and Ills place in the forming of German foreign pol­
icy. It is an objective study.
Dawson, T;1 Ilian ilarbr fct. The German Umpire , 1667-19 lit and
Rac-the Tjnl ty Movement. 2 vols • New fork: The M  
mfilar Co.7 1919 •
"Dawson’s two volumes, though general and aowe- 
what dated, provided material on the organisation of 
the Second Hex ch.
Qugdale, Blanche Elizabeth Campbell. Arthur James Balfour,
First Sari of Balfour, h. a., 0. V •, F. H . S* 2 vols.
Mew Y o rk : (5T ¥~* fu tn a if^ s  P.onsT lT 3? . ”~
These two volumes contain information on Eckard­
stein and the 1896 negotiations for an alliance.
Dreyer, Johannes. Deutschland und England In ihrer Dolltik 
und Tress© Im Jahre 19017 BerTiiTi EmiTf leering, 
15514..
As one of the most reliable and detailed accounts 
of the 1901 negotiations, It was helpful on Bckard- 
stein*s i*ole In the alliance discussions.
Finer, Herman. The Ka .jor Governments of Modern Europe.
Evanston, 'ilYIn oYol How, PeEerson and Co7, i960.
The study was of use on the organization of the 
Second 'Reich, though it was brief.
Fischer, Bugen• Holstein*g Grosses Hein. Berlin: Deutsche
Verlagsgesellschaf i fuer PolTtTC und Geschichte, 1925• 
Fischer argued and is now dlsproven that Holstein 
prevented an alliance in 1901. It is now only use­
ful as an Interest:* ng piece of historiography.
Flenley, Balph. hoderr Germany History. Hew York: E. P.
Dutton and Co., Y953"*
This volume Is a norItable and general history 
of Germany.
Garvin, J. L. The LIfe of Joseph Chamberlain. 3 vols.
London: STacSrTlan and Co.7 l932-3l> •
Garvin’s biography, though pro-Chamberlain, is 
an excellent study and gives a detailed account of 
the Anglo-German negotiations up to 1901.
Gohhardt, Bruno. Handbuch Der Deutscher Geschlchte. h vols. 
Stuttgart: Veria’g UnTon, 1960
In a brief but accurate account of the 1901 
negotiations, Gebhar&t presents the negotiations in 
proper perspective. Hie book was also valuable for 
its excellent bibliography.
Gooch, G-. r. Before the War> otudieo in diplomacy. 2 vols. 
London: LongmansGreen and Co., 193o-i93'8*
This was a useful ana general treatment of the 
1901 ne got1at i on s .
 _____ • History of iiodern hurope, 107.0-1919. hew York:
Henry holt and Co., lijl;*
Gooch has u great deal of information on Hol­
stein in this volume and gives a fairly detailed 
treatment of the 1901 negotiations.
. Recent Revelations of European diplomacy. Hew
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927*
Fills volume was useful as a bibliographical 
source.
. -Studies In Jiplonaoy and Statecraft. New York:
Longmans, Green and Go., 1912.
This work provides additional information on 
Holstein and th© alliance negotiations, as well as
material on the diplomatic situation before 1901.
________ • i: todies In German, history. New York*: Longmans,
Greeri and Co.,T’gEBT
One of the articles 5 ri this book is entitled 
"Holstein: Oracle of the Wil'helmstrass©”, which Is
the best and lengthiest biography in nnglish of 
Holstein. The article also contains a merltabl© 
account of the 1901 negotiations. This work is 
mandatory for any study of Holstein.
Grey, Viscount of Pallodon. Twenty-Fiye Years, 1892-1916.
2 vols. Tew York: 1r-ederick1"IV Stokes Co., 192%• 
These two volumes were o n l y  helpful in pro­
viding interesting comments on British policy.
Halevy, Llie. A History of the IngHsh. reopl© in the Nine­
teenth C e n l i ^  tFaETT ^ T 7  V a W K T "  ^ V S T ? . - SIw 
TorkT"* Barnes aim Toble, Inc., 1961.
Tlais is the standard work on British history in 
the Nineteenth century.
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Haller, Johannes. Philit) Bulenburgt The Kaiser*s Friend* 
trans. Ethe!T~CoTburn hayne. 2 vols. New YorST-  
Alfred A. Knopf, 1930.
•Though biased against Holstein, the two volumes 
contain pertinent 5nformation on the influence and 
Intrigues of Holstein.
Haramann, Otto, lillder aus der Let a ten Kaiserzei t» Berlins
K • H ob b ixi'H, 192'? *
Ibis volume contains a brie*0 but 'biased bio- 
graph!cal sketch of Holstein.
    ____• The r*orld Poll, cy of Germany 1590-1912. trans.
Maude A. Huttman. Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 192?.
Tn fh! s volume, Ilamm a m  gives c useful account 
of German foreign policy and the 1901 negotiations.
______ . Zur VorRe8ohic;ht© des WeItkrleges. Berlins
Feimar fiobi xng, lr'"lG- •
fhe volume was only of slight help in its few
comments cn Holstein.
Karder, Maxi milian• Koepfe. H vols. Berlin: Fr ich Reiss, 
1910.
Harden presented a brief and sympathetic sketch 
of Holstein in volume I.
Holland, Bernard. The Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke 
of GevorgM re. 2 vo T&T. t5o rdonl Longmans, Green 
end Co., 1911 •
The two volvnes were of very little help for 
this study.
hoynlngen genannt Huene, Heinrich Freiherr Von. Untersuch- 
ungen aur Gesehx elite des Deutsch-ingllschen fuend* 
allEroEIemsyT IffiQl. feres lau , ~19 fell- •
TFiis study is one of the most scholarly examina­
tions of Eckardstein1s role in the 1901 negotiations 
and in his intrigue against Katzfeldt.
Kraucnlck, Helmut. Holstein und das ">eutsch-vngl 1 sche Very 
haeltnls von'1 ^ 1^90-19 0T  ^ Braun s cl -w c* i g : 1991 •
This work was unobtainable for thi s study.
Kurenborg, Joachin. 03e Graue Hminenz♦ Berlin: Helmut
Rau,s chenbua ch"U T9T5T
In this early biography of Hoistedn, Furerberg 
presents Holstein as an individual of great and evil 
influence. The work Is general, and undocumented.
Lanier* William L. The diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902.
2 vols. I T e   ---
Langer’s two volume study is a great scholarly 
work, It is? th«* meet extensive account in Onglish 
of the 1901 negotiations and provides an extensive 
bibliography on the alliance qacc tier..
bee, qir Sidney. F ‘ n y F'dwn rd 7TT , hi or trophy, 2 vole • 
for don: tiaenTllan and Co., 1^25^T92?T
r,1hcugh highly ant5.-Germain, Lee included, in the 
biography, important material or the Kaiser* 3 visit 
to hrT tain in January, 1°01.
Fa gnus, Tyhil1. r>. King Edward the Seventh. Lor; don: John 
Murray, l9F!t7
bagrms deals only very bri efly »-d th the alliance 
question. Th© volume tends to be a social history of 
King Hdward.
Meinecke, Friwdrlch. leschi chtc due veuFseh-1 ngll scheti
Buendni aproblems, T T oTT-T qOTT "Wih'icK: R. Oldo'r.v ourg,
T?2f."
This is on© of the most extensive treatments of 
the 1901 alliance negotiate ers but relates the prob­
lem to the causes of World War I* It is one of th® 
few studies that deals in any length with the influ­
ence of Holstein and the negotiations but does so in 
a b i r, s e & f e s h i o r •
V. ewton, Thomas Wo dehouse Lei mb t Lord Lons do-; me , .A Biography. 
London t 11a era! lion and Co., 1929.
fnLu hook is helpful, to a tier ref , as to Fans- 
d o w e * s opinion of the Germans in 1901.
Hichols, J• Aider. Germany After Bismarck: The Caprivi Fra 
129C-189L. C&mbrl choe s Harvard Ini vc rs * tv Press",
I9FF.----
The r ran test. nor* h of flue rol ur*e la the- ere cl­
ient hibl1ograpHy and the irformati on on Holstein
during the Caprivi Fro.
Xv uern b c rg or, H i c h a r d ( ed. } • F e stschri ft f u. or 0 e rh a r d Bitter.
Tuebingen: J. C. P. M ofir., Tcl^.
This volume includes an essay by Ctto Becker en­
titled 11 Die Wende der 'Jeiitsch-Fnglischor He z i ehurgen M , 
which is a commendable account of the 1901 negotia­
tions and too anti-Holstein.
Office of The Times. The History of Th© Times. I* vols.
Lon don t the Off Tee of The~lmes, 193f>*,19^2.
The third volume of this work contains a scholarly
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ber and November* 1901, and a portion of the two 
men’s correspondence of 1901,
Ogg, Frederic A. and Zink, Harold* Modem Foreign Govern­
ments* New York: K a cmi 11an and Co *, 1953•
fhis book contains general information on the 
political organization of the Second Reich.
Ferris, Herbert* Germany and the German Emperor* New York: 
Henry Holt and Co •, T9T2T
This general study is still useful, mainly be­
cause of its accuracy in interpretation*
Pinson, Koppel S. Modern Germany* New York: Macmillan and
Co*, 19514..
Pinson’s volume serves as an excellent general 
study of Germany and contains helpful bibliography 
li stings•
Pribram, Alfred Francis* England and Intematlonal Policy 
of the European Great Powers l871-X9lii* Sxfords 
Theclarendon Press, 1931.
Though a brief study of pre-World War X diplo­
macy and somewhat dated as to detail, the book is 
particularly outstanding because of Pribram’s inter­
pretative comments on European relations*
Ritter, Gerhard* Die Legend© von der Versehmaehten Englischen 
Freunds chaft 169 8 -1 W l  *' Freiburg: fimi 1 Sros z, 1929.
11118 is on® of tli© most objective and accurate 
studies of the 1901 alliance problem. Ritter pre­
sents the thesis that there really never was an 
attempt for an alliance in 1901.
Royal Historical Society. Transactions of the Royal Histor­
ical Society* vol." JdtV tfth series. UondonT 6fftc© 
oF Royal Hist or i c al Society, 1914.3*
Th© volume contains an article by Lillian M. 
Penson entitled "The New Course in British Foreign 
Policy 1892-1901”, which Is a helpful interpretation 
of Salisbury’s foreign policy.
Sarkisslon, Arshag Ohannes, (ed*)« Studies in Diplomatic
History and Hi3toriography in Honour of G* P. Gooch, 
£. H* London? Longmans, 19ol.
This volume includes the most recent research on 
the problems in pre-World War diplomacy* There are 
articles on Anglo-German relations and Holstein.
7Schmitt, Bernodotte. The Coming of the War 1911u 2 vols*
New York: Charles Scribners1 Sons, 1930.
The book presents a general survey of the alli­
ance negotiations.
Seton-Watson, Robert V. Britain in Europe 1789-191U* Cam­
bridge : The University Press,' 1955T
In this work, Seton-Watson gives a meritable 
account of Anglo-German relations before World War I*
Sontag, Raymond James. European Diplomatic History I87I- 
1932. New York: TheCentury Co., V$JT*
Sontag gives a highly interpretative and useful 
account of European diplomacy.
  • Germany and England, Background of Conflict l8h8-
I89I1. New iferk: D • £pp 1 e t on - C entury Co., 1938.
This volume is a general survey of Anglo-German 
relations and was helpful for the background of this 
study.
Taylor, A. J. P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 18|j8- 
1916. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 195?•
Taylor presents a provocative and highly inter­
pretive account of European diplomacy. The volume 
also contains a lengthy and valuable list of biblio­
graphical materials.
frotha, Friedrich von. Fritz von Holstein als Kensch und 
Polltlker. Berlin: Richard Schroeder,”T93T7
In this very sympathetic biography, Trotha feels 
that Holstein was not as powerful or as evil as his 
contemporaries claimed. It is a useful work but is 
a general account.
Young, Harry F. Maximilian Harden, Censor Germanise. The 
Hague: M art I nus N'f jh off, 19 59.
This biography of Harden is an excellent study 
and contains valuable information on Holstein’s 
position and character.
PERIODICALS
Bickford, John Dean, and Johnson, Edgar N. ”The Contem­
plated Anglo-German Alliance: 1890-1901,” Political
Science Quarterly, XLII (March, 1927), 1-57.
This article contains little of merit and is too 
dependent upon Eckardstein’s memoirs to be useful.
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Gooch, G. P. "Baron von Holstein, the Mystery Man of the
Foreign Office 1390*1906," The Cambridge Historical 
Journal, I, (1923), 61-8l|,
This biographical sketch of Holstein supplies a 
few details and insights that Gooch did not repeat 
In his later biography of Holstein in Studies in 
German History*
Morrow, Ian F. D. "The Foreign Policy of Prince von Buelow,” 
The Cambridge Historical Journal, IV, (1932), 63-93• 
The article is a traditional treatment of Buelow’s 
foreign policy and adds little to what Buelow had 
already said in his Memoirs,
Penson, Lillian K. ”Th© Principles and Methods of Lord Salis­
bury’s Foreign Policy,” The Cambridge Historical
Journal, V, (1935), 8 6 - 1 ^ 7 ------- --------------
Fenson, in this article, presents some very In­
teresting comments on the nature of Salisbury’s for­
eign policy. The article is also helpful for the 
proper understanding of Salisbury’s character,
Rassow, Peter. ”Schlieffen und Holstein," Historis©he 
Zeitsehrlft, CLXXIII (February, 1952), £9?-3T3.
In this article, Rassow, besides discussing Hol­
stein and Schlleffen’s relations, discusses the 
position and character of Holstein, but the article 
was of little us© for this study.
Rich, Norman• "Holstein and the Arnim Affair," Th© Journal 
of Modern History, XXVIII (March, 1956)
Rich, in this astute and scholarly article, re­
futes successfully the traditional belief that the 
Arnim Affair changed Holstein's character and caused 
him to work for the overthrow of Bismarck,
Vogel, William C, "The Holstein Enigma: A Reappraisal of
its Origins," The Journal of Modern History, XIV 
(March, 1914-2)
This is a fairly objective study of Holstein 
from the psychological viewpoint, but of little us© 
for this study.
